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PREFACE
This study was originally intended to deal with 
corporate tax policy in relation to the financing of 
investment and tax incidence, as well as the incentive to 
invest. However, as Domar has remarked, 'there is just so 
much one can do in one paper' [51, p . 1 5 6 ] . The desired
treatment of the latter aspect of the overall relation 
between corporate taxation and business behaviour left no 
room, under the regulations, for the two former aspects. 
Whether this is considered reasonable in the circumstances, 
or merely downright bad management of the available space, 
depends very much on one's views about the conclusions of 
this study and the methods by which they have been reached.
The approach adopted is based firstly on the belief 
that effects of corporate taxation on investment incentives 
depend on the choice of a theory of investment and of a 
theory of the role of profit in relation to investment.
The approach is based secondly on the conclusion that in 
neither case is a satisfactory explanation readily available 
from the literature which could be adopted on an overall 
basis after brief introductory justification. This is 
especially true of the theory of profit. Accor d i n g l y , much of 
the study is devoted to the eclectic construction of theories 
of positive behaviour in these two interrelated areas.
A subsidiary purpose of the study is to test the 
alleged applicability to corporate real investment of the 
1944 analysis of effects of income tax changes on 
risk-taking by Domar and M u s g r a v e . This influential
(v)
(Vi)
analysis acts as a point of departure for the present study, 
and it is suggested that the edited version of their article 
contained in the Appendix should be read before embarking on 
the main study. Organization of the subject matter, 
particularly of the first two Chapters, has been considerably 
influenced by the Domar-Musgrave analysis or, more 
specifically, by the dissection of the various strands of 
their argument which seemed appropriate for purposes of 
understanding and criticizing their conclusions. Like Domar 
and Musgrave this study refers to proportional income or 
profits taxation.
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CHAPTER 1
CORPORATE OBJECTIVES
1.1 Introduction
On the role of corporate objectives Williamson has 
observed: 'in all cases except where profitability is at
best the minimum sum necessary to prevent take-over, the 
policies the firm pursues will depend on the form of its 
objectives' [264, p.15]. Ansoff expressed a similar opinion 
in stating that proposed courses of action by a corporation 
will be tested for the extent to which they are likely to 
close the gap between the corporation's current position 
and the set of objectives established. [7, p.26] .
This Chapter therefore examines how objectives are 
determined, whose objectives are important for 
decision-making purposes, and the respective roles of real 
investment and profit (or profitability) in corporate 
objectives. Although the latter do not constitute business 
behaviour, or even fully explain it, their identification 
provides an essential foundation for the analyses of real 
investment decision-making and effects of corporate income 
tax changes in later Chapters.
Relevant aspects of the Domar-Musgrave analysis of 
effects of income tax changes on investment are 
progressively introduced during the course of discussion. 
These aspects are compared with their closest counterparts 
in the corporate sphere to test the alleged applicability 
of this analysis to real investment decision-making from
1
1 .1 2
the viewpoint of objectives or preferences. This comparison 
culminates in the final Section with a critique of the 
Domar-Musgrave results; and preliminary conclusions are 
drawn from the same viewpoint about effects of corporate 
income tax changes on real investment decisions.
31.2 Determinants of Corporate Objectives 
(a) Managerial Motivation
Separation of control from ownership of corporations 
is a major institutional fact of modern corporate life.
As Mason states: 'almost everyone now agrees that in the
large corporation the owner is, in general, a passive 
recipient; that typically control is in the hands of 
management; and that management normally selects its own 
replacements' [176, p.4] . Shareholders have in fact 
exchanged control for liquidity. [Berle and Means, 14, 
p . 286] . ( 1}
The decline of shareholder influence provides 
tremendous potential scope for the exercise of discretion 
by managements. In particular, it is extremely likely 
that a firm's business will be conducted, not primarily 
for its shareholders' benefit, but for the sake of the 
enterprise itself. [Maurer, 177, p.186] . As Williamson
argues: 'Surely it is significant that the second and
third chapters of Genesis record that where discretion 
exists it is apt to be exercised, and that merely to charge 
someone to be a good and faithful servant is not adequate 
to secure his performance' [265, p.3].
(1)
In a recent study of the extent of management control 
among the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations in 1963, 
Larner compared his findings with those of the 1929 study 
by Berle and Means. He concluded that 'it would appear 
that Berle and Means in 1929 were observing a "managerial 
revolution" in process. Now, 30 years later, that 
revolution seems close to complete, at least within the 
range of the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations' [150, 
pp.786-7]. Larner found that managerial control had 
substantially increased in each of the major industrial 
groups since 1929.
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There is typically little that shareholders can do to 
prevent or reverse this state of affairs. Effective 
criticism of management may be very difficult, if only for 
lack of specialized knowledge and access to relevant 
information. Management itself tends to be
self-perpetuating, largely through transfer of its monopoly 
power over time by a process of executive ascension and 
retirement. Also, 'the proxy machinery has...become one of 
the principal instruments not by which a stockholder 
exercises power over the management of the enterprise, but 
by which his power is separated from him' [Berle and Means, 
14, p.139]. Moreover, large institutional investors, such 
as insurance companies, rarely attempt to interfere in the 
affairs of corporations whose shares they purchase. [Gordon, 
96, p.vii; Williamson, 265, p.22].
As Marshall observed, separation of control from 
ownership frees management from effective criticism for 
anything less than gross negligence. [174, pp.317-8]. 
Shareholders' power is likely to be limited to demanding a 
minimum performance level of management. [Papandreou, 197, 
pp.197-8] . Managerial motivation, not that of shareholders, 
underlies the formulation of corporate objectives and the 
decision process, although management typically does not 
bear the main financial risks involved and does not directly 
benefit from the profits of successful decisions. Whether 
corporate objectives and decisions are incompatible with 
shareholders' interests
will depend on the degree to which the self-interest of 
those in control may run parallel to the interests of 
ownership and, insofar as they differ, on the checks on 
the use of power which may be established by political, 
economic, or social conditions.
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The corporate stockholder has certain well-defined 
interests in the operation of the company, in the 
distribution of income, and in the public security 
markets. In general, it is to his interest, first that 
the company should be made to earn the maximum profit 
compatible with a reasonable degree of risk; second, 
that as large a proportion of these profits should be 
distributed as the best interests of the business 
permit,...and finally, that his stock should remain 
freely marketable at a fair price [Berle and Means,
14, p .121].
Domar and Musgrave believe that 'the rationale of real 
investment decisions would move along similar lines' to those 
of financial investment. [52, p.422]. By providing only the
'risk-taker' with investment preferences they implicitly 
assume that management and shareholders exhibit similar 
preferences; or, in Berle and Means' terminology, that there 
is either an exact parallel between the self-interests of 
control and ownership, or that checks of sufficient strength 
exist on use of managerial power to enforce the same result. 
Since neither of these conditions usually obtains in 
practice, it would seem that Domar and Musgrave either 
overlooked the differences between real and financial 
investment caused by separation of control in the former 
case, or that they would deny the importance of these 
differences.  ^2 ^
A considerable literature is devoted to the question 
of how a firm should proceed if its objective is 'the 
greatest satisfaction of common stockholders' preferences' 
[Lintner, 155, p.292]. This objective, to which the 
implicit Domar-Musgrave assumptions actually correspond
(2 )
The latter explanation is more probable, especially 
as Domar and Musgrave referred to 'the manager of a 
corporation about to decide which of his plants he should 
expand,...' [52, p.422].
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when corporate real investment behaviour is considered, is 
generally identified with maximization of the market value 
of shares, or of net worth. [E.g. Gordon, 91; Gordon and 
Shapiro, 95, p.142; Lintner, loc.cit, and 159, p.50; Lorie 
and Savage, 161, p.57; Roberts, 212, p.199; Solomon, 235, 
p.74]. Some participants in this normative debate claim 
that firms do in fact try to maximize the market value of 
shares, even when control is separated from ownership. 
Roberts, for instance, believes that a management with 
separate powers 'would appear to be in the best position' 
[loc.cit.] to achieve this objective. Walter, however, 
feels that market value maximization need not be the sole 
objective of corporate managements [261, p.281], while 
Gordon states: 'It is possible that the influence of other
objectives subordinates the influence of maximization of the 
stock value in corporate financing policy’ [91, p. 2 34] .
In this study the view is taken that exercise of 
managerial self-interest rules out market value maximization 
as a positive corporate objective, and that the market value 
of shares enters managerial calculations as a principal 
security constraint. Implicit identification of the 
normative objective with the Domar-Musgrave investor 
preference assumptions is therefore potentially fatal to 
the claim that their analysis applies to, and correctly 
describes, managerial investment behaviour. Their analysis 
depends heavily on arguments about investment behaviour 
derived from investor indifference curves, whose properties 
result from their preference assumptions. Unless it can be 
shown that these preferences correspond reasonably closely
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to managerial motivation, the Domar-Musgrave analaysis is 
off to a bad start in its bid to explain corporate reactions 
to profit tax c h a nges.^^
The set of investor preferences adopted for purposes
of their analysis is quite straightforward. They assume,
first, that for any individual the marginal utility 
of income declines with increasing income, and second, 
that the marginal disutility of risk-taking rises 
with increasing risk. We also assume the marginal 
utility of income to be independent of risk and vice 
versa. Our analysis being limited to the immediate 
effects of a tax on investment, without regard for 
secondary effects such as changes in wealth, this 
assumption appears reasonable [52, p.402] .
Domar and Musgrave also consider an alternative set of
preferences .
If income utility i s . ..assumed constant,the second 
assumption (increasing disutility of risk-taking) 
must be applied, since the tax will produce no effects 
on risk-taking whatsoever, if both income utility and 
risk disutility are held constant [52, p.403 , n.9] .
Investment yield (y) 'is regarded as a c o m p e n s a t i o n  for
risk-taking' [52, p . 3 9 7 ] , is net of all monetary costs of
investment, and includes a return for 'the personal "effort"
of making the investment' [52, p.398].
If the return on risk-taking is close to zero - that 
is, if market prospects are extremely poor - the 
investor will take little risk, if any. As the 
market improves, he will take more risk. Finally,as 
his income increases, due to improved market
(3)
Domar and Musgrave claim that their investor preferences = 
shareholder preferences = managerial preferences. If it is 
now accepted that shareholder preferences ^ managerial 
preferences, then their investor preferences = managerial 
preferences only if their investor preferences ^ shareholder 
preferences. The disability attaching to the Domar-Musgrave 
analysis is therefore already serious. Also, suppose that 
managerial preferences do correspond to the Domar-Musgrave 
investor preferences within the narrow scope of the latter 
(yield and r i s k ) . It would still be possible for managerial 
investment behaviour to differ in response to objectives 
which have no counterpart in the Domar-Musgrave analysis.
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conditions, he may once more become less willing to 
take risk [52, p.407].
Domar and Musgrave define risk in the following passage.
Of all possible questions which the investor may ask, 
the most important one, it appears to us, is concerned 
with the probability of the actual yield being less 
than zero, that is, with the probability of a loss.
This is the essence of risk. Since the investor is not 
only interested in the probability of a negative return, 
but also in the chances of suffering losses of various 
magnitudes, the coefficient of risk should be defined 
more precisely as a function of losses and their 
probabilities. This can be done most simply by defining 
risk as...r, i.e. the summation of all possible losses 
multiplied by their respective probabilities. . . [52,p.396]
The investment behaviour of a Domar-Musgrave investor is
therefore determined (apart from tax considerations) by
interaction between his progressively-increasing dislike of
risk, as the extent of his risk-taking expands, and his
(perhaps) diminishing enthusiasm for further increments of
income as the level of his expected income rises. 'In the
extreme case, the investor who insists on a given income,
irrespective of the risk involved, will be taking higher and
higher risk as the rate of the tax increases' [52 , p . 407 , n . 4] .
It would be practically impossible to deal with the
motivation underlying corporate behaviour within the same
extremely simplified framework employed by Domar and
Musgrave for their individual financial investor. Detailed
discussion of corporate attitudes and policies towards risk
and uncertainty is deferred until Chapter 2. Even the
question of investment yield or profit is not one that can
be tackled head-on, since corporate profits do not normally
accrue directly to those making decisions. Clearly the
first task is to conduct a detailed examination of the
factors motivating corporate managements.
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As Berle and Means have observed, 'we must know the
controlling individual's aims before we can analyse his
desires' [14, p.122]. Many psychologists would consider a
single-goaled individual most unusual [McGuire, 180, p.74],
and managers, like anyone else, have a host of personal
motives including profit, sex, food,and saving souls.
[Katona, 131]. More fundamentally, however, managers aim
for achievement and long-run survival in their positions.
[Cyert and March, 44, p.9]. Marris [173, p.49] states that,
in interviews with 100 successful top managers, Henry [112]
found them to be psychologically we 11-integrated persons
who nevertheless possessed strong drives towards
achievement. These subjects were ambitious and active in
the sense of being impelled to move continually onward and
upward at least until nearing retirement. It was found that
these managers constantly try to maintain and improve their
performances within their firms. Social conventions are
thought to play a significant part in the development of
business goals [Streeten, 246, p.282], for example, by way
of managers' position in the social structure.
More than any other type the business executive is 
many-sided and multi-motivated. He has professional 
ethics, he feels a sense of public service and is not 
insensitive to public opinion. He is both a member 
of the corporate rich and an Organization Man. But 
it seems that the nearer he gets to the top, the more 
he is of the former and the less of the latter 
[Marris, 173, p.51].
Ethics should not, however, be equated with altruism.
Marris points out that, if a professional code does exist, 
'it is particularly likely to be afflicted with 
contradictions' [173, p.52], especially when the firm's 
interests conflict with those of society. The response of
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managers to such incompatibilities is likely to be 
aggressive pursuit of narrowly-defined material 
self-interest. This has obvious implications for 
manager-shareholder relations, since 'the interests of 
ownership and control are in large measure opposed if the 
interests of the latter grow primarily out of the desire 
for personal monetary gain' [Berle and Means, 14, p.123].
The widespread freedom of managers to pursue their own 
self-interest in business dealings casts doubt on the 
adequacy of the traditional definition of rationality in 
the theory of the firm. This definition states that action 
is rational if it is consistent with the goal of maximum 
profits. [E.g. McGuire, 180, p.56]. Papandreou believes
that 'rationality is consistent with the maximization of 
other things as well as profits' [197, p . 2 0 6 ] , while in
Baumöl's view:
People's objectives are what they are. Irrationality 
surely must be defined to consist in decision 
patterns which make it more difficult to attain one's 
own ends, and not in choosing ends that are, for some 
reason, considered to be wrong [11, p . 4 7 ] .
Baumöl is surely correct here. Managerial rationality may
be defined as the pursuit of management's self-interest
through corporate decision processes. Since action which
will further self-interest is not necessarily given or
apparent in conditions of uncertainty, rationality is more
specifically defined as the pursuit of perceived
self-interest. Problems relating to its perception will be
considered in Chapter 2.
Williamson suggests that 'the criteria for selection 
of goals to be included in the [managerial] subset are two: 
What satisfactions is the environment particularly
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well-suited to satisfy? What needs does the environment 
create?' [265, p.29]. Remuneration conforms to each of the 
above criteria.
Managers determine one another's salaries and are far 
from elastic in supply. They represent a 
non-competing group in relation to the rest of the 
population and are typically paid considerably more 
than would be necessary in the long run to discourage 
them from turning to alternative occupations ... But to 
say that managers, as a class, determine their own 
remuneration does not necessarily imply that they can 
take any sums they care to name. They are not acting 
collectively or conspiratorially and not necessarily 
even monopolistically. They are probably working 
within a system of rules developed from their own 
functional needs and based on their own norms...The 
system of compensation is the result of the function, 
but must also, through motivation, affect the way the 
function is performed, i.e. must affect policy 
[Marris, 172, pp.89-90; also Williamson, 265, p.35].
In order to understand the implications of the system of
compensation, it must be appreciated that 'in manufacturing,
democracy in the sense of government by all is unknown. The
only alternative to government by all is government by
pyramid, and it has everywhere prevailed' [Marris, 173,
p.92]. Secondly, for authority within a hierarchy to be
exercised in reverse order to income is normally out of the
question. [Simon, 224, pp.32-3]. Managerial remuneration
may thus become an organizational status symbol. However,
remuneration tends to be 'sticky': it does not increase
as the direct result of profitable decisions, but rather as
the individual rises in the hierarchy and, of course, as the
size of the hierarchy itself increases. Therefore, if
managers wish to increase their remuneration for reasons of
prestige, as well as purchasing power, they will be
interested, not only in rising within the existing hierarchy,
but also in working to create circumstances whereby the
hierarchy may be appropriately enlarged. That is, for
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reasons of material self-interest, they will seek to induce
expansion of the size of the firm, and may moreover
subordinate the profitability of decisions to this goal.
The incentive effects of bonus schemes depend on whether
bonuses vary with both profitability and scale, or whether
the amount depends on profitability alone. The latter,
scale-independent type favours maximization of profitability,
perhaps at the expense of growth. On the other hand,
under most typical scale-dependent schemes, even 
managers receiving more than half their remuneration 
in bonus could be behaving rationally if they 
permitted quite substantial downward variations in 
rate of return in exchange for the possibility of 
accelerated growth, provided only that significant 
other utility were associated with expansion as such 
[Marris, 173, pp.69-70].
The reason for this is that scale-dependent formulae make 
use of an apparent tendency for a given percentage increase 
in firm size to be associated with a smaller percentage 
increase in the number of managers. These formulae 
therefore provide an incentive to expand size relative to 
the number of people with whom a total bonus must be shared. 
It is therefore very significant that (as Marris reports 
[173, p.70]) , whereas schemes of the scale-dependent type 
have been widely adopted, those depending on profitability 
alone have not. 'Dare we suggest that it is because
(4)managers rather than shareholders devise them?' [1oc . cit.3.
Classical economics, which always depicted work as a 
source of purely negative utility, could never envisage the 
non-finaneia 1 aspects of managerial motivation.
IT)
Penrose implies that bonuses are really designed to make 
respectable high compensation levels, which might otherwise 
be questioned by public opinion. [200, p.28nj.
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The most important spurs to action by the businessman, 
other than the desire for goods for direct 
want-satisfaction, are probably the following: the
urge for power, the desire for prestige and the related 
impulse of emulation, the creative urge, the propensity 
to identify oneself with a group and the related 
feeling of group loyalty, the desire for security, the 
urge for adventure and for "playing the game" for its 
own sake, and the desire to serve others...These 
motives can be satisfied more or less through monetary 
rewards. They can also be satisfied in good part by 
other attractions which the large corporation offers 
its business leaders [Gordon, 96, p.305].
The 'other attractions' to which Gordon refers consist
essentially in providing the means whereby managerial
aspirations can be fulfilled. Bearing in mind that
opportunities for managers to transfer between firms are
restricted, the association between management and firm is
one of mutual benefit.
Organization is required to exploit the 
advantages of large scale, and persons capable of 
providing this acquire considerable bargaining power.
In the resulting balance, it is impossible to confine 
the senior executives to a purely immanent role, and, 
indeed, it might almost seem as if the institutions of 
managerial capitalism were developed to serve this 
class, as much as any other [Marris, 173, p.112] .
By virtue of organizational need managers are therefore in
a position to exercise and acquire considerable power and
prestige, subject to the requirements of reasonable
security. As to the nature of this power and the manner
of increasing it, Gordon states:
The corporation executive possesses power by virtue 
of his position of authority in a firm which is 
itself powerful. His power is a product of his 
position rather than of personal wealth. Power in 
this case means authority over subordinates, control 
of the disposal of vast resources, and great 
influence over persons and affairs outside the firm.
The corporation is a vehicle through which power 
comes to be held and exercised...Power thus secured 
increases with the size of the firm. Here lies an 
important explanation of the tendency of many firms 
to become larger, even if sometimes the profitability 
of such expansion is open to serious question 
[ 96, p p .305-6 ] .
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Prestige may be defined for present purposes as
recognition of one's success in an executive capacity by
superiors, colleagues, subordinates, and competitors, etc.
It is accorded to management on the basis both of
demonstrated capacity to produce 'results', and of the
power base - the firm and its associated resources and
influence. Success may be variously defined in terms of
aggregate turnover, total profits or assets, and
profitability (which differs from profits in not
necessarily depending on the scale of operations). Each
of these is a possible corporate objective and therefore
also a candidate for the criterion of success. However,
the enjoyment of prestige is functionally related to the
exercise and increase of power, so that the means whereby
managers increase their power are very likely also to be
those whereby prestige is enhanced. Thus, if by achieving
expansion, a manager improves both his own position and
those of his colleagues and subordinates, his prestige will
( 5 )doubtless increase within the firm. According to
Galbraith, his prestige and that of his firm, would also 
rise in the business community, at least in the United 
States.
The income of a businessman is no longer a measure of 
his achievement: it has become a datum of secondary
interest. Business prestige. . . is overwhelmingly 
associated with the size of the concern which the 
individual heads. American business has evolved a 
system of precedence hardly less rigid than that of
(5 )
Correspondingly, if a manager seeks to increase his own 
power at the expense of his colleagues, obstacles to group 
consensus may be encountered.
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Victorian England. It is based almost exclusively on 
corporate assets [85, p.29] . (6)
As is well-known, managers operate in teams or groups.
If an organization controlled by a group is to remain
viable, there must be a working consensus between the
participants even though each is seeking to attain separate
personal goals. [Cyert and March, 44, p.9; McGuire, 180,
p.31]. In Williamson's opinion this need for consensus
precludes the arbitrary assignment of objectives. [265,
p.8]. However, despite '...the obvious potential for
internal goal conflict inherent in a coalition of diverse
individuals and groups' [Cyert and March, 44, p.27],
the best short description of the motivation induced 
by social existence in a managerial group is that of a 
drive towards efficient, we 11-organised expansion, 
associated with a persistent search for new 
opportunities from a set which is perceived as finite, 
at least at any one moment of time [Marris, 173,
p. 61] .
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that, as already 
described, managers as individuals are able to achieve their 
desire for power and prestige through expansion, in addition 
to increasing their remuneration. Expansion also appears 
compatible with consensus inside the managerial group to the 
extent that it does not obviously offend particular 
interests within that group. Moreover, in view of the 
discipline imposed by the hierarchical structure of firms, 
'the policy bias of an organization as a whole can be 
thought of as resulting from the preferences of its 
individual members weighted by their relative influence
7 6 )
Galbraith's remarks apply to prestige outside the firm 
and do not invalidate a previous statement that managerial 
remuneration is an organizational status symbol.
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position' [Marris, 173, p.103]. Therefore, if it can be
shown that the self-interest of senior management is 
especially served by pursuing the goal of expansion, this 
explanation of individual motivation may be plausibly 
generalized to apply to the firm as a whole. Marris 
suggests that such a step is justified by the relative 
immobility of senior management.
Once an otherwise bureaucratic organization is 
permitted to grow, while high-level mobility continues 
to be inhibited (as is empirically the case in firms), 
...it provides a powerful motive for senior officials 
to attempt to induce expansion and thus create higher 
vacancies into which they themselves are surely most 
likely to be appointed. There can be no doubt at all 
that this fundamental characteristic of the 
interaction between salary system, organizational 
structure and poor transfer market provides a real and 
powerful motive for inducing internal expansion in 
every modern business [173, p.101].
Other factors may be cited to support this view, for instance
that prestige tends to be more a perquisite of senior than
of junior management, especially prestige accruing from
sources outside the firm. Senior management is more likely
to be concerned with its 'image' in the business and
financial communities.
The preceding discussion implies that modern corporate 
managements are potentially so strongly motivated towards 
growth that, ceteris paribus, no external stimulus beyond 
that of available investment opportunities is required. Yet 
it is a demonstrable fact that not all firms are growth 
leaders and that many of quite large size appear to opt for 
the quiet life. This may be due to lack of the necessary 
motivation towards growth, or this motivation may have been 
frustrated by other factors. Changing technologies, with 
which a firm is unable to keep in step, may, for instance,
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have eroded its product-market scope. Alternatively, the 
desire to grow may have been lost through disappointments 
or simply because management no longer values growth 
sufficiently. In any case, the assumption that 
management is entrepreneurially competent, as well as 
properly motivated 'merely provides us with a class of 
firms which are capable of growing' [Penrose, 200, p.33].
A firm that is efficiently managed may still not be very
. . . (7)enterprising.
Lack of enterprise in an otherwise efficient 
management may be explicable in terms of the utility 
derived by management from a given growth rate. The extent 
to which utility is obtained from growth through additional 
remuneration, power and prestige is affected by 
management's fundamental desire for security and long-run 
survival, from which utility is also derived. [Lintner, 
157, p.525]. This is especially relevant to senior 
management, for whom the personal consequences of financial 
failure or take-over would be relatively serious. [Marris, 
17, p.103]. Desire for security is thus assured an 
important place in a firm's policy bias; and growth and 
security normally constitute the two main dimensions of 
managerial utility. 'Indeed, we do not care whether the
(7)
Penrose defines enterprise as 'a psychological 
predisposition on the part of individuals to take a chance 
in the hope of gain, and, in particular, to commit effort 
and resources to speculative activity' [200, p.33]. Since
'the problem of entrepreneurial judgment is closely 
related to the organization of information-gathering and 
consulting facilities within a firm, and...leads into the 
whole question of the effects of risk and uncertainty on, 
and the role of expectations in,the growth of firms' [200, 
p.41] - managerial competence is discussed in Chapter 2. It
is noted here as a constraint on growth motivation.
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growth and security motives are regarded as primary, 
intermediate, "fundamental" or, for that matter, 
proximate..., given the facts of corporate life, they 
dominate' [Marris, 173, p.105]. Desire for security 
operates as a constraint on other aspects of managerial 
motivation. One explanation of inter-firm differences 
in the degree of 'enterprise' demonstrated is therefore 
managerial predilection for security. This is determined 
both by temperament and by pressure of circumstances, and 
the emphasis it receives will vary both as between firms 
and in a given firm over time.
The notion of managerial expense preference provides 
a further possible explanation for deficiency in growth 
motivation. Thus, in some cases 'it is not a general 
expansion of the entire scale of the enterprise that is 
desired, but a selective expansion of the expenditures that 
m o s t  contribute to managerial satisfactions' [Williamson,
265 , p .30] .
The notion of expense preference is developed... for 
the purpose of making the connection between motives 
and economic activity...Such an indirect approach 
seems to correspond to Marshall's observation [175, 
p.92] that although "desires cannot be measured 
directly," they can be measured "by the outward 
phenomena to which they give rise"...
By expense preference I mean that managers do not 
have a neutral attitude toward all classes of expenses. 
Instead, some types of expenses have positive values 
attached to them: they are incurred not merely for
their contributions to productivity (if any) but, in 
addition, for the manner in which they enhance the 
individual and collective objectives of managers 
[Williamson, 265, p.33].
Managerial expense preference is an offshoot of the 
important concept of 'organizational slack' , which 'consists 
in payments to members of the [corporate] coalition in 
excess of what is required to maintain the organization'[Cyert
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and March, 44, p.36]. Slack is by no means confined to 
management: it can include, inter alia, dividends, prices,
wages, and public services provided by firms. But 
management, as Cyert and March explain, is favourably 
placed in this regard.
From time to time virtually every participant in 
any organization obtains slack payments. However, 
some participants ordinarily obtain a greater share 
of the slack than do other participants. In general, 
we would expect that members of the coalition who are 
full-time, in a position to perceive potential slack 
early, or have some flexibility in unilateral 
allocation of resources will tend to accumulate more 
slack than will other members [44, p.37] .
Expense preference is therefore the process by which slack
( g )is generated by management for its own benefit. In
particular, managements will tend to have strong preference 
for remuneration and numbers of staff employed. [Cyert and 
March, 44, p.241; Simon, 222, pp.117-8, and 224; Thompson,
250, pp.101-2; Williamson, loc . cit. ] . In accounting terms 
these roughly correspond to administrative and selling 
expenses and may be jointly described as 'staffing' .
Preference for staffing serves managerial aspirations 
for remuneration, power and prestige, and may contribute to 
security as well. [Barnard, 10, p.159; Cyert and March, 44, 
p.242]. As such, this preference is normally exercised in 
conjunction with the growth motive, 'since expansion of 
staff and emoluments can scarcely proceed independently of 
the expansion of physical facilities,...' [Williamson, 265, 
p.36] . Also, availability of suitably qualified staff often
W )
Expense preference, in the form of discretionary spending 
for investment,also expresses managerial motivation towards 
expansion of the firm. [Cyert and March, 44, pp.240-44].
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acts as a principal constraint on the growth rate 
attainable. [Penrose, 200, pp. 45-55] .
In some cases, however, this preference is exercised 
in lieu of the growth motive or, at least, to an extent 
which is out of phase with realized expansion rates.
Depending on a firm's resources, it is clear that benefits 
which, in the long run, may be safely taken only as a 
result of growth may, over periods of surprising length, 
also be taken without (sufficient) growth. Increased 
jurisdiction within a fixed-size firm is, within limits, a 
substitute for promotion in an expanding firm. Cyert and 
March state:
That staffs have a tendency, sometimes legitimate 
and certainly natural, to grow has been widely 
observed. What may appear originally as a legitimate 
expansion, however, can, in the absence of binding 
constraints, easily lead to a general condition of 
excess staff throughout the firm. Indeed, the steady 
accumulation of excess staff may be difficult to resist 
as long as the firm is not confronted with 
adversity [44, p.242].
Excess staff is relatively likely to be found in established
firms of at least medium size, supported by 'discretionary
profit' - defined as 'that amount by which earnings exceed...
[the] minimum performance constraint' [Williamson, 265,
p.36] - in conditions of imperfect competition.
In the long run the position of such firms may become
untenable, as explained by Marris in describing effects of
organizational slack generally. He states that such firms
will grow more slowly for given security, experience 
less security for given growth rates, or, more likely, 
experience low security and slow growth together. In 
a 'bad' case, the firm would be growing slowly, be 
earning a poor rate of return, be compelled to adopt 
a relatively high retention ratio in order to 
finance even this modest growth rate, and hence be
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d i s p laying a low v a l uation ratio and be in 
con siderable danger of take-over [173, p.270] .
The p r e d o m i n a n t  m a n a gerial objectives of growth,
securit y and organi z a t i o n a l  slack are appa rently
inc on si stent with normative m a x i m i z a t i o n  of shareholder
satisfaction, and, therefore, with an implicit preference
assu mpt ion of the D o m a r - M u s g r a v e  analysis, as ap plied to
the cor porate scene. A l t hough relative emphases on these
obj ec ti ves vary ma r k e d l y  between firms, it does not seem
that such vari ations will always affect the gap between
ma n a g e r i a l  beh a v i o u r  and that consistent with ma x i m u m
sha re ho lder satisfaction.
This is e s p e c i a l l y  likely of vari ations in investment 
behaviour, which turn on the quality of managerial 
enter prise, or the ability and desire to grow. Sustained 
growth is sought, if at all, for m a n a gerial self-interest, 
and not p r i m a r i l y  for shar eholder satisfaction. Mana gerial 
security is p r e s e r v e d  by, inter a l i a , m a i n t a i n i n g  safe 
levels of the market value of shares, instead of maxi m i z i n g  
this normative objective. Mana g e r i a l  slack payments are 
ge n e r a l l y  contrary to s h a r e holder interests, e s p e cially if 
they dissipate comp etitive strength and are excessive in 
relation to earnings potential.
Obje ctions to profit m a x i m i z a t i o n  as a managerial goal 
are di scussed later. In this Section mana gerial 
s el f- in terest has been d e s cribed in terms of other
Til
The valuation ratio is defined as the ratio of current 
market quotation of all issued securities (excluding debt) 
to net assets. [173, p.xviiij. Marris regards the 
valua tio n and leverage ratios as managements' principal 
securi ty constraints.
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objectives, without explicit reference to their relations 
with profit. Therefore, it cannot yet be stated that 
managerial attitudes to profit do not correspond to the 
Domar-Musgrave preference assumptions. However, in 
addition to the inconsistency involving their implicit 
assumption of identity between shareholder and managerial 
interests, it is already apparent that profit may be ranked 
differently in relation to other managerial objectives than is 
yield among the preferences of a Domar-Musgrave investor.
At this stage profit has not even been admitted as a 
managerial objective proper, whereas yield is the sole 
positive objective of their investor.
The import of these differences cannot be clarified 
until the nature of the 'managerial state' has been further 
examined. Comparisons with the Domar-Musgrave world are 
therefore carried over pending discussion of the corporate 
environment and the role of profit.
(b ) The Corporate Environment
It has been argued that long-run survival depends on 
chance not motivation [Alchian, 2, p.213], and that 'when 
the future outcomes of present decisions are uncertain, 
motivation does not constitute a criterion for each 
entrepreneur' [Enke, 73, p.568]. These views fail to 
recognize the true role of motivation in corporate behaviour.
The impact of motivation on behaviour is conditioned by 
both the internal and external environments. The latter, 
the world outside the firm, also affects motivation
indirectly through its influence on the internal environment.
The objectives selected by corporate managements devolve 
from this interaction between collective motivation and 
environment: they represent motivation as translated into
criteria for action, subject to the lets and hindrances 
imposed by environmental factors. Certain of these factors 
had to be introduced for purposes of examining the nature 
of motivation. For instance, the hierarchical structure of 
firms is one important feature of internal environments, 
whilst separation of control from ownership is an indication 
of the extent to which external factors affect (or do not 
affect) the formulation of objectives.
The main influence of the external environment relates 
to the competitive conditions in each of a firm's actual and 
potential markets. These conditions, in conjunction with 
its competitive advantages and disadvantages, determine the 
firm's opportunities for profitable growth (in Ansoff's 
terms, its 'product-market scope'). [Ansoff, 7, pp.68,
108; Penrose, 200, p.31; Standish, 238, p.83]. The
characteristics of a given product market broadly depend on 
the stage reached in the life cycle of the industry 
concerned. This cycle typically follows a path consisting 
of several stages. Initially firms concentrate on forging 
their competitive strength within the industry, and on 
absorbing the new technology which gave rise to the industry. 
Eventually its structure may become concentrated as the 
result of competition in its formative stages: attention
is likely to focus on internal productive efficiency 
during this period. If the industry does settle down 
within an oligopolistic framework, competition for market 
shares may develop in anticipation of the stage when
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saturation of demand and high costs of further penetration 
identify the industry as mature. [Ansoff , 7, pp.70-1] .
Alternatively, one firm may establish monopolistic sway, or 
concentration may never eventuate, so that competition among 
a considerable number of firms remains effective .
Given the strength of a firm's motivation towards 
expansion, its objectives, and particularly their priority 
at any time, will both be influenced by the nature of the 
current phase of the life cycle of each industry in which 
the firm is interested, whether actually or potentially. 
Kmenta and Williamson [138] tested a proposition similar to 
this with reference to United States railroads over the 
period 1872-1941. Their particular purpose was to explain 
'the likely changes in investment behaviour which occur as 
the industry passes through a fairly predictable set of 
institutional and growth p h a s e s ’ [138, p.172]. They found
that 'a "single model" approach to explain investment 
behaviour breaks down when applied to differing stages of 
railroad development. On the other hand, the 
stage-of-growth models have produced very satisfactory 
results...' [138, p . 18 0] . That is, changing c ompe titive 
circumstances in, and the degree of maturity of, an industry 
determine the extent to which expansionary tendencies are 
reflected in investment behaviour.
Competitive circumstances have an important bearing on 
managerial security. As already stated, the desire for
(1 0 )
In the latter case, entry into the industry would 
probably be quite easy, but the mortality rate would 
normally also be high owing to a competitive struggle for 
survival. [Williamson, 265, p.20].
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security operates as a constraint on the growth motive.
Thus, as Williamson explains:
Where the range of behavior that is consistent with 
survival is narrowly bounded, the question of 
motivation is of small importance. However, some 
firms appear to have access to advantages that bring 
substantial relief from the threat of extinction.
Here an understanding of motivation may be essential 
[265 , p . 11] .
Leaving aside the question of whether Williamson implicitly 
understates the number of firms that are so favoured, it 
follows that a firm's growth motivation will be completely 
constrained by security considerations when a state of 
effective competition prevails in each of its existing and 
potential markets. ^  ^  The same applies if these markets 
have matured, since one firm's gain can then only result in 
another's loss. Lesser degrees of competition in existing 
markets, together with the potential availability of new 
markets, allow growth motivation to be reflected in working 
objectives. However, lack of competition is of little help 
if accessible industries are already mature, i.e. if demand 
is already saturated and/or the costs of further penetration 
are prohibitive.
For some resourceful firms the external competitive 
environment stimulates more than it constrains. Man is 'a 
learning... p a t t e rn-finding and concept-forming animal' 
[Simon, 229 , p. 272 ] . Successful growth ventures may 
therefore strengthen motivation and cause objectives to be
(ID
In Machlup's opinion, 'for competition to be. effective 
it is not necessary that competition is either pure or 
perfect or that all or any of the markets in which the 
firm buys or sells are perfect' [167, p.19, n.9].
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revised in favour of higher growth rates. Increases in 
competitive strength over time may enhance managerial 
aspirations. Competitors' successes may influence 
motivation through a 'demonstration effect'. Priorities 
may be re-thought in terms of competitive strength and 
opportunities by new brooms in top management.
Numerous other factors in the external environment 
condition managerial motivation, including constraints and 
responsibilities imposed by law and public opinion, such as 
anti-trust legislation [Ansoff, 7, p.59] and sanctions 
against elimination of competitors by violent means. The 
desire to attract external resources argues for pursuit of 
goals that are reasonably compatible with this aim. 
[Standish, 238, pp.83-4]. Fear of take-over, probably
synonymous with disaster for top management, is also likely 
to exercise a certain influence on some managements.
[Marris, 173, p.262].
The translation of motivation into working objectives 
is affected by a firm's internal environment in two 
principal ways: first, by what may be termed the existing
state of the firm; and second, by the process employed to 
formulate and revise objectives, and to order their 
priorities over time.
The existing state of the firm refers to its age and 
size, the amount and types of resources controlled 
(including managerial resources), the nature of its 
existing business, its past history, its current growth and 
profit performances, and its internal structure. Age, size 
and resources, together with the nature of the existing
business, largely determine a firm's scope in the external
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environment. Larger and older (i.e. established) firms 
tend to have many competitive advantages over small firms, 
and their scope is also usually much wider. [Penrose, 200, 
p.204]. Thus, as a firm grows in size, its ability to grow 
becomes stronger, at least up to a certain point.
According to Penrose,
There is considerable evidence that small firms, 
because of their size alone, are restricted by their 
environment to certain types of opportunity where the 
prospects of continued expansion are extremely 
limited...[Their growth]...may be more controlled by 
the environment than by the quality of resources or 
the enterprise and ingenuity of entrepreneurs,...
[200 , p .215] .
However, as the number of 'large' firms undoubtedly
increases over time, some small firms must overcome these
disadvantages and become large themselves. This is
attributed mainly to superior entrepreneurial ability, which
gives those possessing it a choice of possible activities
comparable to that of a firm with large financial resources.
These firms demonstrate their ability by selecting fields
in which growth (and profit) opportunities are good. Their
success testifies to the strength of their desire to 
(12 )expand , and implies that, without the necessary
motivation (inter alia) , firms will not grow.
The importance of availability of resources to back up 
growth motivation transcends their total size. As Penrose 
explains:
Strictly speaking, it is never resource s 
themselves that are the 'inputs' in the production 
process, but only the se rvice s that the resources can 
render...The important distinction between resources 
and services is not their relative durability; rather 
it lies in the fact that resources consist of a
(12)
That is, to their enterprise. See note 7 above.
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bundle of potential services and can, for the most 
part, be defined independently of their use, while 
services cannot be so defined, the very word 'service' 
implying a function, an activity..., it is largely in 
this distinction that we find the source of the 
uniqueness of each individual firm [200, p.25] .
Resources tend to be rather inflexible in practice, both in
total capacity and type of use. [Ansoff, 7, p.41]. This
applies to fixed assets, managerial and staff resources and,
in total terms, to the availability of finance. However,
this is a further source of inter-firm differences. The
amount of expansion that may be contemplated in a given
period is limited by availability of managerial resources
over and above those required to carry forward the firm's
existing operations at an appropriate level of activity.
[Penrose, 200, p.201]. In addition it is necessary that
these resources should be of appropriate quality and skills,
so that the constraint also depends on the complexity of
the desired expansion, whether it will occur in areas
closely related to existing activities, and whether it will
(1 3 )require skills and knowledge not possessed by the firm.
These factors determine the quantity and types of 
managerial resources required.
There is a close and mutual relation between objectives 
and resources. On the one hand, a firm's objectives 
determine both the amount and types of resources required 
and, in part, the extent to which those resources will grow 
over time. On the other hand, the amount and types of a 
firm's resources govern both the formulation of objectives
(13)
Managerial preference for staff may, as already noted 
(p.19), overcome the problem of shortage of human resources 
for expansion purposes, provided that the staff engaged is 
of suitable quality and skill.
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at any time and, depending on rates of change of the 
different types of resources controlled, revisions of 
objectives and their priorities over time are also 
affected.
These considerations raise a number of complex issues,
not the least of which concerns application of the
Domar-Musgrave analysis to corporate behaviour. Their
analysis was 'limited to the immediate effects of a tax on
investment, without regard for secondary effects such as
(14 )changes in wealth,...' [52, p . 4 0 2 ] . Now it is impo s sible
to confine an analysis of corporate behaviour in this 
respect. In the first place, firms' reactions (if any) to 
profits tax changes may only be fully worked out over the 
conventional long run. Over this period the effects of 
growth on the size of firms and on their productive 
opportunities are likely to produce changes or revisions of 
objectives: these changes need to be analysed. Secondly,
as Domar and Musgrave noted in connection with their 
individual investor, changes in wealth may cause changes in 
motivation. [52, p.421]. Changes in resources affect a 
firm's preoccupation with security, among other effects.
The mutual relation between resources and objectives 
over time can, however, best be studied in terms of the 
process whereby objectives are translated into action, viz. 
through the decision-making process. The same applies to
(14)
However, Domar and Musgrave also stated: 'The
indifference map could also have been expressed in dollar 
amounts. Then the pattern would have been independent of 
changes in wealth, which would have been reflected in a 
shift of the optimum-asset curve' [loc.cit., n.7].
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the nature of a firm's existing business and its current 
performance, which act as points of departure for purposes 
of revision of objectives. The past history of a firm 
inevitably determines its present situation and exercises 
upon both revision of objectives and the decision process 
the influence of precedent. [Cf. Hurwicz , 117, p . H 6 J .
Formulation of a set of objectives constitutes the 
first stage in rational decision-making under uncertainty.
A hierarchy of goals, sub-goals and criteria of choice for 
reaching those goals is required, since uncertainty may 
prevent the goals themselves from acting as an adequate 
basis for choice; i.e. the outcome of a given strategy is 
uncertain and it may be impossible to infer from the goals 
alone that this outcome will be superior to those of other 
available strategies. [Latane, 151, pp.144-5].
The process by which the above hierarchy is 
constructed and revised will intimately affect the nature 
of the goals, their priorities (including the sequence in 
which they receive attention), and the manner in which they 
control the decision process. Inter-firm differences in 
the first-mentioned process may therefore cause otherwise 
inexplicable variations between firms in their reactions to 
given environmental disturbances, such as a tax change.
For instance, a disturbance may precipitate a conflict of 
objectives. In these circumstances probably no two 
managements would resolve the conflict in exactly the same 
way .
It is necessary first to establish who is responsible 
for formulating and revising objectives and, in fact, whose 
objectives they are. A firm may be regarded as a coalition
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of interests comprising shareholders, management, workers, 
creditors and customers, etc. Each of these groups may have 
substantially different collective goals, and would like to 
see those goals reflected in the firm's objectives. The 
'stakeholder' theory of objectives suggests that 
objectives balance the claims of the groups concerned.
[Ansoff, 7, p.34], Papandreou argues that objectives grow 
out of interaction among the various participants in the 
form of a general preference function. [197, Vol.2, 
pp . 183-219] .
These explanations neglect 'the obvious potential for 
internal goal conflict inherent in a coalition of diverse 
individuals and groups' [Cyert and March, 44, p.27]. In
practical terms of power and opportunity management alone 
will normally set and revise objectives, except in conditions 
of great adversity.
Although we thereby reduce substantially the size 
and complexity of the coalition relevant for most goal 
setting, we are still left with something more 
complicated than an individual entrepreneur. It is 
primarily through bargaining within this active group 
that what we call organizational ob j e c tive s arise.
Side payments, far from being the incidental 
distribution of a fixed, transferable booty, represent 
the central process of goal specification. That is,a 
significant number of these payments are in the form of 
policy commitments [Cyert and March, 44, p.30].
Goal formulation and revision by way of bargaining
within the active managerial group reflects these authors'
view that 'people (i.e. individuals) have goals;
collectivities of people do not' [44, p.26]. The
bargaining process must, however, be somewhat constrained by
the hierarchical power structure of management, and also by
the degree to which policy-making is centralized. [Ansoff,
7, p.35].
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Although other groups in the coalition are normally
passive, there are limits to managerial freedom of action,
'applied via share price, prices at which resources
(especially financial resources) will be supplied, and
customer and competitor reactions' [Standish, 238, pp.84-5].
These limits are reflected in various constraints
self-imposed by management for its own security. ^^^^
Regarding the type of consensus which is likely to
emerge from the bargaining process, Cyert and March state:
Actual organizational goals cannot normally be 
described in terms of a joint preference ordering. 
Studies of organizational objectives suggest that 
agreement on objectives is usually agreement on 
highly ambiguous goals...The studies suggest further 
that behind this agreement on rather vague 
objectives there is considerable disagreement and 
uncertainty about subgoals, that organizations 
appear to be pursuing different goals at the same 
time. Finally, the studies suggest that most 
organization objectives take the form of an 
aspiration level rather than an imperative to 
"maximize" or "minimize", and that the aspiration 
level changes in response to experience [ 4 4 , p.28;
also Alt, 4, Blau, 19, and Kaplan e t a 1 . , 129].
It appears therefore that the bargaining process itself
does not produce consensus in any great depth. However, a
considerable number of organizational factors co-operate
to ensure that there will normally be a sufficient degree of
de facto agreement for working purposes. First, as already
stated, objectives are constrained by scarcity of resources.
Successive resource allocations effectively simplify
problems of future allocations by narrowing the range of
available alternatives. Control systems, such as budgets,
facilitate the disposition of scarce resources. These exert
a stabilizing influence on objectives over time.
(15)
See footnote 9.
The force
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of precedent also exerts a stabilizing influence on
objectives. Moreover, internal functions may be disposed so
as to mutually constrain active coalition members. As
mentioned above, disagreement would tend to be limited by
the hierarchical structure of firms.
To a degree conflict is not settled but sidestepped in
what amounts to a 'continuous bargaining-learning process'
[Cyert and March, 44, p.28] . People have limited time to
spend on particular aspects of the overall problem. They
may often neglect to test fully the consistency of new
policy demands with existing goals, whether for lack of
skill or on account of the particular sequence of demands
which precedes the new issues. Also, since attention to
sub-goals is largely determined by a firm's existing
information-processing systems, conflict is to some extent
avoided by the devices of sequential attention (i.e.
considering one goal at a time) and quasi-reso1ution
(active pursuit of all goals in conflict). [Ansoff, 7,
p.37; Cyert and March, 44, C h .5]. As Dorfman observes:
Typically a business firm watches manifold 
consequences of its operations including rate of 
profit, value of its shares, sales volume, share of 
market, ejt hoc genus omne , and is not willing to 
increase its performance in any one of these respects 
at unlimited sacrifice in the others [53, p.6 08] .
By implication goal conflict largely relates to what
Marris terms 'proximate objectives' [173, p.105], which
express in operational terms a management's desire for
growth and security. 'The latter in turn result from a
more basic managerial utility system, incorporating a
number of psychological, sociological and economic variates,
such as dynamic aspiration, self-identification, class
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orientation, and desire for power, status, wealth and 
personal security' [loc.cit. ] . The relation between 
managerial motivation and a firm's external and internal 
environments describes the methods by which management will 
strive to satisfy these most basic desires.
35
1.3 Theory of the Firm and the Role of Profit
(a ) The Theory of the Firm
The above discussion of motivation and other factors 
determining corporate objectives has neglected both the 
conventional Theory and the relation of profit to 
objectives. However, the Theory is still too persuasive 
and well-established to be left entirely out of account, 
and, moreover provides an excellent basis from which to 
determine the role of profit in corporate objectives.
Also, a variant of the Theory's extension to conditions of 
risk and uncertainty, namely expected return maximization, 
was used in the Domar-Musgrave analysis of effects of income 
tax changes on investment.
The Theory states that a firm's sole objective is to 
maximize net revenue (profit), given input and output 
prices and a technologically-determined production function. 
Perfect competition and perfect foresight are assumed.
[Cyert and March, 44, pp.5-6; McGuire, 180, p . 5 6] . Profit 
maximization is assured by the condition that output will be 
produced up to the point at which MR-MC = 0, the lowest 
point on the average cost curve for the given product. At 
this point the system is in equilibrium. Moreover, by 
virtue of the particular brand of rationality assumed by 
the Theory, a firm always tends toward this state.(16)
Rationality, in the economic theory of the firm, 
implicitly assumes no action will be undertaken by the 
business enterprise that will move it away from its
(16)
Theories of monopolistic competition, oligopoly and 
monopoly have taken the basic Theory as given and have 
extended it to different market situations. [Chamberlin,
33; Robinson, 214; Stigler, 245].
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goal of maximum profits. Furthermore, it assumes that 
the decision maker, faced with two or more 
alternatives that will result in various outcomes, 
will invariably select the alternative that will tend 
to move the firm to (or closer to) profit 
maximization [McGuire, loc . cit . 1 .
Essentially, therefore, the Theory is of the steady-state 
type concerned with successive equilibria; it is not really 
capable of distinguishing the long from the short term. It 
does not aim to describe or predict the whole range of a 
firm's behaviour, but to explain price determination and 
optimum output and resource allocation in a given price 
system. [Cyert and March, 44, p.15; Krupp, 143, Ch . 1 ;
McGuire, 180, p.19; Penrose, 200, pp . 10-11]. The real 
existence of the firm is incidental to these purposes; in 
fact, 'the concept of the firm to the economist is in reality 
the concept of the entrepreneurial role, which is treated 
as though it were the firm for purposes of theoretical 
analysis' [McGuire, loc . cit . ] .
Owing to its assumption of perfect foresight and 
specified rationality, the basic Theory does not deal with 
problems connected with formation of expectations or with 
prediction of competitors' behaviour and other aspects of 
uncertainty. [Cf. Simon, 229, p.256]. Even when extended
to take account of uncertainty, the Theory treats the 
entrepreneur as mainly a passive 'risk bearer' who is unable 
to reduce the risk or uncertainty of enterprise, but must 
accept or decline it according to his nature. [Penrose,
200, p .58].
The Theory's static assumptions and preoccupation with 
equilibrium set fairly strict limits to the degree of a 
firm's expansion. The firm is assumed tied to given
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products and markets. Growth is regarded as 'nothing more 
than an increase in the output of [these] given products...' 
[Penrose, 200, p.ll], and is limited to the extent that the 
firm may not proceed beyond the 'optimum size' of these 
outputs. Without some change in external conditions (by 
definition beyond the firm's policy control) or knowledge, 
rising production costs will eventually halt expansion. 
Inter-firm differences in growth rate over the long period 
are not envisaged because compensating forces generated by 
cost differences tend to bring these rates back to equality. 
[Marris, 173, p.246].
(b) Critique of the Theory
A voluminous literature is devoted to criticism and 
defence of the Theory, particularly its advocacy of profit 
maximization. One widespread criticism, that firms 
cannot maximize profits owing to risk and uncertainty, will 
be examined in Chapter 2. Attention is directed here to 
the question, whether profit maximization will be selected 
as a firm's prime objective or even as an objective at all. 
The answer to this question will clarify the relation 
between profit and managerial motivation.
It was stated above that the real existence of the firm 
is incidental to the purposes of the Theory, for which the 
concept of an entrepreneurial role is sufficient. The 
Theory is concerned neither with the nature of the firm as 
an organization, nor with the whole range of its behaviour. 
Indeed, 'to some economists it has seemed implausible that
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a theory of an organization can ignore the fact that it is
one' [Cyert and March, 44, p.8]. Machlup touched on this
paradox in a recent review article.
The model of the firm in that theory is not, as so 
many writers believe, designed to serve to explain and 
predict the behavior of real firms; instead it is 
designed to explain and predict changes in observed 
prices (quoted, paid, received) as effects of 
particular changes in conditions...In this causal 
connection the firm is only a theoretical link, a 
mental construct helping to explain how one gets from 
the cause to the effect. This is altogether different 
from explaining the behavior of a firm [167, p.9] .
Machlup labels the belief, that the firm as a theoretical
construct can be identified with the firm as an empirical
concept, as the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' [loc.
c i t . ] .
Moreover, according to Machlup, the Theory is not
designed to explain and predict the behaviour of individual
producers, only the effects of mass behaviour.
The point is that a model of a theoretical firm in an 
industry consisting of a large number of firms can do 
with a much smaller number of assumptions, provided the 
model is used to predict, not the actual reactions of 
any one particular firm, but only the effects of the 
hypothetical reactions of numerous anonymous "reactors" 
(symbolic firms). If it were to be applied to 
predictions of reactions of a particular firm, the 
model would have to be much more richly endowed with 
variables and functions for which information could be 
obtained only at considerable effort and with results 
that may or may not be worth the cost of the required 
research [167, pp.8-9] .
Since the purpose of this study is to explain the 
behaviour of individual 'real' firms, the Theory is clearly 
unsuitable. In particular, it is unable to describe the 
processes by which firms achieve sustained growth: in fact,
as already stated, it predicts that growth will be 
non-sustainable without exogenous increases in demand 
volume. Two reasons for the Theory's inability may be
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mentioned. First, there is the assumption that a firm is 
tied to given products and markets. Second, as Machlup 
explains: 'For certain economic problems the existence of
the firm is of the essence. For example, if we study the 
size distribution of firms or the growth of the firm, the 
organization and some of its properties and processes are 
the very objects of the investigation' [167, p . 1 0 ] .
(c) The Role of Profit
The question now is whether the goal of profit
maximization must be rejected along with the Theory for
purposes of analyzing individual firm behaviour and growth.
It is at least unlikely that a firm would achieve profit
maximization in the manner described by the Theory, which
appears to assume that optimum output of a given product is
less than its capacity output. If it is then true 'that the
efficiency of the variable factor is customarily greatest at
or near the point of capacity output, . . .businessmen do not
determine their scale of operations by reference to marginal
cost and revenues at all: they simply produce all that they
can sell' [Eiteman, 72, p . 9 1 3 ] . Secondly,
there may be an "optimum" output for each of the firm's 
product-1i n e s , but not an "optimum" output for the 
firm as a whole. In general we have found nothing to 
prevent the indefinite expansion of firms as time 
passes. . .It should be clear. . .that in rejecting the 
notion of an optimum size of firm in this context we 
are not quarrelling with the concept of the optimum 
size of firm as it appears in the "theory of the firm," 
since the "optimum firm" in that context is merely the 
optimum output of a given product [Penrose, 200, 
pp.98-9 and p.99, n.l].
Also, unit costs need not necessarily rise as firms grow
l a r g e r . Various economies may be reaped, both from a firm's
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size and from the growth process itself. [Penrose, 200, 
pp.88-103 ] . In practice, therefore, there may exist no 
equilibrium at which firms can attain maximum profits.
This contrasts with the Theory, in which 'the sufficient 
conditions for equilibrium insure a maximum (rather than a 
minimum) of net revenue' [Cyert and March, 44, p.6].
If no equilibrium exists for maximization purposes, 
over what time period would a firm be likely to seek to 
maximize profits? As Simon observes, the Theory is somewhat 
ambiguous on this matter. [229 , p.262 ] . However, as growth 
is a long-run objective, it may instead be enquired whether 
growth is compatible with long-run profit maximization.
Penrose claims that, where growth refers to expansion 
of fixed assets, the two are interchangeable.
The assumption that the managers of firms wish to 
maximize long-run profits derived from investment in 
the enterprise itself has an interesting implication 
for the relation between the desire to grow and the 
desire to make profits. If profits are a condition of 
successful growth, but profits are sought primarily for 
the sake of the firm, that is, to reinvest in the firm 
rather than to reimburse owners for the use of their 
capital on their "risk bearing", then, from the point 
of view of investment policy, growth and profits be come 
equivalent a s the criteria for the selection o f 
inve s tment programme s . Firms will never invest in 
expansion for the sake of growth if the return on the 
investment is negative, for that would be self-defeating. 
To increase total long-run profits of the enterprise in 
the sense discussed here is therefore equivalent to 
increasing the long-run rate of growth. Hence, it does 
not matter whether we speak of "growth" or "profits" as 
the goal of a firm's investment activities [200, 
pp . 29-30] .
These arguments exemplify Cyert and March's observation 
that'...it is difficult to document the proposition that the 
firm is pursuing goals other than profit maximization 
without encountering a claim that the firm's activities are 
somehow consistent with "long-run profit maximization,"...'
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(17 )[44, p.239]. Profit certainly is a condition of
successful growth, but not necessarily maximum profit.
Penrose assumes that firms must depend solely or mainly on 
retained profit to finance growth of fixed assets, whereas 
a major (and, within limits, growing) proportion of gross 
investment expenditure is covered by annual depreciation 
charges. [Domar, 51]. Expansion may also be partly 
financed from external sources over the long run. Penrose's 
statement that 'profits are sought primarily for the sake of 
the firm...rather than to reimburse owners...' denies the 
fact that (long-run) profit maximization is the objective of 
a management whose primary aim is to serve the owners' 
interests. Such a management would be likely to distribute 
a relatively greater proportion of profits to owners than 
one mainly interested in growth. [Williamson, 264, p.3] .
Also, a profit-maximizing management would reinvest in the 
firm only if external investments, including financial 
investment, offered lower returns. Factors other than 
profit evidently supervene. [McGuire, 180, p.78;
Rothschild, 215, pp.308-9].
Penrose also believes that separation of control from 
ownership will cause managements to equate long-run growth 
and profit maximization; that is, although the profit motive 
may be weaker in such firms than in small, owner-managed 
firms, it may also be stronger because the personal
(17)
They brand this claim as the '"long run" dodge' [ loc . 
cit. ] and believe that ' . . .ultimately it makes only slightly 
more sense to say that the goal of a business organization 
is to maximize profit than to say that its goal is to 
maximize the salary of Sam Smith, Assistant to the Janitor' 
[44, p . 3 0] .
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preferences of businessmen are more rigidly controlled in 
the interests of the firm. [200 , p.27] . Machlup extends 
this argument as follows:
In principle I would expect three different views 
to be taken regarding the relative independence of 
corporate management: (1) Whereas owners would run
their business chiefly with a view to a maximum of 
money profits, managers run it with several 
supplementary and partly competing goals in mind.
(2) Whereas owners, especially wealthy ones, would 
often allow nonprofit considerations to enter their 
decision-making, managers have a sense of dedication 
and identification with the business that makes them 
the more single-minded seekers of profits. (3) Even 
if managers are inclined to indulge in seeking other 
goals as long as profits look satisfactory, they are 
as professionals, trained in the art and science of 
management, able to make better profits than the owners 
could ever hope to make running their [167, p.5] .
Previous discussion of managerial motivation and the
corporate environment indicated that management will pursue
its own self-interest unless constrained by effective
competition. The nature of this self-interest argues
strongly for acceptance of the third view listed. That is,
although professional managers doubtless would make a better
job of maximizing profit than shareholders, they have no
particular reason to do so because their collective
self-interest seeks satisfaction in terms of other goals,
particularly those of growth and security. Maximum profit,
over whatever period, is, for reasons that can only be
fully explained as part of an analysis of how managements
set out to achieve these goals in their decision-making,
not compatible with maximum sustained growth and desired
security levels. For instance, managements are unwilling,
for security reasons, to establish performance norms that
they may be unable to maintain. Attempts to maximize
profits are likely to cause undesirable fluctuations in the
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market values of shares [Baumol, 11, pp.93-4] , quite an 
unnecessary and avoidable hazard for managements with 
discretionary power who are not subject to effective 
market competition.
More generally, Marris describes the relation between 
profit and collective managerial self-interest in the 
following terms:
When a man takes decisions leading to successful 
expansion, he not only creates new openings but also 
recommends himself and his colleagues as particularly 
suitable candidates to fill them...So personal 
ability also becomes judged by achieved growth, and 
the encouragement of growth becomes a motive for not 
only collective but also individual advancement, thus 
reinforcing the basic connection. True, if personal 
promotion were in fact decided by shareholders' 
committees, abi1ity . . .might be judged by achieved 
profits, but when, as is in fact the case, an 
individual manager's rate of advance is determined 
exclusively by peers and superiors, it is more likely 
to be governed by criteria derived from the collective 
situation of the managerial class, which, we have now 
seen, means favouring expansion. This does not mean 
that a man's profit-earning ability will necessarily 
be ignored, for profits are required for growth and 
minimum profit is necessary for a minimum valuation 
ratio [security constraint]. But it does mean that a 
man is unlikely to be judged by his ability as a profit
(18)
Kamerschen has made a recent study to 'determine whether 
the extent of management control exerts an important 
influence on the rates of return in [the largest 
corporations]' [128, p.432]. His conclusion that 'it
generally does not' [loc.cit.] should be interpreted as 
support for Machlup's third view of the effect of 
control-ownership separation, quoted above. That is, an 
entrepreneurially-competent, growth-oriented management is 
better equipped than owners to earn profits, and its 
decisions will tend to lead the firm into bigger markets 
where profitability is also higher. This type of 
management is therefore especially likely to earn greater 
profits, as a consequence of nonprofit-oriented motivation, 
than owner managements. If published profits do not always 
reflect this situation, that is probably due to 
organizational slack. It is important to distinguish the 
lower emphasis on profits that accompanies control-ownership 
separation from any reduction in a firm's propensity to 
generate profits. Kamerschen does not make this 
distinction. [128, p.444].
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maximiser. By contrast he may well be judged by his 
ability to maximize, or at least promote, 
organizational growth [173, p.102].
It is therefore concluded that, in the absence of 
effective competition, a growth-minded management will not 
seek to maximize profits: it will instead rationally seek
profits that are satisfactory for security purposes and to 
assist in financing expansion. Correspondingly, a 
management interested mainly in emoluments and staff
accumulation would also not attempt to maximize profits.
(19 )[Machlup, 167, p.23, n.13; Williamson, 265, pp.43-4].
In short, the failure of profit maximization coincides with 
the freedom of management from effective competition.
From previous discussion of the influences of 
environment it will be recalled that 'where the range of 
behavior that is consistent with survival is narrowly 
bounded, the question of motivation is of small importance' 
[Williamson, 265, p.ll]. Behaviour is so bounded when 
effective competition prevails in each of a firm's actual
(19)
According to Williamson, for such a management to select 
a profit-maximizing position,the marginal substitution rate 
between profit and staff must be zero. Since this implies 
that marginal utility of staff in the vicinity of the 
profit-maximizing position must also be zero, 'either staff 
must be "objectively" valued only for its contribution to 
profit or the benefits associated with expanding staff must 
be exhausted before...[the profit-maximizing position] is 
reached' [loc.cit. ] . Given a positive preference for staff, 
the first possibility is rejected, while the second represents 
an unlikely limiting condition. Cyert and March [44, 
pp.246-7] arrive at similar conclusions.
(2 0 )
These conclusions are widely supported in the 
literature including, inter alia, the following: Ansoff, 7;
Baumöl, 11, pp.45-53 and 13, p.1085; Cyert and March, 44, 
pp . 8 , 10 , 237-40 ; Duesenberry, 56, p.133; Gordon, 97;
Kaysen, 132, p.90; Lintner, 157, pp.52 3-4 ; Machlup, 167, 
p p .4, 11, 23; Marris, 173, pp.102, 241; McGuire, 180, Chs.4,
5; Papandreou, 197, p.206; Simon, 229; Williamson, 264, p.16; 
Williamson, 265 , pp . 4 , 18.
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and potential markets. Machlup defines 'effective' 
competition as follows:
a firm is exposed to heavy, vigorous, or effective 
competition if it is kept under continuing pressure 
to do something about its sales and its profits 
position. Under this "competitive pressure" the 
firm is constantly compelled to react to actual or 
potential losses in sales and/or reductions in 
profits, so much so that the firm will not be able 
to pursue any objectives other than the maximization 
of profits - for the simple reason that anything less 
than the highest obtainable profits would be below the 
rate of return regarded as normal at the time...[That 
is] competition is effective if it continually 
depresses profits to the level regarded as the 
minimum tolerable. What makes it effective is not 
part of the definition, but has to be explained by the 
conditions of entry, aggressive attitudes on the part 
of existing firms, or imports from abroad [167,
p .18] . (21)
Thus, although normally a management would not rationally 
seek to maximize profits, it may be forced to adopt this 
objective by competitive pressures for security purposes.
It is now necessary to make a sharp distinction between 
the short and long term aspects of this problem. Effective 
competition is synonymous with adversity and means that a 
firm must adopt profit maximization as its short-run goal. 
This, it is believed, is imcompatible with both long-run 
profit maximization and long-run security, because 
investment in projects with future benefits will be passed 
over. [Ansoff, 7, p.32] . Also, it is obvious that such a 
firm will not achieve sustained growth. Effective 
competition therefore restricts both a firm's objectives 
and, unless conditions change, its future.
Firms most likely to suffer effective competition are 
small and relatively young. Most would have limited
(2 1 )
See also note 11 above.
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entrepreneurial ability and resources at their disposal, 
and
are of necessity confined to those fields where the 
only requirements for getting some kind of a start are 
a little capital and perhaps a training or skill which 
is widespread among the non-professiona1 working 
population. It is in this type of field where we find 
the peculiar combination of circumstances characterizing 
the position of firms that cannot be expected to grow - 
a high rate of entry, and a high rate of exodus, low 
profit rates and a low level of technical progress 
[Penrose, 200, p.221].
These are the firms to which the profit maximization 
objective is most likely to apply. It is significant that 
the sort of firm described by Penrose would also be 
characterized by a lack of separation of control from 
ownership. In general, the real investment behaviour of 
such firms is unlikely to be of significant long-run 
interest.
That some new and small firms eventually become large 
is due mainly to the quality of their entrepreneurial and 
managerial ability, as well as to resources and a 
non-rigorous element of luck. Managements of these firms 
are not attracted to fields in which growth and profit 
opportunities are limited. Although at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to existing large firms in any field 
of the latter's choice, they would take advantage of the 
fact that even the largest firms are often unable to 
utilize all possible profitable opportunities for 
expansion. [Penrose, 200, p.222].
It is concluded that, except in the limiting case of 
effective competition, profit is not a managerial objective 
as such, but that satisfactory profits are required for 
growth and security. More precisely, examination of
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corporate decision-making will show that growth-minded 
managements rationally aim to optimize rates of return on 
amounts of resources employed in relation to the maximum 
growth rates safely attainable. [Ansoff, 7, pp.40-1; 
Marris, 173, pp.241, 251], Managements not
entrepreneuria1ly-motivated may optimize profitability by 
maintaining productive and administrative efficiency of 
existing operations. In many cases, however, investment 
and productive efficiency do not completely determine the 
profit result, because managerial slack payments trade-off 
part of earnings capacity for preferred expenses. Slack 
payments include excess expenditures in non-preferred 
categories resulting from managerial inefficiency.
48
1•4 Managerial Motivation and Corporate Income Taxation 
(a ) Preliminary
In 1.2(a) above it was stated that the Domar-Musgrave
preference assumptions must satisfy two requirements to be
relevant for purposes of analyzing corporate investment
reactions to tax changes. Firstly, because their analysis
does not distinguish between managerial and shareholder
self-interest, reasonable similarity between the interests
of these respective groups is necessary. Secondly,
preference assumptions should correctly and adequately
describe managerial motivation. Evidently neither
requirement has been satisfactorily met. Managerial
interests diverge significantly from those of shareholders,
as underlined by the fact that management typically regards
market value of the firm's shares as a principal security
constraint on discretionary behaviour. This constraint is
(2 2 )operated through a firm's profit level ; but it is not
in managerial interests (as it is in shareholders'), 'first 
that the company should be made to earn the maximum profit 
compatible with a reasonable degree of risk; second, that as
(2 2 )
It is a matter of controversy in the literature whether 
or not, in the absence of debt, equity market values are a 
function of corporate earnings independent of dividends. One 
group claims that equity values are independent of dividends: 
it includes, inter alia, Dean, 47; Durand, 58; Kuh, 145;
F. and V. Lutz,165; Modigliani and Miller, 187 and 188; 
Modigliani and Zeman, 189; Roberts, 212; Solomon, 236;
Weston, 262. A second group claims that equities are valued 
at the present value of expected dividend streams, and 
includes, inter alia, Bierman et a 1. , 16; Durand, 57 and 59;
Gordon, 90, 92 and 94; Gordon and Shapiro, 95; Preinreich,
206; Tinbergen, 253; Walter, 260; Williams, 263. Modigliani 
and Miller state that,'as long as management is presumed to 
be acting in the best interests of the stockholders,retained 
earnings can be regarded as equivalent to a fully subscribed, 
pre-emptive issue of common stock. Hence...,the division of 
the [earnings] stream between cash dividends and retained 
earnings is a mere detail' [187, p.266].
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large a proportion of these profits should be distributed 
as the best interests of the business permit,...' [Berle 
and Means, 14, p.121].
In this Section the results derived by Domar and 
Musgrave from application of their preference assumptions 
to the case of an increase in the rate of a no-loss-offset 
profits tax are examined and criticized. Their results are 
a s follows :
Since, without loss offset, the yield is cut, 
while risk is unchanged, the compensation for 
risk-taking is reduced. Risk-taking has become less 
attractive, so that the investor will want to take 
less risk. But the reduction in yield also means a 
lower income from his investments. To restore his 
income, the investor will try to take more risk, since 
risky investments can be expected to have a higher 
yield. These two forces are operating in opposite 
directions. Theoretically the result is uncertain; 
practical evidence would indicate that the investor is 
likely to shift in the direction of less risk 
[52, p.390].
Several matters need to be mentioned before these 
results can be examined.
(1) As Domar and Musgrave observe [52, pp.391-2] , a 
corporation is assured of offset for losses on 
individual projects provided these losses do not 
exceed profits from other projects. A 
no-1oss-offset corporate tax thus applies to net
operating profits and losses, and may differ from 
a personal no-loss-offset income tax on small 
financial investors. However, this difference is 
offset to the extent that a financial investor can 
diversify his holdings over a relatively greater 
number of investments (see 4 below). Also, it is
presumed that financial investors are assessed to
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personal tax only on their net gains, so that 
they too benefit from automatic loss offset.
(2) Domar and Musgrave assume that 'a given amount of 
investment funds is available to the investor'
[52, p.393], and are concerned only with 'the 
immediate effects of a tax on investment, 
without regard for secondary effects such as 
changes in wealth...' [52, p.402]. They admit 
that, when an investor's wealth changes, 'his 
general attitude towards risk-taking may become 
more or less favourable' [52, p.421].
(3) For reasons of space, analysis of the nature and 
effects of risk and uncertainty has not been 
included in this Chapter, although the general 
role of managerial security constraints has been 
explained. To the extent that a critique of the 
Domar-Musgrave results necessitates statements for 
which no proper foundation has been laid, full 
restitution will be made in Chapter 2.
(4) One obvious difference between real and financial 
investment is that, in the former case, a 
decision-maker
is confronted with fewer and more unique 
investment alternatives than is the financial 
investor, and is thus unable to achieve an equal 
degree of diversification. Certain 
considerations which might be of little 
importance for the financial investor, such as 
those related to maintaining competitive 
advantage, might be very significant for him 
[52, p .422].
The Domar-Musgrave claim, that 'the general 
conclusions here arrived at would also apply to the
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case of real investment' [ loc.cit.3 , was 
therefore made after taking account of these 
dif fe rence s .
(5) Domar and Musgrave assume throughout that the 
investor will consider only those investments 
with the greatest expected yield for a given 
degree of risk. This assumption corresponds, of 
course, to the Berle and Means criterion for 
shareholder satisfaction, mentioned in the first 
paragraph of this Section. In addition, Domar 
and Musgrave presume that return is directly 
correlated with risk, in that the greater the 
return expected from an investment, the higher 
will be the risk taken. [52, p.390].
The two opposing forces, which Domar and Musgrave 
consider would result from an increase in the tax rate, are 
respectively its income and substitution effects. The 
income effect expresses an investor's desire to restore his 
pre-tax-increase income level, and results from their 
preference assumption of diminishing marginal utility of 
rising income. The substitution effect reflects his 
tendency to reduce risk-taking because unit compensation 
for risk has fallen: this effect incorporates their second
preference assumption of increasing marginal disutility of 
risk-taking as the amount of risk borne increases.
Domar and Musgrave also found that an increase in the 
rate of a no-loss-offset tax tends to reduce unit
compensation for risk relatively more the greater the total
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risk and yield of a given 'asset combination'. This
causes what they term a secondary substitution effect, 
which acts as a check to both upward and downward 
adjustments of risk-taking following the tax increase.
[52, p.407]. The underlying reason for this so-called
secondary effect is that, in the Domar-Musgrave analysis, a 
tax without loss offset reduces yield by a greater 
percentage than the nominal tax rate, 'because all gains are 
reduced by the rate of the tax, while all losses are left 
unchanged' [52, p.404] .
C b ) The Income Effect
For purposes of determining the validity of the 
Domar-Musgrave claim that an increase in the tax rate will 
produce an income effect on managerial behaviour,it is 
convenient to dissect the claim into its twin components. 
Firstly,they claim, management is motivated to seek to restore 
corporate profit following a tax increase. Secondly, 
management will be induced to take more risk in order to 
accomplish this. These aspects will be considered in turn, 
it being assumed that, in addition to no offset for net 
losses, there is no corporate borrowing, and only 'normal' 
depreciation is allowed for tax purposes.
An income effect arises because the tax increase 
raises the marginal utility of income to a Domar-Musgrave 
_____
Defined as the (financial) investor's security portfolio 
plus any (assumedly riskless) cash not invested. [52, 
pp . 399-401] .
investor. How does this correspond to the role of profit
among managerial objectives? In the previous Section it
was established that, except in conditions of effective
competition, management is not motivated toward profit as
such, but needs 'satisfactory' profit for several reasons.
Firstly, profit is required to provide, through
distributions, a return acceptable to the market, since the
market value of a firm's shares acts as a principal security
(24 )constraint on managerial behaviour. Secondly, profit is
needed to assist in financing future growth, and will assume 
differential importance to different firms for this purpose, 
owing to variations in growth rates, access to external 
capital, liquidity, and the adequacy of corporate 
depreciation provisions and revenue reserves, etc. Thirdly, 
profit is needed to absorb management's typical expense 
preference for staff and emoluments.
As Colm states, it is useful in tax analysis to 
distinguish 'between the effect of tax changes (and the 
related changes in expenditures or other methods of 
financing) on the flow of funds and on demand and costs, on 
the one hand, and the effects on the intentions, motivations, 
and behavior of business managers..., on the other hand'
[41, p.492]. From the latter point of view profit is
important mainly for security purposes, to maintain an 
acceptable level of the market value of the firm's shares.
An entrepreneurially-competent, ambitious management, it is 
recalled, rationally aims for the highest sustainable growth
(24)
See note 22 above.
1.4(b) 54
rate consistent with acceptable levels of this and other 
security constraints, including liquidity.
Domar and Musgrave's third preference assumption (that 
'the marginal utility of income...[is] independent of risk 
and vice versa' [52, p.402]) means that risk does not enter 
into the value which an investor places on successive 
increments of income; nor do income considerations affect 
his attitude to risk as such. This assumption is difficult 
to reconcile with their view that income is a compensation 
for risk-taking, so that 'if the return on risk-taking is 
close to zero - that is, if market prospects are extremely 
poor - the investor will take little risk, if any' [52, 
p.407]. Risk and income are in fact closely linked in the 
Domar-Musgrave analysis, as, for example, in their 
statement that 'the faster the slopes of the indifference 
curves fall as the rate of yield increases along any given 
horizontal line/ that isf the more the inve stor's marginal 
rate o f risk-1aking is ( inversely) affected by the size o f 
his income, the sooner will the tax-asset curve begin to 
fall' [52, p.407; italics added].
The fact that, for corporate purposes, profits are 
required for security reasons means that a significant part 
of the utility attaching to profits from managements' point 
of view arises from profits' contribution to the reduction 
of uncertainty or insecurity. Thus, the marginal utility of 
profits is not, within certain limits, independent of 
managerial risk or uncertainty. Whatever its relevance for 
purposes of analyzing the response of a financial investor 
to tax changes, the third Domar-Musgrave preference
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ass um pt ion is therefore inapp r o p r i a t e  so far as 
m a n a g e m e n t - c o n t r o l l e d  real inv e s t m e n t  is concerned.
Moreover, the reason a b l e n e s s  of this assu mption seems to 
have little connection with their further assu mption of a 
fixed amount of wealth, despite their statement to the 
contrary. [52, p.402]. As argued below, this latter
ass um pt ion is also inappropriate in the case of real 
inve s t m e n t .
Subject to the above comments, the first 
Do ma r- M u s g r a v e  pref erence ass u m p t i o n  of d i m i nishing marginal 
util ity  of rising income does b r o a d l y  describe managements' 
attitude  to profits. However, it cannot be inferred 'from 
this that a m a n a g e m e n t  will take deli berate action through 
in ve stm ent policy to restore the p r o f i t  level after a tax 
increase unless, p r o bably as a special case, the firm is 
driven back onto its mi n i m u m  p r o f i t  constraint by the tax 
increase. M a n a g e m e n t  would then strive to increase profit 
for its own security; but the D o m a r - M u s g r a v e  analysis could 
not explain this reaction, because they assume that the 
ma rg in al utility of profit is i ndependent of security 
co ns id e r a t i o n s  .
For several reasons the above situation represents a 
special case so far as ambitious, competent m a n a gements are 
concerned. The a r g ument that m a n a g e m e n t s  are not motivated 
very p o s i t i v e l y  towards profit b e y o n d  a m i n i m u m  constraint 
does not at all imply that actual p r ofit usually 
a p p r o xi mates this level. Quite the reverse would tend to 
apply in the case of aggressive m a n a g e m e n t s  operating under 
imper fect competition. Fre q u e n t l y  the number of prof itable
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investment opportunites available will exceed that which an
existing management team is able comfortably to handle.
The firm will then 'operate most of the time well back into
the intramarginal range of investments so far as
profitability is concerned,...' [Lintner, 157, p.528].
This may also happen when a firm limits investment outlays
as a matter of policy to funds generated internally by
retentions and depreciation charges. Then:
If the supply of funds for investment is completely 
inelastic, both the elasticity of the demand schedule 
and the extent of its vertical displacement by tax 
changes will be irrelevant so long as the intersection 
of the supply and demand curves after the tax increase 
are still above the minimal cutoff rate of return 
management has in mind [Lintner, loc.cit.].(25)
Restriction of investment to internally-generated funds is
a matter of necessity for young and unestablished firms
without access to external capital. It is a matter of
deliberate policy on the part of established, conservative
managements, which prefer to emphasize security rather than
growth. If such managements are able to operate in the
'intramarginal range of investments so far as profitability
is concerned', they need have no more reason motivationally
than growth-minded managements to initiate action to restore
profit levels following a tax increase. A conservative
management may be more likely than a thrusting management
to wish to restore the profit level after a tax increase,
(25)
Streeten argues similarly that limitations in supply of 
capital create an element of monopoly revenue as the result 
of uncertainty about the future. He then states that 'a tax 
which falls on this rent element can have no effect on the 
supply of uncertainty-bearing' [246, p.285]. That is, there 
will be neither an income nor a substitution effect.
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but, given its financial constraint on investment, would 
be relatively less likely to do this through investment 
policy.
Assuming that a firm operated above its minimum profit 
constraint prior to a tax increase, whether the constraint 
becomes binding depends on several factors. These include 
the size of the tax increase, the margin by which actual 
profit exceeded the level of the constraint prior to the 
increase, the incidence of the tax, and the degree to which 
tax increases are capitalized in the market value of shares. 
Tax capitalization means that the effective profit rate on 
issued capital is unaffected by a tax increase: management
therefore need not, at least for this reason, take profit 
action for security purposes. Similarly, to the extent that 
a tax increase is passed on, the reason for an income effect 
will also be reduced or removed.
Even apart from limiting factors, such as tax 
capitalization and incidence, an income effect on investment 
policy would be rather a special case in practice, even when 
conservative managements are taken into account. As stated 
above, the latter are more likely to be sensitive to 
reductions in profit, but less likely to use investment 
policy in response. Moreover, the income effect probably 
overstates considerably for imperfect competition the 
frequency with which tax increases find profit at its 
constrained level.
Lintner believes that the minimum profit constraint 
may indeed be less important for tax purposes than is often
supposed.
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Although many companies require at least given 
prospective rates of return after taxes on such 
investments [as are not justified on non-profit 
grounds], others state the returns required for 
favourable consideration as minimum rates of profit 
before taxes and make their investment decisions 
largely if not entirely on this basis . . .there is also 
evidence that the standards of minimum acceptable 
pre-tax return are adjusted sluggishly and 
incompletely, and sometimes not adjusted at all, to 
changes in tax rates. Moreover, we have observed 
cases where companies... which use a cut-off rate of 
return after taxes have formally or informally 
adjusted this rate downward as taxes increased. In 
both cases, the return required after taxes is not 
substantially unchanged as usually assumed in theory,..
[ 157 , p . 522 ] .
It is concluded that a tax increase alone will not 
normally induce managements of firms which usually operate 
above minimum profit constraints to take investment action 
to restore the profit level. Also, if, as a special case, a 
tax increase does induce action to restore profits, it will 
be for reasons not visualized by the Domar-Musgrave analysis 
Now consider the sort of firm whose minimum profit 
constraint i_s_ normally binding. It is recalled that this 
occurs when a firm is subject to effective competition in 
each of its actual and potential markets. The firm is then 
confined to the objective of short-run profit maximization. 
In these circumstances the firm does not respond at all to 
an increase in the rate of tax on its profits. [Cyert and 
March, 44, p.248; Williamson, 265, p.74]. It does not 
respond for the simple reason that, in these circumstances, 
it is unable to respond. There is then neither an income
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(26)nor as a substitution effect. Effective competition,
together with factors that make competition effective for a 
firm (managerial competence, resources, etc.), therefore 
represent additional grounds for believing that the 
circumstances in which an income effect occurs are very 
limited.
Domar and Musgrave assert secondly that management will 
shift to a more risky combination of projects (investments) 
as the means of recouping the extra portion of profits taken 
in taxation. It is recalled that given resources are 
assumed available for investment, and that their analysis 
disregards effects on investment decisions of changes in 
wealth. 'Whenever an investor shifts to a more risky asset 
combination, he may do so by taking more risky investments 
or holding less cash or, most likely, by applying both 
methods at the same time' [52, p.407] . The notion that
risk-taking must increase in order that expected income may 
rise is based on the Domar-Musgrave assumption that 'risky 
investments can be expected to have a higher yield' [52, 
p. 390 ] , and on their definition of risk as 'the probability
(26)
Domar and Musgrave allow for the absence of an income 
effect whenever the marginal utility of income is assumed 
constant. [52, p.408, n.5]. Profit maximization corresponds 
to this income assumption. However, they appear to rule out 
the case in which the marginal disutility of risk-taking is 
also constant by stating: 'If income utility is thus assumed
constant, the second assumption (increasing disutility of 
risk-taking) must be applied, since the tax will produce no 
effects on risk-taking whatsoever, if both income utility 
and risk disutility are held constant' [52, p.403, n.9].
The resulting paradox is more apparent than real, since a 
firm subject to effective competition, and therefore,in 
Domar-Musgrave parlance, to constant marginal disutility of 
risk-taking, does not willingly suffer this state of affairs. 
It is merely unable to take steps to improve the situation.
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of a loss [which is] a property of a known probability 
distribution' [52, p.396].
In view of the previous conclusion, that action 
designed to recover profit following a tax increase will be 
taken only if that increase activates the security 
constraint on profit, it seems prima facie unlikely that 
managements would be persuaded by Domar and Musgrave to 
increase risk borne. Also, it must again be stressed that 
the type of management which is relatively sensitive to 
security, and which tends to restrict investment to internal 
funds, would be unwilling to use investment policy in this 
situation. It might be more inclined to reduce the 
investment rate, since 'available' funds have been eroded 
by the higher tax rate.
However, the most serious objection to this aspect of 
the income effect concerns the assumptions under which it 
allegedly occurs. An income effect is incompatible with the 
assumption of fixed resources, because a firm can normally 
adjust its 'investment combination' only through additional 
investment in new product lines. Additional resources are 
needed for this purpose, since the firm would hardly be 
likely to disinvest from existing activities in order to 
finance the specified adjustment in risk-taking. Heavy 
capital losses would be incurred if it attempted to do so, 
which would not facilitate restoration of either profits or 
security. It need hardly be added that managerial prestige 
is involved in maintaining shares in existing markets.
Firms do, of course, effect considerable changes in their
product-market postures over time, by gradually
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disinvesting from saturated existing lines in favour of 
fresh growth opportunities. However, significant fractions 
of investment will be devoted to maintaining a firm's 
stake in existing markets, even though these markets 
cannot necessarily be relied on to contribute 
significantly to profit expansion.
The income effect of taxation predicted by Domar and
Musgrave is therefore inherently unlikely so far as
corporate real investment is concerned. Firms are unable
to emulate individual financial investors in the speed and
facility with which 'portfolio' changes may be effected.
Real investment policy cannot be studied under the
assumption that corporate 'wealth' is fixed (which is, of
course, a different matter from the assumption that
investment resources are inelastic in supply). There are
no 'immediate effects of a tax on [real] investment' [52,
p.402] when effects of changes in corporate wealth are 
(27)disregarded. Although there may be scope for investment
of idle cash resources, it would be difficult to establish 
a case on motivational grounds for supposing that tax 
increases have much effect in this direction. Liquidity is 
an important managerial security constraint. Management 
would therefore rationally avoid trading-off necessary 
liquidity against increased risk-taking, because such an
(27)
Domar and Musgrave admit that, when an investor's wealth 
changes, their results may need to be modified. However, it 
is considered that even the grounds on which this admission 
is based are unsatisfactory for corporate investment 
behaviour; i.e. they merely observe that, when wealth 
changes, the investor's 'general attitude towards 
risk-taking may become more or less favourable' [52, p.421].
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exercise would probably be self-defeating. Efficient firms 
do not normally carry liquid resources over and above 
amounts needed for security purposes and those earmarked 
for actual projects.
An efficient management would assess the causes of a
profits crisis on their merits, and would take action
appropriate to the circumstances. This may not involve
investment policy as such, but may instead consist of cost
(28)reductions effected by reducing organizational slack.
Other criticisms of the Domar-Musgrave income effect 
depend on the distinction between risk and uncertainty, and 
on the nature of the corporate decision process. These 
matters are discussed in later Chapters. If their risk 
assumptions are replaced by those of uncertainty, direct 
correlation between expected profit from real investment 
and overall 'risk' may no longer be taken for granted, as 
did Domar and Musgrave. That is, under uncertainty, it is 
necessary to reformulate their assumption that 'risk-taking' 
must be increased in order to increase expected profit.
(c ) The Substitution Effect
According to Domar and Musgrave, 'the tax will reduce 
the compensation per unit of risk y/r, because y is reduced 
while r is left unchanged. The investor will therefore
(28)
Reder notes that, after a loss of about fifty million 
dollars in the first three quarters of 1946, the Ford Motor 
Company 'announced that it had found methods of reducing 
operating costs (on a given volume of output) by about 
twenty million dollars per year' [209 , p.4 53 , n.12] .
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tend to take less risk' [52, pp.405-6]. This view 
expresses the 'disincentive' effect of a no-1oss-offset 
tax which has been widely identified in the literature.
[E.gs. Brown, 22; Cosciani, 43; Due, 55; Goode, 88;
Kurihara, 147; Lintner, 157; Musgrave, 191]. In the 
Domar-Musgrave analysis, inter alia, the disincentive 
effect is directly related to the view that yield 
constitutes the compensation for risk-taking. So much is 
clear from the above passage, but the connection needs to 
be emphasized. In the opinion of Brown [22] and Streeten 
[246], however, 'the effects of taxation on
uncertainty-bearing (used synonymously with "risk-bearing")
must be distinguished from its effects on investment.
Certain types of taxes discourage investment even under
conditions of certainty' [246, p.271, n.l]. In Brown's
study, to which Streeten was referring, the only i n v e stment
'incentive' envisaged was that of profitability.
Some authors have queried the strength of the
disincentive effect on the grounds that it may be less if
business aims to earn reasonable, as opposed to maximum,
profit. [Colm, 41; Kimmel, 135; Lintner, 157; Sanders,
217]. Streeten notes that 'it is not at all clear that
risk-taking is a real cost rather than a positive utility'
[246, p.283], and that psychological attitudes may be
(2 9 )unaffected by the tax. [246, p.284]. Colm feels that
high corporate taxes will not necessarily discourage 
investment when firms are intent on expansion. [41, p.498] .
See also note 25.
(2 9)
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Streeten supports this view on the grounds that, 'in 
corporations where management and often control are 
separated from ownership a reduction in dividend payments 
to shareholders need not affect the willingness of those 
responsible for decisions to take risks. Their main interest 
is the growth of the company' [246, p.282]. In Lepper's 
view (with reference to financial investment), whether 
there is a disincentive effect depends on the form of an 
investor's utility function, and particularly on the method 
by which risk is measured, and on whether investors would 
hold large proportions of their portfolios in risky assets 
in the absence of a tax. [153, p.40].
This study has taken the view that tax increases react 
on managerial motivation, as distinguished from the 
financing of investment, primarily from the security angle. 
Profitability will need to be improved for security reasons 
when a firm is driven back onto its minimum profit 
constraint by a tax increase. It has been suggested that 
this would represent a special case, and that profit action 
by management may take the form of cost reductions effected 
by cutting back organizational slack. Investment policy may 
thus be unaffected by a tax increase, remaining geared to 
management's main aims, subject to available opportunities 
and finance. It is further considered that the nature of 
managerial motivation precludes a tax disincentive effect 
(or, for that matter, an incentive effect) in the sense in 
which these terms are conventionally employed, and for the 
reasons usually advanced. That is, managerial investment 
policy is not dictated solely or even mainly by profit
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considerations, and there appears to be little justification 
for the view that profit is regarded by management as the 
compensation for risk-taking. Managerial compensation for 
risk-taking comprises the pecuniary and other benefits which 
accrue from successful growth. Satisfactory profit is a 
necessary but subsidiary condition for this.
Various other specific criticisms of the Domar-Musgrave 
analysis, raised in connection with their income effect, 
apply also to the substitution effect result. These may be 
briefly summarized as follows:
(1) The marginal utility of profit is not independent 
of risk or uncertainty.
(2) Effects of changes in corporate resources on 
investment behaviour cannot be disregarded in 
determining the effect of a tax increase.
(3) There is no automatic correlation between 
expected profit and the uncertainty of a firm's 
operating position.
(4) Firms cannot disinvest from existing lines, as 
financial investors do, in order to adjust their 
'risk-taking'. Adjustments normally occur through 
additional investment in new lines.
(5) For reasons of prestige and investment strategy, 
maintenance of existing market shares is an 
important 'proximate' managerial objective.
(6) As well as the market value of a firm's shares, 
corporate liquidity also acts as a managerial 
security constraint. Action to restore profit, 
following a tax increase, would be unlikely to 
proceed at the expense of the latter constraint.
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(7) Corporate investment policy is subject to
uncertainty or partial ignorance rather than to 
risk. Managements therefore do not know the 
probability of a given outcome of an investment 
decision when the decision is made.
When a tax increase causes a security constraint to 
become binding, the present analysis suggests that, if 
remedial action involves investment policy rather than cost 
reductions, the effect of the tax from the motivational 
viewpoint may be regarded superficially as a combination of 
income and substitution effects. That is, the firm would 
be concerned to boost its profit level in order to increase 
security and would accordingly revise the ranking of its 
proximate objectives, viz. future investment expenditure 
would be governed relatively more by considerations of 
profitability than in the past. Essentially, however, the 
tax has only one effect on motivation, which may be termed 
its security effect. The success of managerial action
in terms of the security effect depends, as already stated, 
on the calibre of search and evaluation procedures, while 
the extent of the 'substitution' between proximate 
objectives depends on available investible resources 
(liquidity), suitable investment opportunities, the profit 
'gap', and the bargaining-learning process within the active
TTcT)
As explained below, the impact of a tax increase on 
managerial expense preference may be regarded as one of 
facilitating an already active aspect of managerial 
motivation. By contrast, the tax security effect 
creates a situation, viz. a security problem which, by 
hypothesis, did not exist prior to the tax increase.
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managerial group. As previously stated, a firm subject to 
effective competition is unable to respond in this fashion 
to a tax increase.
Williamson argues that the reaction to a tax increase,
of a firm whose main objective is to maximize sales subject
to a minimum profit constraint, will be to reduce both staff
and output and move towards a profit-maximizing position
independently of the condition of the competitive
environment. His reason is that the firm's minimum profit
constraint is assumed to be always binding. [265, pp.80-1].
It is debatable whether profit-constrained sales
maximization, as advocated by Baumöl [11, Ch.6] , is really
compatible with managerial self-interest, despite Baumöl's
claim that 'this hypothesis in no way conflicts with an
assumption of rationality' [11, p.47].
in the sales maximizing firm, the managers have no 
greater preference for staff than for production. 
Additional laborers and additional staff are equally 
valued...The objective is merely to choose that 
composition of variable factors that most contributes 
to sales. Thus, instead of expanding the operations 
of the firm in a manner that favors expenditures on 
staff (as occurs in the managerial discretion models), 
the entire scale of the enterprise is expanded 
generally and without bias towards staff [Williamson,
265 , p . 80] .
In normal circumstances an expense preference for staff 
is one dimension of managerial self-interest. Moreover, 
since a sales maximizer's profit constraint is, by 
assumption, always binding, Baumol's model seems to place 
management in a position similar to that of short-run profit 
maximization under effective competition. Actually, in 
advocating sales maximization, Baumol's main aim was to 
displace profit from its position as a firm's main objective, 
although a sales maximizer can pay no less attention to
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profit than would a profit maximizer. The former would also 
be likely to allot a higher priority to maintenance of 
existing market shares than would a growth maximizer, who 
would be relatively more ready to diversify into new 
fields. Sales maximization is of interest here from the 
twin viewpoints of investment policy and the response of 
management to tax increases. However, because it appears to 
conflict with the exercise of (unfettered) managerial 
self-interest, this objective may be confined to particular 
market situations.
A firm whose security constraints are not activated by a 
tax increase will not take special investment action as a 
result of the increase. Its investment policy will continue 
along existing lines, subject as always to the rate of 
increase in available resources (including staff), and to 
available investment opportunities. In these circumstances, 
as Lintner explains:
considerations of profitability enter into investment 
decisions in a much broader context of other 
considerations and objectives than has been reflected 
in the theoretical models used to discuss the effects 
of taxes on investment...So long as profit positions 
are not unacceptably low and the necessary funds are 
available on acceptable terms, very substantial amounts 
of new investment are likely to be undertaken even 
where there is no good evidence that the individual 
investment moves will add enough to net profit to make 
them worth while on that ground alone...if an 
investment is primarily justifiable on grounds of 
profit and it is marginal on this basis or is made 
marginal in these terms by a tax increase, another 
investment directly justifiable on other grounds is 
likely to be made in its stead. Since investment 
policies serve a number of different management and 
company objectives, not just greater profits alone, 
the degree of reduction in the volume of investment 
attributable to taxes on incentives will be seriously 
overstated by considering simply the effects of taxes 
on profitability [157, pp.523-4 ] .
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Given managerial expense preference for staff and 
emoluments, unless a tax increase activates security 
constraints, there will be substitution between profit and 
preferred expenses. As Williamson states: 'when the
"price" of taking satisfaction in the form of profit 
increases, the compensated tax adjustment always leads to 
a substitution of staff for profit...' [265, p.47]. This 
conclusion is supported by Cyert and March as follows:
With respect to an increase in the profit tax 
rate, our model predicts that the firm will shift out 
of profits and into staff and output as well as 
managerial superfluities as the penalty associated 
with reporting profits is increased. In the presence 
of an excess profits tax, for example, the behavioral 
firm will increase expenditures on advertising, 
customer services, public relations, and so forth and 
at the same time increase the proportion of 
management slack absorbed as cost [44, p.249].
Machlup also supports this view, and states that 'every
change in tax rates changes the trade-off ratios...[between
profit, managerial remuneration and] several other company
expenses which add to the prestige, power, and self-esteem
of the managers' [167, p.20]. He further points out that
'this is confined to situations where profits are high
enough to stand encroachments by avoidable expenses - to
situations, that is, where the firm is not hard-pressed by
competition' [loc.cit.]. Although, as Machlup implies, the
marginal substitution rate between profit and preferred
expenses is zero when a firm is subject to effective
competition, the extent to which these expenses may be
safely preferred to profit is always limited. Thus, when
the tax rate increases, profit trade-off is constrained by
liquidity considerations, the threat of share market
sanctions, and by demand for resources to finance future
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growth. Various other institutional and legal considerations 
may also limit the exercise of expense preference.
Managerial expense preference for staff and emoluments 
is a normal feature of the modern corporate scene which will 
be exercised to varying extents whenever firms are not 
subject to adversity. Real investment is also a preferred 
expense, subject to managerial growth motivation. Since 
expense preference manifests managerial self-interest and 
would be exercised with or without a tax to some extent 
(circumstances permitting), a tax substitution effect 
between profit and staff only facilitates or enhances an 
essentially non-tax tendency. This view is consistent with 
the previous conclusion that the main effect of tax 
increases on managerial motivation is confined to cases in 
which one or more of a firm's security constraints becomes 
binding as a result of the tax increase.
* * * * *
CHAPTER 2
THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
2.1 Introduction
In conventional tax theory investment is subject to 
risk, the quantifiable probability of loss. Despite the 
considerable information available to investors through 
their assumed ability to calculate probability 
distributions for outcomes of investment opportunities, 
risk is considered a strong deterrent to investment. This 
is especially so when the tax rate on yield or profit rises, 
since this reduces the reward for risk-taking.
It is therefore widely agreed that relief is necessary, 
to provide an investment incentive, or to restore that 
destroyed by the tax. Various measures have been 
canvassed for this task, including the expensing of 
investment. Following the Domar-Musgrave analysis, 
however, one very influential method of redress is 
provision of offset for losses. This measure has long 
commanded support in equity. However, Domar and Musgrave 
found in loss offsets for tax purposes a whole new 
dimension as an investment incentive, based on this 
provision's impact on investment yield and risk.
This Chapter examines the reasonableness of risk 
assumptions for corporate real investment, and identifies 
some consequences of the state of knowledge in which 
investment decisions are made. Incentive effects of tax 
loss offset provisions are then evaluated in relation to
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results of the examination of risk assumptions, and to 
conclusions about how pursuit of managerial self-interest 
is affected by the state of knowledge.
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2 . 2 The Domar-Musgrave Analysis 
These authors followed Hart's view that it is 
'reasonable to set up the assumption of quantified 
probability estimates as an idealization of actual business 
practice' [109, p.52]. They adopted the probability
distribution 'in the absence of a better approach' and 
assumed that their investor would construct such a 
distribution for each available investment opportunity.
[52, p.393]. Although their analysis is therefore 
couched entirely in terms of risk, Domar and Musgrave did 
not completely ignore uncertainty.
Investment decisions are made in spite of 
uncertainty with respect to the relevant data and 
their implications. No investor is sure that his 
estimated probability distribution is entirely 
correct, but the degree of uncertainty will vary 
with different investors and different investments.
It will be a factor in the investment decision. Yet 
it is extremely difficult to express the degree of 
uncertainty involved in workable terms. For our 
purpose it is sufficient to say that the prevalence 
of uncertainty may induce the investor to require a 
somewhat higher return than would be required 
otherwise [52, pp. 395-6] .
Moreover, in their opinion,
if definitions for risk and yield were obtained on 
the basis of some different approach,.. .behavior 
under the impact of a tax would probably be very 
similar. If it is denied that numerical values can 
be obtained, no method for a precise analysis of the 
problem appears to be available [52, p.421].
Domar and Musgrave found that 'the probability of a
loss...is the essence of risk' [52, p.396]. Specifically:
Since the investor is not only interested in the 
probability of a negative return, but also in the 
chances of suffering losses of various magnitudes, 
the coefficient of risk should be defined more 
precisely as a function of losses and their 
probabilities. This can be done most simply by 
defining risk as...r, i.e. the summation of all 
possible losses multiplied by their respective 
probabilities. . . [loc.cit. ] .
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Risk is expressed symbolically in terms of mathematical 
expectation as
k
r = - E q p ,
i = 1
where , q^ ... q^ , q^ + ^ ••• qn are expected rates of
return such that q, < q, , and q, = 0, and where thel l+l ^k
probability of occurrence of q_^  is p_^ , such that
n
£ p. = l 
i = l 1
Further comments by Domar and Musgrave, which are 
pertinent to their views on the nature of risk and 
uncertainty, are briefly listed below:
(1) Investment constitutes creation of risk, whereas 
the holding of cash is riskless by assumption 
[52 , p. 391] ;
(2) Risk includes the possibility that losses will 
not be covered by other income, but large 
corporations should be relatively well-placed in 
this respect [52, pp.391-2];
(3) Greater dispersion of the probability distribution 
does not, ceteris paribus, constitute risk in the 
sense of commanding a market return, although it 
is a factor in investment decisions [52, p.397];
(4) The speculative, precautionary and income elements 
of Keynesian liquidity preference represent 
aspects of the fear of loss, and are therefore 
taken into account in the probability distribution 
[52, p.398]; and
(5) Opportunity costs are excluded, so that risk does
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not include the possibility of missing 
opportunities [52, p.400].
In common with many other writers Domar and Musgrave
conclude that a tax without loss offsets will lead to a
reduction in investment, in terms of the quantity of risk
borne. This is the net result of the negative risk or
substitution effect and the positive income effect.
However, when provision is made for losses to be fully
offset against taxable income, their model shows that return
per unit of risk is unchanged by the tax, and that the
income effect, operating alone, causes total risk-taking to
<increase. Total risk includes that borne respectively by 
the taxpayer and by the government, which, under a tax with 
loss offset provisions, shares investment risk with the 
taxpayer. Total risk, after adjustment to increases in the 
tax rate, will be greater when full offset for losses is 
permitted the higher is the tax rate. Above some optimum 
tax rate, however, reduction in the level of private risk 
overcomes the multiplier income effect and total risk tends 
to fall.
According to Domar and Musgrave, therefore, the 
incentive or disincentive effects of the tax depend entirely 
upon whether or not provision is made for losses to be fully 
offset. As they observed, since corporate revenue losses 
are necessarily offset against available income in the same 
year, only net losses remain to be dealt with for tax 
loss-offset purposes. [52, p.391]. They suggest that 
losses should be carried forward and back against income of 
other periods to provide full offset, on the understanding
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that the investor is assured of such income. Better still, 
the government should consider reimbursing taxpayers (at the 
tax rate) during the same period as losses are incurred. 
This, claim Domar and Musgrave will ensure that investment 
conditions are more favourable under a high tax rate than 
under a lower rate with less complete offset for losses.
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2.3 Risk or Uncertainty?
A decision alternative, that is, a known possible 
course of action, is characterized by risk if the 
probabilities of each of its possible outcomes are known 
when the decision is made. [Ansoff, 7, p.120; Baumöl, 12, 
Ch.19; Farrar, 76, pp.1-2; Knight, 139, p.233; Lintner,
156, p.254; F. and V. Lutz, 165, p.182]. Knowledge refers 
here to the requirement that there should exist a 
numerical probability distribution, either provided 
a priori to the decision-maker, or established statistically, 
or developed subjectively by experience. [Knight, 139, 
p.214; Luce and Raiffa, 163, Ch.13; Savage, 218, p.3;
Tisdell, 254 , pp.125-7] . In order to satisfy the above 
requirement a decision alternative must be capable of 
repetition over a very large number of homogeneous, 
individual instances, either by the decision-maker himself 
or by someone (such as an insurer) to whose knowledge the 
decision-maker has access. [Farrar, 76, p.2; Knight, 139, 
p.234; Shackle, 221, pp.4-5]. The frequency distribution,
representing the knowledge gained by serial testing, must 
be available ex ante to the decision-maker.
A choice situation is one of risk when all available 
decision alternatives can be specified in advance and are 
capable of being treated as risk alternatives in the manner 
specified above.
The measurement of risk is usually associated with 
dispersion of possible outcomes around an average, although 
it may be recalled from 2.2 above that Domar and Musgrave
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do not share this view. V a r ious measures of dispersion
are used as investment criteria, including:
(1) The range of the d i s t r i b u t i o n  around its mode 
(most probable value) , in which case 'the greater 
the range, the less definite the expectation of 
the most probable price' [Lange, 149, p . 2 9 ] ;
(2) The variance of the d i s t r i b u t i o n  from its mean. 
[Makower and Marschak, 168] ;
(3) The standard deviation of the d istribution from
its mean. [F. and V. Lutz, 165, p.180; Tobin,
255, p .7 2] ; '
(4) The standard deviation as in C3), with
correction for skewness of the distribution.
( 3)[F. and V. Lutz, loc.cit ■ ] .
C o r respondingly, a decision alte rnative is subject to 
u n c e rt ainty when, prior to the decis i o n  being made, it is 
either impossible to formulate its numerical prob a b i l i t y
( 1 )
Di sc ussions of the effects of prop o r t i o n a l  taxes on 
individual investment behaviour, under various assumptions 
re gar ding which moments of p r o b a b i l i t y  d i stributions are 
relevant to investors, are found in Lepper [153] and 
Richter [211] .
(2 )
Lintner found, despite a general p r e s u m p t i o n  among 
economi sts that relative risks are best measured by the 
standard deviation, that indi fference functions are linear 
between expected rates of return and their variance, not 
their standard deviation, at least in cases when all 
cov ariances were cons idere d invariant or zero. [160, p.14]. 
In Tobin's opinion 'the standard deviation is neither the 
sole measure of dispersion nor the obvi ously most relevant 
measure' [loc.cit. ] .
(3)
Skewness is de fined as the diff erence between a 
d i st ri bution's mean and mode di vided by its standard 
deviation: it is often argued that, if the mode is located
to the right of the mean, the p r o b a b i l i t y  of values higher 
than the mode o c c u r r i n g  is less than that of values smaller 
than the m o d e .
2 . 3 79
dist ri bution [Baumol, 12, Ch.19; Farrar, 76, p.2; Hurwicz,
117, p.133; Knight, 139, p.233; Lintner, 156, p.254; Luce
and Raiffa, 163, C h . 13 ; Tisdell , 254, p . 12 5] , or the
d i s t r ib ution is considered unreliable. [ G e o r g e s c u - R o e g e n ,
86, p.25; Knight, 139, p.199; Modigliani and Cohen, 186,
p . 15 5 ; Penrose, 200, pp.56 , 58 ; Shackle, 220, pp. 115-6].
Hart has stated that u n c e r tainty is present when the
par am et ers of the p r o b a b i l i t y  d i stribution are not
s i n g 1e - v a l u e d . [108, p.110]. Shackle has ascribed
u n c e r ta inty to c i rcumstances in which the decis i o n - m a k e r
'is a chooser among courses of action concerning the
outcome of each of which he entertains several
( 4 )n o n - e xc ludable hypotheses' [221, p.18]. His reasoning,
well worth noting,is as follows:
The things amongst which a man is free to choose are 
not satisfactions themselves, but actions designed to 
secure for him some sort of satisfaction; and except 
when he acts as a mere spender of income on familiar 
things for immediate consumption, there is no knowing 
whether any given course of action that he embarks on 
will secure him the sort of satisfaction he looks to 
it for, either in kind or in quantity. This is most 
stri kingly true in regions of economic theory lying 
outside the theory of value, narrowly interpreted; and 
in p articular it is true in the theory of investment 
[loc.cit. ] .
Before taking the cue from Shackle's remarks, it 
remains to define the u n c e r t a i n t y  of a choice situation. 
This occurs when the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r  is not aware ex ante 
of all the specific decision a lternatives available to him 
[Ansoff, 7, p.15; McGuire, 180, p.33; Savage, 218, p.16;
(4)
In Shackle's t e r m i n o l o g y  a non-ex c l u d a b l e  hypo thesis is 
one which cannot be rejected 'absolutely as irrelevant and 
out of the question...' [ l o c . c i t . ].
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Simon, 228, p . 5 3 ] , and is mo reover unable to formulate 
num erical p r o b a bility distr i b u t i o n s  for those alte rnatives 
of which he is aware.
Most managerial real i nvestment decisions are taken in
conditions of u n c e r tainty in this latter sense. Despite
this, the majority of theoretical discussions of investment
(including those of corporate tax theorists) assume
conditions of risk. Specifically, it is usually assumed
either that the choice situation is fully one of risk
(Domar and Musgrave, for e x a m p l e ) , or, as a concession to
reality, that the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r  cannot fully enumerate his
investm ent opportunities, but is able to handle known
alt ern atives in terms of risk. As G e o r g e s c u - R o e g e n  observes:
Most social scientists and decision theorists reason 
on the assumption that such an u ncertainty can be 
r epresented by some kind of numerical profitability.  
Warnings issued from time to time against the futility, 
nay the danger, of treating all decisions as if they 
ref erred to "a gamble on a known m a t h e m a t i c a l  chance" 
[Knight, 139, Ch . 7] have had little effect..., most 
students have p r e f e r r e d  to advance on the less thorny 
pas sage of measurable unce r t a i n t y  - a passage more 
fertile in analytical results - rather than to face the 
delicate comp lexity of e xpectation and be content with 
making smaller, yet more relevant, strides [86, p . l l ] .(5)
(5)
The available options are perhaps less bleak than 
Geo r g e s c u - R o e g e n  suggests. It may be possible to predict 
the dir ection of real investment behaviour under u ncertainty 
on the base's of a ssumption s about motivation, competence and 
available resources, without having to ascertain the manner 
in which an investor forms his detailed expe ctations about 
the future. G e o r g e s c u - R o e g e n  in fact concludes that 'the 
concept [of good judgment] seems to resist any attempt at 
an objective d efinition that also would be operational ex 
ante' [86, p . 2 9 ] . Also, as Simon points out, 'expectations 
play a narrower role in actual business behavior than they 
do in classical models of rational choice. The devices 
employed in p r o g r a m m e d  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  to reduce dependence 
on explicit forecasts are numerous' [228, p . 5 7 ] .
2 . 3 81
A prime example of the practices to which G e o r g e scu-Roegen  
refers is the facile assumption (made by Domar and 
Musgrave; refer 2.2 s u p r a ) that risk may satisfactorily 
substitute for unce r t a i n t y  subject to the investor 
dem and ing that his return should include a p r emium to cover 
the latter .
Many issues are affected by the choice between risk and 
unc e r t a i n t y  assumptions, including the m a x i m ization 
controversy, definition of rationality, and the nature of 
exp ect ations, etc. For present purposes, however, the 
n e c e ss ity for basing discussion on the assumption that 
unce rt ainty prevails reduces to two considerations: firstly,
that bus iness is in fact faced with uncertainty; and, 
secondly, that beha viour under u n c e rtainty differs 
sub st an tially from that under risk. It may be recalled that 
Domar and Musgrave did not dispute the first c o n s i d e r a t i o n / 6 
but they rejected the second one expl icitly [52, pp.395, 
n.6, 421, 422], on the grounds that 'it is sufficient to say
that the prevalence of u ncertainty may induce the investor 
to require a somewhat higher return than would be required 
otherwise' [52, pp. 395-6].
It is judged s elf-evident that corporate m anagements  
cannot be aware ex ante of all possible available
(6 )
Specifically» Domar and Musgrave defined u ncertainty as 
doubt with regard to the correctness of p r o b a b i l i t y  
dis tributions. By referring to 'a p r o b a b i l i t y  distribution 
which the investor will construct for each available 
inv estment opportunity' [52, p.393], it is clear that they 
assu med  a choice situation of risk, as defined above. That 
is, they a cknowledged uncertainty, but not in the sense 
re co gni zed here, and they assumed that the investor can 
specify all available decision a lternatives in advance.
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investment opportunities. The u ncertainty which attaches 
to the outcomes of known op p o r t u n i t i e s  arises from the 
uniquen ess of most individual investment decisions. This 
uniquen ess means that it is impossible to form the very 
large group of like instances necessary to construct a 
p r o b a b i l i t y  distribution. The p r oblem is beyond the scope 
of insurance for the same reason. [Knight, 139, p p . 233-4; 
Latane, 151, p . 149 ; Shackle, 220, Ch.7; 221, Ch . 1] . Even
if a h y p o thetical e x a n t e d i s t ribution was constructed, no 
e x post d istribution would ever become available wh ereby the 
former could be proved correct. These obstacles extend to 
the case in which results from a considerable number of 
similar past instances are available, since failure to 
d i s t in gu ish aspects of a current decision a lternative which 
differ from those of past instances may have very 
un fo rt unate consequences. [Fellner, 79, p.197]. Moreover,
as Knight has p o inted out: 'Where the connection [between
pre sent and past decisions] is occasional, d e m o n stration of 
a depe ndable connection is vastly more difficult, and there 
is the added p r o b l e m  of a s c e rtaining the precise proportion 
of cases in which the connection occurs' [139, p . 2 1 4 ] .
Pr ob a b i l i t y  d i s t r ibutions are a doubtful guide for 
individual cases, apart from the problems of uniqueness and 
e s t a b li shment of d ependable  connections between cases.
It is clear then that the p r o b a b i l i t y  coefficient 
can be uniquely de fined as a frequency ratio only in 
the entire phase-space. A sequence of observations, 
be it infinite, represents but a mere sample of this 
space. This does not mean that we can dispense with 
it...But can we trust the inte rmediary link, knowing 
that a sequence of o b s e r v a t i o n s  may lead to any 
frequency limit or even to none? [G e o r g e s c u - R o e g e n ,
86, p . 16] .
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The answer is that 'we cannot affirm that in the long run an 
event will occur with a frequency p r o p o rtionate to its 
prob abi lity; but we can affirm that it is more likely to 
occur with this than with any other precise degree of 
frequency' [Boole, 20, p.422]. Therefore, a p r o b a bility 
dis tr ib ution provides knowledge for prediction 'not of the 
outcome of any one future trial, but only of the average 
outcomes of a long series of future trials, all identical 
to those conducted in the past' [Angell, 6, p.4].
Ma the m a t i c a l  e xpectati on on its own has long since 
ceased to be advo cated as the criterion for decision-making, 
because Bernoulli [15] demonstrated, in terms of the 
St Pet er sburg Paradox and other examples, that this 
pri nc ip le is contravened in practice. Instead it was 
supposed that decisio n - m a k e r s  seek to maximize the product 
of objective proba b i l i t i e s  of outcomes and the utilities of 
those outcomes, known as expected utility maximization.
In 1944, the year in which the D o m a r -Musgrave analysis was 
published, the criterion received trem endous impetus from 
p u b l i ca tion of von Neumann and M o r g e n s t e r n 's famous work 
'Theory of Games and Economic Behavior' [194] . They 
de mo n s t r a t e d  that risky prop o s i t i o n s  can be ordered in 
desirability, and thereby endowed expected utility with 
b e h a v i o u r a l  meaning.
Nev ertheless, d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with objective 
probab ility, for reasons already explained, soon led to 
d ev el op me nt of an alte rnati ve approach based on subjective 
pro bability. The subjective approach arose from the work 
of de Finetti [80] , Ramsey [208] , and Savage [218] , of which
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the latter is most influential. Whereas, in the case of 
objective probability,
evidence for the quality of agreement between the 
behavior of the repetitive event and the mathematical 
concept, and for the magnitude of the probability that 
applies, is to be obtained by observation of some 
repetitions of the eventf and from no other source 
whatsoever...[subjective or personal probability] 
measures the confidence that a particular individual 
has in the truth of a particular proposition...[on the 
understanding that] two reasonable individuals faced 
with the same evidence may have different degrees of 
confidence in the truth of the same proposition 
[Savage, 218, p.3].
In contrast to objective probability, subjective probability 
is regarded as 'a code of consistency for the person 
applying it, not a system of predictions about the world 
around him' [Savage, 218, p.59]. Internal consistency of
beliefs is achieved by a rationality stipulation to the 
effect that a person's beliefs should reduce to addition of 
probabilities of mutually exclusive events and to 
multiplication of those of independent events. [Cf. Keynes, 
134, p.120]. Learning by experience through changes in 
subjective probability is governed by Bayes' Theorem. Thus, 
although subjective probabilities have the same 
mathematical properties as objective probabilities, an 
individual is free to choose any subjective probabilities 
he likes prior to the first occurrence of an event, even 
ones unsupported by compelling argument. [Savage, 218, 
p.65] .
Although subjective expected utility maximization must 
rate as an advance on its objective predecessor, it is no 
more competent than the latter to cope with decision-making 
under uncertainty. Objections to the subjective theory 
involve both its probability and utility aspects.
2 . 3 8 5
Acc o r d i n g  to the p e r s o n a i i s t i c  view, the role of 
the m a t h e m a t i c a l  theory of p r o b a b i l i t y  is to enable 
the person using it to detect in consistencies in his 
own real or envisaged behavior. It is also 
und e r s t o o d  that, having detected an inconsistency, he 
will remove it. An i nconsistency is typically 
removable in many different ways, among which the 
theory gives no guidance for choosing. Silence on 
this point does not seem alto gether appropriate, so 
there may be room to improve the theory here 
[Savage, 218, p.57].
That is, subjective numeric al p r o b a b i l i t y  is something less 
than a p r a ctical guide to action. It can warn the 
dec is i o n - m a k e r  that he is in error, but it cannot advise him 
how to correct the situation. This weakness arises from the 
sub jec ti vist view that p r o b a b i l i t y  is not concerned with 
pr ed i c t i n g  the outside world. [Georgescu-Roegen, 86, p.29;
Savage, 218, p.59].
The p ostulates of personal p r o b a b i l i t y  imply that I can 
determine, to any degree of ac curacy whatsoever, the 
pro b a b i l i t y  (for me) that the next president will be a 
Democrat. Now it is manifest that I cannot really 
det ermine that number with great accuracy, but only 
roughly [Savage, l o c .c i t .j .
The apparent accuracy of numerical p r o b a b i l i t y  is 
spurious and unat t a i n a b l e  in conditions of uncertainty. A 
s ub je ct iv ist is no more able to determine the outcome of an 
election than is an o bjectivist able to state that 'on the 
basis of the available evidence it is very improbable, though 
not impossible, that France will become a mo narchy within 
the next decade' [Savage, 218, pp.61-2]. Yet elections or 
suc ce ssi ons would normally be subject to a lower order of 
u n c e r t a i n t y  than many business investment decisions.
Given that p r o b a b i l i t i e s  which do not add to unity are 
not proper measures [Edwards, 64, p.72] , subjective 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  may be regar d e d  as being bounded at 0 and 1 in 
the same way as objective probabilities. The addition
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theorem specifies b o u n dedness to achieve internal 
con si st en cy of beliefs. Therefore, subjective and 
objective p r o b a b i l i t y  scales are identical and 'the 
for mal iza tion of weights as subjective p r o b a b i l i t y 
mea sur es must then be either abandoned altogether, or the 
measu res  arrived at originally must be adjusted upwards 
(or downwards) so as to make them conform to the rule that 
the weight of a tautology is equal to unity' [Ozga, 195, 
p . 91; Edwards, 65, p.37; Fellner, 78]. E xperimental  
evidence indicates that people simply do not possess the 
nec es sa ry  degree of r a t i onality to conform to the addition 
theorem. [Cf. Edwards, 64, p.74]. Instead, as Shackle has 
explained, an increase in the number of unexcludable 
hyp ot he se s about the result of a decision does not reduce 
the degree of acceptance accorded those hypotheses already 
held. [220 , p p . 113-4; 221, pp.26-9].
Just as Bernoulli d e m o n s t r a t e d  that people do not
con form to the principle of m a t h e m a t i c a l  expe ctation on its
own, Pareto [198] has shown that the p r o b a b i1 ity-less idea
of utility (which refers to the consequences of acts, rather
(7 )than to acts themselves) is untenable. Therefore, if
nu me ri ca l probability, wh ether subjective or objective) is 
d is cr ed it ed for conditions of uncertainty, utility 
m a x i mi za tion must also be rejected. However, certain
77)
'Utility as a function of wealth can have any shape 
wh a t s o e v e r  in the p r o b a b i 1i t y - 1ess context, p r o vided only 
that the function in question is i ncreasing with i ncreasing  
wealth, the provision following from the casual 
o bs er va ti on that almost nobody throws money away' [Savage, 
218 , p . 96] .
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obj ect ions which apply to the utility aspect of subjective
expecte d utility maxi m i z a t i o n  are worth noting, because
they must be reckoned with in connection with managerial
re al -i n v e s t m e n t  decision-making. Two main assumptions
un de rl yi ng utility maxim i z a t i o n  are that all acts can be
(8 )rank or dered and that the sure-thing prin ciple applies.
In practice it is likely that d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  is affected by
i n co ns is tencies and i n t ransitivities that are difficult to
deal with conventionally, even by means of stochastic
(9 )choice models (e.g. Luce [162]) . Incons istencies occur
as a result of elem entary mistakes in logic or because, 
although people often follow precedent, they have faulty 
memori es for it, p a r t i c u l a r l y  when similar sets of 
circu ms tances are separated at all widely in time. 
Alt ern at ively, man's learning faculty may cause him to 
p er pe tr at e deliberate i n co nsistencies over time, if he
(8 )
This principle is as follows: if a person would not
pr efe r act f to act g, kn owing either that event B will 
occur, or that event not B will occur, then he does not 
prefer f to g. Also, p r o vided event B is not regarded as 
virtu all y impossible, if the person defi nitely prefers g to 
f, know ing that B will occur, and, if he would not prefer f 
to g, knowing that B will not occur, then he definitely  
prefers g to f. [Savage, 218, p p . 2 1 - 2 ] .
(9)
Inc on sistency occurs when a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r  fails to 
repeat a previous choice from the same set of decision 
alte rn at ives and under the same conditions. Intran sitivity  
occurs when a d e c i s i on-make r prefers A to B , B to C, and 
C to A .
(10)
Cf. Knight's observation: 'Where the connection
[between homogeneous cases] is occasional, d emonstration of 
a dep en dable connection is vastly more difficult, and there 
is the added p r o blem of ascer t a i n i n g  the precise 
p r o p or ti on of cases in which the connection occurs' [139, 
p.214].
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remembers that previous instances of a current choice 
situation turned out badly for him.
The above utility assumptions may therefore be 
unrealistically stringent in their requirements of logic 
and knowledge on the part of decision-makers: indeed, they
strongly suggest the 'look before you leap' principle.
Carried to its logical extreme, the "Look before 
leap" principle demands that one envisage every 
conceivable policy for the government of his whole 
life (at least from now on) in its most minute details, 
in the light of the vast number of unknown states of 
the world, and decide here and now on one policy.
This is utterly ridiculous, not - as some might think - 
because there might later be cause for regret, if 
things did not turn out as had been anticipated, but 
because the task imp lied in making such a decision is 
not even remotely resembled by human possibility. It is 
even utterly beyond our power to plan a picnic or to 
play a game of chess in accordance with the principle, 
even when the world of states and the set of 
available acts to be envisaged are artificially reduced 
to the narrowest reasonable limits [Savage, 218,
p .16].(11)
Intransitivities in choice are especially serious for 
utility maximization because they strike at the foundation 
of the theory's rationality assumptions. Luce and Raiffa 
suggest that intransitivities 'often occur when a subject 
forces choices between inherently incomparable alternatives. 
The idea is that each alternative invokes "responses" on 
several different "attribute" scales and that, although 
each scale itself may be transitive, their amalgamation 
need not be' [163, p.25] . May [178] suggests that
(11 )
Savage nevertheless feels that this principle 'is the 
proper subject of our further discussion, because to cross 
one's bridges when one comes to them means to attack 
relatively simple problems of decision by artificially 
confining attention to so small a world that the "Look 
before you leap" principle can be applied there' [l o c .c i t .].
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intr ans itive choices may be expected to occur wh enever more
than one dimension exists in the stimuli along which
de ci si o n - m a k e r s  may order their preferences. This
de sc ri pt ion seems to fit very well the m u l t i - m o t i v a t e d
(1 2)cor po ra ti on ma nager of Chapter 1. However, underlying
both in co nsistencies and i n t r a n s itivities are the effects 
of uncertainty, espe cially as regards the boundedness of 
r a t i o n a l i t y .
No matter how intrans i t i v i t i e s  arise, we must 
rec ognize that they exist, and we can take only little 
comfort in the thought that they are an anathema to 
most of what constitutes theory in the behavioral  
sciences today. We may say that we are only concerned 
with behavior which is transitive, adding hope fully  
that we believe this need not always be a vacuous study. 
Or we may contend that the transitive d escription is 
often a 'close' a p p r o ximation to reality. Or we may 
limit our interest to 'normative' or 'idealized' 
behavior in the hope that such studies will have a 
m e t a t h e o r e t i c  impact on more realistic studies [Luce 
and Raiffa, 1o c . cit . ] .
(1 2 )
Strict i n t r a n sitivity has nothing to do with changes in 
tastes that can occur during sequential choice procedure. 
E xp er im en tal studies have e s t a b lished that i n t ransitivities  
and in co nsistencies are empirical facts of life, and the main 
p r o b l e m  appears to consist of esta b l i s h i n g  the frequencies 
with which they occur. Other references include Edwards,
64, 65; Davidson and Marschak, 46; Luce, 162; Papandreou,
196, and Tversky, 258.
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2.4 Some Effects of Uncertainty
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing
discussion. Firstly, investment decisions are made in
conditions of uncertainty, not risk. Secondly, and as a
direct result of uncertainty (as here defined), it is
unlikely that decision-makers can maximize their inves tment
objectives. Theories based on risk and maximization
assumptions, whether they deal with expected profit or
utility, are suspect for positive micro-economic purposes,
because the circumstances which they envisage bear little
resemblance to the real world. That is, action based on
the fantastic degrees of knowledge and logic with which
m a x i m i z i n g  risk-takers are endowed is of quite a different
order to that of even the most competent and enterprising
management. The nature of the decision process, its
problems and emphases, must differ markedly between the
two cases, because of the great disparity in knowledge and
rationality. It is necessary to discard risk and
maximization assumptions for purposes of studying real
investment behaviour and business reactions to corporate tax
changes, in favour of a more realistic approach based on
(1 3 )sub-optimizing under uncertainty.
The Domar-Musgrave analysis is an excellent early 
example of the subjective expected utility maximization
(13)
In discussion on a paper by Simon [226] Lintner states: 
"descriptively behavior as observed often differs markedly 
(and in relatively systematic ways for substantial periods) 
from optimizing behavior and...these observed patterns, 
not the implications of presumed optimizing behavior, are 
what is relevant in judging, for instance, the effect of a 
change in tax rates on real investment, . . . ' [226 , p.25] .
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approa ch to the pr o b l e m  of pre d i c t i n g  investment reactions
to income tax changes. They de fined unce r t a i n t y  as a
quality of doubt about the correctness of p r o b a b i l i t y
distribut ions, as opposed to complete inability to construct
such distributions. Consequently, they were able to defend
(14)their risk assu mptions vigorously. Their assumptions
are no more idealized than those of many other 
(15)con tributions. Nevertheless, their conclusions about
effects of income tax changes on inve stment depend on these 
ass umptions, and are therefore suspect. It would be 
impossible in practice for a firm to formulate the smooth, 
con tinuous optim u m - a s s e t  curve 'w h ich describes the 
investor's evaluation of the market situation and which is 
the pri nc ipal tool for our analysis' [52, p . 4 0 2 ] . Nor
(14 )
Shackle, a subjectivist who rejects the p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i st ri bu tion approach, comments on the Domar- M u s g r a v e  version 
of unc er tainty in the following terms: 'It is not quite clear
whether the u n c e r t a i n t y . . .arises from the fact that the 
dis tr ib ution is a distr i b u t i o n  and not a unique value looked 
on as certain, or from the investor's doubt as to whether 
the dis tribution is the right shape, wh atever "right" can 
mean here' [220, p . l l 5 ‘J. Shackle points out that the 
d i s t ri bu tion is bogus in these circumstances, and really 
expresses, 'not actuarial risk which is a form of k n o w l e d g e , 
but un c e r t a i n t y which is another name for ignorance' [220, 
p . 1 1 5 - 6 ] . He concludes that the distr i b u t i o n  fails to 
describe an investor's uncertainty in exact terms, because 
the d i s t r ibution itself is po s s i b l y  incorrect, and known to 
be s o . [ 220 , p . 116 ] .
(15)
Consider, for example, the following statement from 
Goode's study of the corporate income tax: 'The importance
of the dete rrent effect of risk is a 11- pervasive and can be 
stated with fewer q u a l i fications than the positive 
att ra ct ion of profit' [88, p,119j. Domar and Musgrave share 
this view in the absence of perfect loss offsets.
(16)
This is due not only to u ncertainty but also, as Domar 
and Mu sgrave pointed out, to the fact that 'the manager of 
a co rp oration ...is confronted with fewer and more unique 
investm ent a lternatives than is the financial investor, and 
is thus unable to achieve an equal degree of diversification' 
[52, p. 422 j. The Dornar-Musgr ave op t imum-a s se t curve is 
dis cu ss ed in the Appendix.
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could management plot any part of such a curve prior to 
investment decisions. These conclusions follow directly 
from this study's definition of uncertainty. On the one 
hand, management is not aware of all available investment 
alternatives, and, on the other hand, it is unable to 
construct numerical probability distributions for known 
opportunities.
The Domar-Musgrave analysis also drastically 
over-simplifies the number of variables which must be 
considered in making investment decisions. These variables 
are elaborated in later Chapters. The relevant point here 
is that their approach would need several dimensions beyond 
the two that were considered in order to bear much 
resemblance to the real investment decision process, even 
if their risk assumptions were accepted.
The preference assumptions underlying the indifference 
curves used by Domar and Musgrave in conjunction with their 
optimum-asset curve were considered in Chapter 1. It may 
be mentioned in passing that their indifference curves 
actually have nothing to do with indifference in the sense 
in which this term is employed for purposes of risk theory. 
Their curves are constant-utility curves of the Edgeworth 
variety, as used in the theory of riskless choice. A 
Domar-Musgrave investor exercizes choice between different 
combinations of risk and yield in much the same way as a 
consumer apportions his budget between different goods.
The main distinction between the two cases is that the 
investor is selecting a preferred combination consisting 
partly of a positive 'good' (yield) and partly of a negative
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'good' (risk). Risk or uncertainty indifference, on the
other hand, refers to comparisons of knowledge or of
ignorance. Keynes defined it strictly as follows:
There must be no r e1e van t evidence relating to one 
alternative, unless there is corresponding evidence 
relating to the other; our relevant evidence, that is 
to say, must be symmetrical with regard to the 
alternatives, and must be applicable to each in the 
same manner [134, pp.55-6].
Richter examined the Domar-Musgrave conclusions under
the assumptions that the investor maximizes expected utility
and is concerned only with the first moment of probability
distributions (as they assumed). He demonstrated that the
investor's preference (indifference) curves between yield
and risk are parallel straight lines and that they are
'incapable of generating the movement toward higher "risk
taking" suggested by Domar and Musgrave. Under neither
proportional income tax nor lump sum tax shifts would there
be any change in the portfolio' [211, p.157]. In his
opinion the same conclusion obtains when an investor
maximizes the expected utility of a Bernoulli logarithmic
(17)function under a truly proportional tax. [211, p.161].
Richter then examined the Domar-Mu sgra ve conclusions from 
the viewpoint of an investor who considers the first two 
moments (i.e. mean and variance) of probability 
distributions. This investor exhibits a quadratic utility 
function. In this case an increase in the proportional
In Savage's estimation: 'To this day, no other function
has been suggested as a better prototype for Everyman's 
utility function' [218, p.94]. However, he cites Cramer's 
view that the logarithmic function is subject to refutation 
in terms of the St Petersburg Paradox and concludes that 
this function 'cannot be taken seriously over extreme 
ranges' [218, p.95].
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element of a linear tax 'leads to a shift away from the 
asset type with lower mean, toward the asset type with 
higher mean' [l o c .cit . 3 . R i s k - taking 'increases in the 
sense that the larger p o r t folio pre-tax income can only be 
ob ta in ed  at the "cost" of a higher port folio variance'
[2 11, p . 160] .
Domar and Musgrave therefore receive some oblique support
from 'a model based e x p l icitly on the von N e u m a n n -Morgenstern
axioms' [211, p.155]. Howev e r , t h i s  support was not
fo rt hc oming on Domar and M u s g r a v e 's own terms, and is itself
(18)open to objections, as in 2.3 above.
Other features of their analysis which attract comment at 
this stage may be br iefly mentioned. Firstly, their 
statement, that 'the prevalence of u n c e r tainty may induce 
the investor to require a somewhat higher return than would 
be req ui red otherwise' [52, p . 3 9 6 ] , is in apparent conflict
with the definition of u n c e r t a i n t y  adopted in the present 
study. The statement rests on the Domar- M u s g r a v e  view that 
u n c e rt ai nty is nothing more than a degree of doubt about the 
co rr ect ness of numerical p r o b a b i l i t y  distributions, and on 
their de finition of yield as a c ompensation for risk-taking. 
Under the present definition of unce r t a i n t y  an investor 
would be unable to compute the p r e m i u m  for u ncertainty 
env is ag ed by Domar and Musgrave. That is, he cannot 
as cer tai n the return to be expected under conditions of risk. 
As Shackle points out, 'it does not make sense to say that a
'(18)
Edw ards notes that it is 'especially easy' to construct 
exampl es of b e h aviour that violate the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
axioms 'when the amounts of money involved are very large'
[65 , p. 32] .
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man feels uncertain how uncertain/ or ignorant, he is. . . '
[220, p.122]. It is also mis l e a d i n g  to regard
investment as risk-taking. This view is based on 
qua nt i f i c a t i o n  of the p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of loss, which is 
impossible in practice. Much investment is made for the 
purpose, inter a l i a , of reducing overall uncertainty.
Domar and M u s g rave's statement, that 'opportunity costs, 
that is, income not receive d because investment opportunities  
were missed, do not enter our analysis' [52, p.400], is 
misleading. On no account would a D o mar-Musgrave investor 
have the slightest excuse for o v e r l ooking the opportunity 
costs of his investment decisions, owing to the great 
knowl edg e at his disposal. He is able to construct 
pro b a b i l i t y  d istributions for all available investment 
oppor tun ities, and can therefore choose or vary his 
po rtf oli o to include exactly that desired prop ortion of cash 
indic ate d by oppo r t u n i t y  cost calculations. Exclusion of 
opp o r t u n i t y  costs is also inconsistent with the 
D o m a r - Mu sgrave claim that 'the three elements of the 
[Keynesian] liquidity preference represent nothing but the 
fear of loss, and are therefore a c c ounted for in our 
p r o b a b i l i t y  distribution and in the values of y and r'
[52, p.398]. Liquidity preference, especially for the 
specu lative motive, clearly implies o pportunity cost 
cal cul ations. It must therefore be concluded that Domar 
and Mu sgrave were mistaken on this issue, and that 
o p p o r t u n i t y  costs do play an important part in their
investo r's calculations.
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Effects of income tax changes on investment under 
unc er ta in ty are considered in the final Section of this 
Chapter, in the light of the above discussion of definitions 
and assumptions which underly the Domar- Musgrave results.
At this stage it is concluded that their assumptions about 
the role of yield or profit and the quality and quantity of 
data available to investors in conditions of risk are 
ina ppr opriate for purposes of studying corporate investment 
dec isions under uncertainty. The full extent of the huge 
disp ari ty be tween the respective decisi o n - m a k i n g  
envi ro nm ents of a Domar-Musgrave investor and corporate 
m a n a g em ents will become evident during later C h a p t e r s . (19'
S u b - o p timality of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  is a direct 
con sequence of uncertainty. Potential investment 
o pp or tu ni ties must usually be unearthed by laborious and 
costly search activity, with no guarantee that effort and 
cost will eventually be repaid. E valuation of known 
o p p o r tu nities is c omplicate d by the fact that they cannot 
always be considered in neat order of suitability. Vital 
opp or tu nity cost calculations, which should precede 
decisions, are ha mpered by acqu i s i t i o n  costs of information, 
and by the fact that,under uncertainty, there is always an 
inevitable and irreducible residue of ignorance about the
(19)
There is little formal similarity be twe e n the real 
inv est ment decision process and that envisaged by the 
D o ma r- Mu sgrave analysis. For instance, search activity has 
no place in the latter, and the proximate objectives in 
terms of which m a n a gerial aspirations are p u r s u e d  bear only 
slight resemblance to those employed by Domar and Musgrave. 
Perhaps a better comparison with their decision process is 
G e o r g e s c u - R o e g e n 's 's e 1 f-guiding section of the enterprise - 
the P r o b a b i 1 i t y - Re 1 ation Bureau - which will autom a t i c a l l y  
make the "right" decisions, including that of what funds 
should be allocated to its proper budget' [86, p . 1 8 ] .
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outcomes of d e c i s i o n s . ^  ^  ' a further comp lication is that 
decisions must often be subjected to time limitation, to 
avoid losing o p p o r t unities to competitors. To these 
dif fi cu lt ies add the p r o blem of acquiring, and sparing from 
existin g activities, managerial resources capable of 
innovative decision-making. [Penrose, 200, p . 6 4 ] .
The imperfect nature of mana g e r i a l  rationality under
un ce r t a i n t y  is an important determinant of the investment
decision process. The pr o b l e m  is one of perception, and
man if es ts  itself in various ways. These include the
d if fi cu lt ies of r ecognizing both problems and opportunities
at the correct time, of giving correct emphasis to different
aspects of decisions and of considering these in the most
ap pr opr iate order, and the fact that, as a rule, p e r c eption
depends on incomplete and sometimes inaccurate 
(21 )information. C o ntribut ions to mana gerial
de c i s i o n - m a k i n g  which recognize its essential sub-o p t i m a l i t y 
under unce rtainty have therefore tended to emphasize the 
li mit ati ons of rationality, its adaptive nature, and its 
de pe nde nce on ex post 'feedback' correction of deci sions as 
data become available. [Cyert and March, 44, p.99; Simon, 
222, 225]. This view of rationality contrasts with that of
the o m n i s c i e n t l y - r a t i o n a l  firm in the classical theory of 
the f i r m .
_____
Cf. Modigliani and Cohen, who 'conveniently assume that 
any aspect of the future can be known with certainty provided 
the agent incurs a finite - though po ssibly very large - cost 
to obtain the information' [186, p.156] .
(2 1 )
Many of the critical problems of British industry have 
been a tt ributed to failures in perception. See, for example, 
Drucker [54] and P.E.P. [204]. Levitt [154] discusses 
comparable American experience.
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In this study a slightly diff erent definition of
ra ti on al ity has been p r o posed to the effect that rational
beh av io ur is the pu r s u i t  of p e r c e i v e d  self-interest. This
definition, which really reduces to the statement that
be hav iou r is rational, p e r i o d , accepts and includes the
views of the contributors m e n tioned above. In addition,
however, practical r ationality is conditioned p r e d o m i n a n t l y
by pe rs o n a l i t y  factors, motivation, and competence,
e sp ec ia ll y (so far as real investment d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  is
concerned) that p a r t icular type of competence known as
en t r e p r e n e u r i a l  competence. These factors determine the
nature of s e lf-interest under uncertainty, the q u a lity or
extent of perception, and the manner in which s e lf-interest  
(2 2 )is pursued. In particular, high premiums are pl aced on
ind ividuals who possess the peculiar facility, in conditions 
of uncertainty, of making correct decisions more often than 
not, and of timing these decisions correctly. This is so 
because 'there seems to be no other recom m e n d a t i o n  for 
dealing with Knightian unce rtainty than the common advice: 
"get all the facts and use good judgment"'
[G e o r g e s c u - R o e g e n , 86, p.29j. The function of mana g e m e n t s
is the refore precisely that of exercizing the p r o v e n  good 
judgment for which they are supposedly selected, in order
(22 )
It appears reasonable to assume that e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l 
compe tence does not usually lack the necessary s uppo rt from 
ambit iou s motivation, and is moreover asso ciated with 
general business efficiency. On the other hand, many are 
amb it io usly m o t i vated while lacking in various degrees the 
en tr ep r e n e u r i a l  competence n e c e ssary to cope succe s s f u l l y 
with innovative dec i s i o n - m a k i n g  under uncertainty.
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to make 'best' decisions on the available facts.
Ma nagerial rationality, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in connection with 
e n t r e p re neurial competence and motivation, varies markedly 
be tw een  different firms, if only because of supply factors. 
For this reason the real inve stment behaviour of different 
firms may be expected to show wide divergences. As Penrose 
observes, the assumption of competence 'merely provides us 
with a class of firms which are capable of growing' [200, 
p . 3 3 ] . Both the capacity and the desire of managements to 
pursue an active real investment policy are involved in 
these int er -firm differences, as implied in the above 
de fi nit ion of mana gerial rationality. The common reaction 
of all m anagements to u n c e r tainty is, simply, 'reduce i t ' . 
This reaction arises from the basic personal motive of 
se lf -p re servation. But, whereas competent and ambitious 
m a n a g em ents tackle u n c e r tainty reduction actively through 
the real investment decision process, l e s s - competent and 
conse rva tive m a n a gements tend to constrain their investment 
behavi our according to restrictive financial criteria. 
Con se rv at ive managements, that is, tend to behave according 
to the principle of increasing risk, which states that, as 
investm ent increases the risk of loss becomes increasingly  
serious. [Kalecki, 126; Penrose, 200, pp.57-8; Steindl,
239, 240], These firms are passive 'risk-bearers' to the
extent of their existing activities, and aim to limit
_____
The p h e n omenon of m a n a gerial discretion then arises 
nat ur al ly from the necessar y asso ciation of respon s i b i l i t y  
with control. That is, just as the corporate form of 
o r g a n iz ation has been correctly attr i b u t e d  largely to 
un ce rt ainty and its consequences [Coase, 38; Knight, 139,
Ch . 8; Malmgren, 169, p.401] , so may the special position of 
m an ag em ents be traced to the same unde rlying cause.
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'risk-taking' by abstention from commitment. Their failure 
to develop long-run investment strategies corresponds to the 
Cyert and March view of business reaction to uncertainty.
That is, firms
avoid the requirement that they correctly anticipate 
events in the distant future by using decision rules 
emphasizing short-run reaction to short-run feedback 
rather than anticipation of long-run uncertain events. 
They solve pressing problems rather than develop 
long-run strategies [44, p.119] .
However, this does not adequately explain the behaviour of
more competent and ambitious managements. The contrast
between action and reaction under uncertainty is an important
factor among inter-firm differences in investment behaviour.
Although uncertainty as such does not constitute a
(24 )deterrent to 'thrusting' managements, they may be
subject to periodic 'confusion in choice' caused by 
instability in external conditions. This is explained by 
Simon as follows:
In order for the decision maker to be able to cope 
with the problems of choice, it is essential to him 
that this environment be relatively stable and 
predictable. Economic instability, whether it stems 
from business cycles, monetary inflation, or 
"excessively" vigorous competition in an industry, 
paralyzes rational action because it destroys most of 
the customary bases for forming accurate expectations.
I would argue that a large part of the discomfort that 
is felt in the face of instability can be traced to 
distraction and confusion in choice, rather than to (2 3 )any careful calculation of economic loss [ 228 , p.57] .
(24)
The terms 'thrusting' and 'sleeping' are employed by 
P.E.P. [204] to denote behaviour characteristic of ambitious, 
efficient managements and conservative managements 
re spec tive1y .
(25)
On the other hand, Henry prefers 'to stress the 
possibility that a complex state of manageable uncertainties 
is more characteristic of the real situation, and the 
possibility that many individuals may receive positive 
reward and personal satisfaction from the constant need to 
cope with a changing environment' [113, p.87].
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If an o t h e r w i s e  a m b i t i o u s  and c o m p e t e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  
e x p e r i e n c e s  th ese  s p e c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in p e r c e i v i n g  its 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t  in the e x t e r n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  its i n v e s t m e n t  
b e h a v i o u r  may  be a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d .  T hes e d i f f i c u l t i e s  
also p r o d u c e  e r r o r s  in i n v e s t m e n t  s t r a t eg y.
N o r m a l l y ,  h o w e v e r ,  the c h i e f  c o n s t r a i n t s  on i n v e s t m e n t  
r a t e s  of t h r u s t i n g  m a n a g e m e n t s  c o m p r i s e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of 
f i n a n c i a l  and m a n a g e r i a l  r e s o u r c e s  and, p e r h a p s ,  s u i t a b l e  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  T h e s e  firms are p r o n e  to m a n a g e r i a l  
' i n d i g e s t i o n '  c a u s e d  by a t t e m p t e d  e x c e s s i v e  a b s o r p t i o n  of 
n ew  p r o j e c t s .  G i v e n  the n e c e s s a r y  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  and 
r e a s o n a b l e  s t a b i l i t y ,  u n c e r t a i n t y  t h e r e f o r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  
li mi t s  e x p a n s i o n  o n l y  to the e x t e n t  that m a n a g e m e n t  is 
r e s t r i c t e d  in its p h y s i c a l  c a p a c i t y  to s e a r c h  for and 
e v a l u a t e  p o t e n t i a l  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  to the stage at w h i c h  
j u d g m e n t  m ay  be e x e r c i z e d  w i t h  r e a s o n a b l e  c o n f i d e n c e .  [Cf. 
P e n r o s e ,  200, p.64] .
C o n s e r v a t i v e  or 'sleeping' firms, on the o t h e r  hand,
e x h i b i t  low ra t es  of i n v e s t m e n t ,  m a i n l y  b e c a u s e  they do not
i n i t i a t e  s e a r c h  and e v a l u a t i o n  a c t i v i t y  d e s i g n e d  to p r o d u c e
n ew  o p e n i n g s .  Th e s e  firms m o r e o v e r  n e i t h e r  a t t r a c t ,  nor
e s p e c i a l l y  seek, the type of m a n a g e r i a l  r e c r u i t  w ho w o u l d
l 2 6 )d e m o n s t r a t e  more t h r u s t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  A p a r t  from
i n na te  c o m p e t e n c e ,  m a n y  f a c t o r s  c o n t r i b u t e  to the a t t i t u d e s  
and b e h a v i o u r  of such firms, but the o v e r a l l  e f f e c t  m a y  be 
s u m m e d  up as a g e n e r a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  or so ci a l lack of 
i n t e r e s t  in gro wt h , an d lack of a w a r e n e s s  of its b e n e f i t s .
(26)
P.E.P.  [204] fo un d t h a t f irm  a t t i t u d e s  t o w a r d  m a n a g e r i a l  
r e c r u i t m e n t ,  e d u c a t i o n  and d e v e l o p m e n t  c o n s t i t u t e  i m p o r t a n t  
s o u r c e s  of d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h r u s t i n g  and s l e e p i n g  firms.
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To the extent that its impact on real investment 
depends upon the personal qualities and capacities of 
managements, uncertainty may be regarded as lacking separate 
significance as a determinant of corporate investment. As 
Farrar observes: 'Uncertainty is present in greater or
lesser degree,in virtually any investment decision.
It is seldom, however, the only (or even the predominant) 
aspect of that decision' [76, p.34] . It would therefore be 
difficult in any case to disentangle the influence of 
uncertainty from that of other factors. The above analysis 
implies that it may also be theoretically improper to 
attempt to do so.
Before proceeding further it will be useful to outline 
briefly the satisficing approach to decision-making under 
uncertainty, in order to establish the areas of similarity 
and difference between this approach and the one adopted in 
the above discussion. Since 'the essence of satisficing is 
human reaction to having to take decisions in ignorance of 
their probable outcomes' [Marris, 173, p.272], it is 
apparent that satisficing is concerned with behaviour under 
much the same conditions envisaged in this study.
Satisficing theory asserts that decision-making under 
uncertainty concentrates on short-period, sequential 
problem-solving (as in the passage quoted from Cyert and 
March supra). These authors also state that 'choice takes 
place in response to a problem, uses standard operating 
rules, and involves identifying an alternative that is 
acceptable from the point of view of evoked goals' [44, 
p.116]. Not only is search activity probiemistlc, but
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solutions are sought and, if possible, accepted in the
immediate vicinity of the problem. The area of search is
wi de ned  only if n e i g h b o u r h o o d  solutions are not. forthcoming,
and search activity ceases once an acceptable result is
found. [Cyert and March, 44, p p . 120-2; 45, p.154; March and
(2 7)Simon, 171, p.178; Simon, 228 and 229]= As already indicated,
a sa ti sficing firm seeks to avoid unce rtainty by
de li b e r a t e l y  failing to develop long-run strategies.
Und erlying these views is the notion that b e h a v i o u r  is
governed by goal aspi ration levels which adjust in
acc ord ance with experience and to what is considered
attainable. Once an aspiration level is attained action
ceases, because search activity is not concerned with
finding the best alternative, but only one that is good
enough (cf. note 27). However, if actual p e r f o r m a n c e s
exceed aspiration levels, the latter may tend over time to
be revised upwards. Correspondingly, if realized
p e r f o rm ances fall short of aspirations, search ac t i v i t y  is
ini tiated while, at the same time, aspiration levels may be
revised downwards. A s p i r ations are b e l ieved highly
sensitive to success or failure, and to those levels of
goal re alization cons idered attainable. [Simon, 228, p.55].
Aspi rations are e xpectations - adjusted in the long 
run to realities - of the result that can reas onably 
be attained. They are not formed on the basis of 
detailed evaluation of alternative courses of action. 
Indeed, their principal usefulness lies in the fact 
that they remove the n e c essity for such evaluations  
until the failures of existing programs indicate the
(27)
Thus, if a man is searching for the sharpest needle 
am on gst  many in a haystack, satisficing theory envi sages  
that he would stop searching once he finds a needle sharp 
enough for his immediate purpose. [March and Simon, 171, 
p.141].
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need for innovation. The innovative process then 
requires the discovery and elaboration of new programs 
that can be regarded as satisfactory - that is, as 
compatible with aspirations [Simon, 228, p.57].
The manner in which a satisficer evaluates known
alternatives, given his objective of finding an acceptable
solution, involves the equation of aspiration level with
opportunity cost. That is, assuming alternative A is under
consideration,
what the decision maker wishes to do is to attach a 
utility to "not doing A" that he can then compare with 
the utility of "doing A". Equally important, he wishes 
to assess the former utility without examining in 
detail all the alternatives that are subsumed under not 
A. It is this utility - the utility of not A - that 
economists denote by the phrase "opportunity cost of 
A" and psychologists by the phrase "aspiration level".
If the result the decision maker expects from A 
exceeds or equals his aspiration level, he will 
presumably choose A; if not, he will choose not A.
But what does choosing not A involve? It involves a 
search for a new concrete alternative to replace A. 
Hence, the aspiration level mechanism determines 
whether a course of action will be chosen from among 
those presently available..., or whether a new 
alternative will be sought that has not previously 
been part of the repertory [Simon, 228, p.55].
Reduced to its basic essentials, the satisficing
approach to decision-making under uncertainty rests on 'the
general proposition that necessity - in the form of the
pressure of applications- really is the mother of
invention' [Simon, 228, p.56]. Adversity, in the form of
problems caused by failure to attain aspiration levels, is
the chief source of this necessity, and therefore the main
determinant of business investment activity.
Simon claims that the aspiration-1eve1 mechanism
provides 'a plausible psychological basis for such concepts
as "reasonable profit"...[and thatj failure to earn a
2 .4 105
reasonable profit will lead to a search for new alternatives, 
will stimulate the innovative processes' [228, p.55]. This 
applies also to other organizational goals, for each of 
which there will be one or more values that are 'critical' 
from the viewpoint of evoking search activity. These 
critical values depend on goal levels in the previous 
period, the extent to which those goals were realized, and 
performances of comparable organizations in relation to 
their goal levels in the previous period. [Cyert and 
March, 44, p . 12 3] .
Satisficing theory distinguishes implicitly between 
firms on the basis of different aspiration levels, but does 
not make the fundamental distinction between thrusting and 
sleeping managements on the basis of motivation and 
competence, as in this study. For instance:
Rational man is a satis ficing rather than an 
optimizing animal. He is the former, if for no other 
reason, because he does not have the wits to be the 
latter. This is almost certainly true...of the way 
in which he decides whether to search for new 
alternatives. It is also true of the way in which he 
selects new alternatives when he is in an innovative 
mood [Simon, 228, p.56].
Consequently, differences between satisficing theory and 
this study are relatively greater so far as thrusting firms 
are concerned.
Whereas satisficing theory regards search activity as 
being initiated mainly by failure to achieve goal aspiration 
levels, a thrusting management would conduct search activity 
as a matter of regular policy - in fact, as a part of 
long-term growth strategy. 'Necessity . . .rea 1ly is the 
mother of invention' [228, p.56]. However, what constitutes
'necessity' for a thrusting management depends not only or
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p a r t i c u l a r l y  on the occurrence of periodic problems or 
crises, but also and chiefly on its own driving ambition - 
on its compulsion to grow.
The failure of such a man a g e m e n t  to reach its mi nimum 
p e r f or ma nce level for a proximate goal - profits, for 
example - would, as specified by satisficing theory, cause 
search ac tivity to be initiated, and this would be 
p r o b 1e m i s t i c . But this type of search ac tivity would not
n e c e s s a r i l y  involve the firm's investment policy, and would 
not usually constitute a high pro p o r t i o n  of the firm's total 
search effort. A t t e ntion might well be drawn to the quality 
and di rection of the firm's strategic (as op posed to its 
problemistic) search, in order to re-d irect search effort 
towards o p p o r tunities of p o t e n t i a l l y  greater profitability. 
Sat is fi cing therefore helps to explain the reaction of a 
thr us ti ng  mana g e m e n t  when a security constraint becomes 
o p e r a t i v e .
There are apparent d i f f i culties about the notion of goal 
aspi ra tion levels as an e xplanation of inve stment behaviour. 
Securi ty considerations, as well as ambition, dictate that 
realiz ed perf o r m a n c e  levels, of prox imate goals such as 
p r o f i t ,should not fall short of certain minima. It is 
reaso nable to suppose that realized p e r f ormances in recent 
past periods have considerable influence in d e t e rmining these 
T281Simon recognizes this to the extent that ' an aspiration 
can become attached to the rate of change of a variable just 
as well as it can to the level of the v a r i a b l e . . .When such 
an es ca lator is built into the a s p i r a t i o n - l e v e 1 mechanism, a 
need for innovation will be g e n e rated even in the absence of adverse envir o n m e n t a l  changes' [228 , p.56] . He cites labour
contracts with inbuilt p r o d u e t i v i t y - b a s e d  increases as an 
example of 'escalators' that can cause this behaviour. This 
qu a l i f i c a t i o n  does not really amount to acceptance of the 
th ru st ing behaviour that is emphasized here.
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minimum performance standards. Proponents of sati s f i c i n g  theory 
accept this, and also claim that the setting of m i n i m u m  
standards of b e h a viour is consistent with satisficing. [E.g. 
Cyert and March, 45, p . 4 5 ] . However, goal a s p i ration levels 
only have oper a t i o n a l  m e a ning if they are i d e n tified with 
these m i n i m u m  standards of behaviour. E m p loyed in the role 
of expected levels of attainment, as in s atisficing theory, 
these as piration levels are indete rminate and would not have 
the effect (of causing search activity to be initiated) that 
is claimed for them. A t t a inable p erformance levels are not 
known in advance under uncertainty, espe cially where new 
pr oje cts  are involved. The only dete rminate basis for 
ins ti tut ing special search activity consists of re q u i r e d  
m i n i m u m  standards of behaviour, in which case options other 
than search for new o p portu nities must also be considered, 
as ex p l a i n e d  above. Also, basic mana g e r i a l  aspirations, 
such as power and prestige, are not easily e x p r e s s e d  in 
terms of levels: it may also be e s p e cially d i f ficult to
pr edi ct the extent to which they are attainable.
A related obje ction to the role of goal a s p i r a t i o n  
levels concerns their i d ent ification with o p p o r t u n i t y  costs. 
The latter are co n v e n t i o n a l l y  defined as the gr e a t e s t 
ben efit given up by selecting alternative A rather than not 
A. Sat isficing theory asserts that, if the result e x p e c t e d  
from A (which may be understood in this case to refer to 
all known opportunities) is less than aspi ration level, the 
d e c i s i on -maker will select the o p p o r t u n i t y  cost of A, or 
not A. That is, he will reject known a l t e r natives in 
favour of search for new ones. Given uncertainty, this
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really means that he is supposed to gamble on the
likelihood that as-yet-unknown opportunities will show more
promise than those about which judgment may be currently
exercised. This is unrealistic. The exercise acquires
meaning only if minimum acceptable performance levels are
substituted for aspiration levels. In the latter case, if
management concludes, on the information available and to
the best of its ability, that no known decision alternative
will meet even minimum requirements, then clearly rejection
of known alternatives in favour of search for new ones is a
rational act. It is considerably easier, under uncertainty,
to judge whether an investment project is capable of
meeting minimum performance standards than to establish
ex ante what its final result will be (viz. in relation to
(2 9 )some desired attainment level) .
Aspiration levels are a well-established phenomenon in 
psychology, for whose purposes they are defined as 
individuals' 'expectations of accomplishment or...the demands 
which they make upon themselves' [Munn, 190, p.179]. 
Individuals differ widely in their levels of aspiration, 
which are modified over time as the result of success or 
failure in achieving personal goals. These considerations 
have been taken into account here, particularly in the 
fundamental division of managements into thrusters and
(29)
The above remarks are not inconsistent with the 
possibility that a thrusting management may, as a matter of 
long-term investment strategy, 'keep its options open' by 
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit it to exploit 
opportunities as they become available.
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sleepers, and emphasis on the necessary association between 
motivation and competence. However, personal aspirations 
cannot be used directly as investment criteria in complex 
managerial decision-making as advocated by satisficing 
theorists, if only because uncertainty and the number of 
relevant variables prevent an ex ante process of relating 
expected results of investment decisions to desired end 
results.
Management is also in rather a different (or at least 
more complex) position to that of an individual with regard 
to raising and lowering aspiration levels, for security 
reasons. If a staggering loss is suffered in one period, 
management must aim to restore profit to its previous level, 
or risk sanctions from the investing and consuming public. 
Correspondingly, management must aim to avoid dazzling but 
unsustainable performances. These considerations are, of 
course, elements of the long-run investment strategy that a 
thrusting management will rationally attempt to develop 
under uncertainty, contrary to the views of satisficing 
theorists .
There is somewhat less dissimilarity between the 
predictions of satisficing theory and the typical behaviour 
of a sleeping management. The latter would not develop 
long-run growth strategies and would not search for new 
opportunities on a regular basis. Its search activity 
would tend to be strictly problemistic or ad hoc, in 
conformity with satisficing predictions. However, search 
would probably not be directed towards discovering new
investment opportunities, at least initially. Problems
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would tend to be identified with and solved in the immediate 
neighbourhood of the firm's existing activities, using means 
other than investment policy. According to P.E.P. [ 204] , 
inactivity and lack of awareness of both problems and 
opportunities are characteristic of such firms. This 
applies, inter alia , to management recruitment and 
development, assessment of the firm's absolute and 
comparative performance, long-range planning, operational 
control, marketing and sales, research and development, and 
general problem-solving. In general a sleeping management 
will be relatively slow to recognize both problems and 
opportunities, and will also lag in taking positive action 
regarding them.
Satisficing theory therefore respectively understates and 
overstates the extent to which thrusting and sleeping 
managements will engage in search activity for purposes of 
real investment. This is due not only to a failure to 
specify the factors which determine aspiration levels 
[Tisdell, 254, p.135], but also to a lack of emphasis on the
role of entrepreneurial competence in managerial investment
decision-making under uncertainty.
Ill
2 . 5 Incentive Effects of Tax Loss Offsets Under Uncertainty
Direct comparison of managerial behaviour with that in 
the Domar-Musgrave and other risk models is rather 
difficult, owing to the latter's extreme artificiality.
Not only are firms subject to uncertainty (defined as 
partial ignorance about the future) rather than risk, but 
profit and real investment policy occupy different positions 
in the corporate environment from yield and risk-taking in 
a Domar-Musgrave world. It is inappropriate to identify 
real investment with increases in risk-taking, or profit 
with managerial reward for risk- or uncertainty-bearing.
As explained in Chapter 1, profit plays a surrogate role in 
managerial motivation, and the chief objectives of 
decision-making are managerial security and either growth or 
a quiet life. These objectives are pursued in terms of 
factors, such as sales, market shares, pricing and 
investment policies, etc., which determine profit residually, 
rather than in terms of profit as such. This is a 
consequence of uncertainty about profit outcomes, and of 
non-profit aspects of managerial motivation.
Uncertainties which confront management in real 
investment and other decisions therefore relate not only or 
even mainly to the possibility of net operating losses, but 
also and predominantly to the variety of 'proximate' 
factors which, as stated above, also determine the eventual 
profit outcome. Profit as such tends to be emphasized only 
when it has fallen, or is expected to fall, below the 
minimum level needed for security and financing purposes.
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This means that profit uncertainty may cause managerial 
concern even when actual net losses are not incurred or 
expected. If losses are incurred or expected, the relevant 
'risk' for decision-making purposes is that felt by 
management. It relates to reactions on the part of the 
investing, consuming and supplying public, and to the 
adequacy of available finance for future growth.
Offsets for losses are normally allowed against the 
taxable profits of periods earlier or later than those in 
which net losses are sustained. If the taxpayer is allowed 
to carry back losses to earlier periods, he is assured of 
the maximum prescribed relief provided that sufficient 
taxable income arose in respect of those periods. However, 
if it is provided that losses are to be carried forward to 
later periods, offset is subject to uncertainty about the 
adequacy of future profits. Thus, even in terms of risk a 
full loss offset tax may not reduce both yield and risk in 
the proportion of the tax rate, because the probability that 
future income will not suffice for offset purposes must be 
taken into account. Domar and Musgrave assumed that their 
investor is assured of sufficient income to achieve full 
offset for losses [52, p.409], which really begs the
question of the efficacy of offset provisions in achieving 
results claimed for them. Firms are less able to predict 
events the further into the future that they may occur.
If net losses are incurred or expected, or if profit 
falls below the minimum required, appropriate action depends 
on which factors cause the loss. The solution would not 
necessarily involve the firm's investment policy, except,
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perhaps, for purposes of cost reduction. The reaction of a 
Domar-Musgrave investor under a full-loss-offset tax, 
however, would depend on his marginal utility of income.
If this increases with falling income, he would presumably 
increase risk-taking through investment in order to restore 
the level of income. In any case, the only type of 
reaction available to him involves investment policy.
Real investment policies are determined respectively 
by the adequacy of existing capacity to meet expected 
product demand, by replacement needs, and by non-productive 
welfare and other commitments. Loss offset provisions, or 
the lack of them, have little relevance to amounts that 
managements feel should be invested under these headings in 
existing lines. Investment in additional productive 
capacity, beyond that believed appropriate to expected 
future demand, would contribute to future losses. Reduction 
of planned investment below this appropriate amount would 
mean loss of sales, market shares and profits. Replacement 
policy, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, is properly 
directed towards reduction of unit costs and, therefore, 
competitive uncertainty. It would be incorrect to argue 
that a loss-induced response through replacement policy 
constitutes an increase in risk-taking.
Although investment may be adjusted in response to 
losses, or even in the absence of losses, when management 
considers this appropriate, various other categories of 
expenditure may also be retrenched in order to improve 
profitability, and without affecting output. Reduction of 
organizational slack increases profitability, and, by
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imp rov ing o p e rating efficiency, also reduces managerial 
uncertainty. Given the choice, and this depends
en ti re ly  upon par t i c u l a r  circumstances, an ambitious 
m a n a ge me nt would disturb real investment policy as little 
as possible, because it is geared to sales and market share 
a s p i r a t i o n s .
These conc lusions apply a fortiori to the more general 
case in which net losses are possible, but are not actually 
in cur red  or expected. In these c i r c u mstances a 
Do ma r- M u s g r a v e  investor will, given an increase in the tax 
rate, r e s p e c t i v e l y  increase or decrease risk-taking, 
dep en di ng upon whether there is p r o vision for offset of 
losses or not. In reality, either response would expand 
the u n c e r t a i n t y  of a firm's competitive position, without 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  increasing expected profits. Loss offset 
pr o v i s i o n s  do not assist man a g e m e n t  to cope with 
u n ce rt ai nties about proximate variables, in terms of which 
inve stm ent decisions are made, and through which managerial 
o bj ec ti ve s are realized. That is, loss offset provisions 
are no help in a s c e r t a i n i n g  wh ether given sales or market 
share targets can be achieved or maintained, how competitors 
will react to the firm's market initiatives, whether 
custo mer s will respond favourably to certain product 
innovations, etc. Nor, in the case of a net loss, can these 
pr ov is io ns alleviate mana gerial u n c e r tainty about the effect 
on the firm's image with the investing, consuming and 
sup plying public.
(30)
See Chapter 1, footnote 28.
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These provisions merely state that, should a net loss 
result from the many decisions taken under uncertainty, then 
relief will be provided at the tax rate on these losses, if 
sufficient taxable income becomes available in prescribed 
periods. The possibility, or even certainty, of such relief 
is irrelevant from the incentive point of view to the 
manner in which investment and related decisions are made 
under uncertainty in relation to managerial objectives.
That is, whether or not offset for losses is allowed, 
management must still make its best decisions under 
uncertainty, by the same proximate criteria, on the basis of 
the same best available data about these criteria, with a 
view to achieving the same objectives. Alterations in the 
tax rate do not directly affect a firm's profit efficiency, 
which is the pre-tax return on resources employed; nor, 
subject to tax capitalization and other aspects of 
incidence, need these alterations affect the amount of 
profit required for purposes of managerial security.
Tax-induced adjustments of a Domar-Musgrave investor's 
portfolio involve physical switches between investments of 
different yields and risks, that is, diversification. The 
above remarks refer more particularly to investment in 
existing lines, so that one may enquire whether managements 
experience any direct incentive to diversify as the result 
of introduction of full loss offset provisions. 
Diversification into new lines usually extends managerial 
uncertainty to some extent, because of initial unfamiliarity 
with their technical, organizational and marketing 
implications. This is the price to be paid for the hope of
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avoiding growth and profit limitations of existing lines. 
Decisions to diversify, together with decisions to establish 
the research and other search processes which laboriously 
unearth potential opportunities, depend directly upon 
managerial interpretation of its own self-interest in 
conditions of considerable ignorance about the eventual 
outcomes of these decisions.
In the absence of loss-offset provisions a Domar-Musgrave 
investor would not diversify after a tax increase, since he 
would wish to reduce risk. Enterprising managements, on the 
other hand, would diversify in the absence of loss offsets, 
since the latter make no practical difference to the quality 
of data at their disposal for decision-making purposes, or 
to their need to exercise entrepreneurial competence in order 
to achieve success. In any case diversification to reduce 
uncertainty, at least in the shorter term, is not always 
possible within the scope of real investment. Financial 
investment in, say, blue chip stocks is quite another 
matter, outside the scope of this study.
Extension of uncertainty through diversification into 
new lines does in fact bear a formal resemblance to the 
Domar-Musgrave income effect of an increase in the rate of 
a tax with full offset for losses. For reasons already 
stated, however, the tax does not generally provide an 
investment incentive which would directly induce 
diversification. That is, managements are not motivated 
either to recoup profit taken in tax, or to extend 
uncertainty for this purpose. Diversification occurs,
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subject to opportunities, when m a n a g ements seek growth (and 
a s s o c i a t e d  profits) be yond limitations of existing lines.
Loss offset prov isions do not really reduce the 
u n c e r ta inties involved, which encompass far more than the 
eventua l profit outcome. Also, mana g e m e n t s  p r e s umably do 
not undertake ve ntures with a v iew to the need to rely upon 
loss pr ovisions at later stages. In Chapter 3 it will be 
e x p la in ed  how mana g e m e n t s  attempt to ensure that losses on 
u n su cc es sful proje c t s  are kept to a minimum. An additional  
factor is that, for reasons connected with financing, 
com pe ti tive power, and a v a i l a b i l i t y  of m a n a gerial resources, 
etc., a firm's new ventures are not normally very large in 
relation to its own size.
Sleepy m a n a g e m e n t s  are even less likely than thrusters 
to d i v er sify in response to increases in the rate of a 
f u 1 1 - lo ss-offset tax. They are i n s u f ficiently m o t i v a t e d  and 
e n t r e p r e n e u r i a 1 ly-efficient to institute the search and 
ev al ua ti on proc e d u r e s  which disclose pote ntial opportunities. 
[Cf. P.E.P., 204, p.208]. However, there may be an
inte rme diate type of cons ervative management, not very 
grow th- minded, nor very e n t r e p r e n e u r i a 11 y - e f f i c i e n t , which 
is yet s ufficiently active to consider occasional ventures, 
subject to rigorous cond iti ons of financial prudence. For 
this type of management, the element of insurance offered by 
loss of fset provisions may well have some attraction.
These firms lack the inherent drive of thrusting managements, 
and are more likely than the latter to be impressed by 
profi t uncertainties. They are also less we 11 - equipped 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y  and by experience to undertake an efficient
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process of data collection and evaluation upon which 
diversification strategy must be based under uncertainty.
Tax loss-offset provisions are based upon the equitable 
principle that, if a taxpayer is levied at a proportional 
rate on his periodic trading surpluses, he should be allowed 
credit at the same proportional rate on periodic trading 
losses. This provides that the tax burden over a number of 
consecutive periods shall not exceed tax at the given 
proportional rate upon the average surplus for those 
periods. Various writers concerned with the economic 
effects of taxation regard this equitable provision as a 
powerful instrument for influencing real investment 
incentives through the tax system.
The foregoing detailed discussion of the nature and 
consequences of managerial motivation and competence, the 
corporate environment in which investment decisions are 
made, and business uncertainty, has found little theoretical 
justification for conclusions of received theory about 
effects of a proportional profits tax, with or without full 
loss offset provisions, on real investment incentives of 
corporate managements. Instead, it is concluded at this 
stage that neither increases in the tax rate nor loss offset 
provisions have much discernible effect on managerial 
desires to invest.
Conclusions of the Domar-Musgrave analysis and other 
contributions depend upon a variety of assumptions that are 
inappropriate to this context. These assumptions refer to 
managerial motivation and objectives, especially in relation 
to profit, and the degree of information available to
2 . 5 119
managements when investment decisions are made. In this 
latter respect the gulf between a Domar-Musgrave world and 
the corporate environment is so wide that any resemblance 
between the respective decision processes is purely nominal.
At this point, therefore, the Domar-Musgrave analysis 
is discarded. On the foundation laid by the previous 
discussion of managerial motivation and business 
uncertainty, etc., the two subsequent Chapters examine 
corporate investment decision processes and their relation 
to profit. This analysis, of the various ways in which 
managerial self-interest is pursued through investment under 
uncertainty, allows the above preliminary conclusions about 
effects of corporate income tax changes to be further tested 
in the final Chapter.
* * * * *
CHAPTER 3
CORPORATE REAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
3 . 1 Int roduction
Analysis in the two previous Chapters has attempted to 
reach satisfactory conclusions in two of the main areas 
underlying the predictions of conventional corporate tax 
theory. These areas included motivation and objectives, 
and the risk-uncertainty controversy. Conclusions in these 
areas have generally not supported the predictions of 
conventional theory.
However, these conclusions are not yet conclusive, 
because there is a third area, real investment
decision-making, in relation to which both the conventional 
theory and the above conclusions must be discussed. Given 
motivation and objectives under uncertainty, that is, 
decision processes describe how self-interest is pursued.
This may reinforce conclusions about effects of 
corporate tax changes arrived at from the viewpoints of 
objectives and the state of uncertainty. Alternatively, 
it may prove necessary to modify these conclusions in 
various respects. This Chapter therefore aims to lay part 
of the foundation for answering that question. In the 
absence of positive theory about real investment decision­
making, and associated theory about the role of profit in 
these decisions, analyses of effects of tax changes may 
predict behaviour which, in reality, would put a firm 
out of business or damage its competitive position.
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Discussion of real investment decisions falls 
conveniently into those concerned with diversification into 
new fields, on the one hand, and those which involve 
expansion of existing lines and replacement investment, on 
the other hand. This distinction is significant from the 
viewpoints of both managerial motivation and uncertainty.
12 2
3.2 Diversification Strategy
In Chapter 1 it was observed that the firm of 
traditional theory has small scope for achieving sustained 
growth through internal policy decisions. The number of 
variables susceptible to influence by policy is few: they
include price, advertising, and quality variation. 
Sustainable increases in the volume of demand are mainly 
exogenous events. Given that the theory of the firm is 
concerned with production of existing lines, its assumptions 
are by no means entirely unrealistic. Industries typically 
pass through a demand and investment life cycle whose stages 
comprise adolescence, maturity,and senility. [Kmenta and 
Williamson, 138]. In the latter stages, when market shares 
have become established and the main reservoir of demand 
has been tapped, the extent to which a firm can achieve 
further growth in a market, other than by waiting upon 
secular increases in demand, may be quite limited. Subject 
to market competition, growth in existing markets may also 
be prohibitively expensive.
If a growth-minded management is to achieve its 
objectives without seeking new outlets, it must therefore 
accomplish the difficult task of increasing its market 
shares for existing products, and must repeat this feat over 
several such markets if growth is to be sustained. This 
requires some increase in relative threat strength vis a vis 
competitors, through cost reductions and/or improvements in 
consumer appeal. Scope for such increases is clearly 
limited. [Marris, 173, p.200; Williamson, 264, p.4].
Diversification therefore 'represents the search for a new
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busines s structure which will provide a means of survival 
for the corporation beyond the life cycle of a single 
industry,...' [Miller, 185, p.136]. It also represents the 
means by which an ambitious mana g e m e n t  may regain and 
mai nt ai n the initiative for dire cting growth of the firm 
through internal policy. A thrusting mana g e m e n t  will seek 
to div er sify wh enever its growth objectives can no longer be 
met within the scope of its existing activities. [Ansoff,
7, p.129; Penrose, 200, p.144]. For many firms this implies 
continuous diversification.
A c c ording to the we 1 1 -documented prin ciple of financial 
investment, portfolio d i v e r s ification contributes greatly 
towards the security of investment. [Domar and Musgrave,
52; Hall, 101; Lepper, 153; Markowitz, 172]. This is 
equally true of real investment. Management can never 
enti rel y depend on existing activities for the future healthy 
exi stence of the firm. The best long-run p r o t ection against 
direct and indirect competition in existing markets consists 
of active p r e p a ration to anticipate or match threatening  
innov ati ons in technology, pro d u c t i o n  and marketing.
[Penrose, 200, p.113; Schumpeter, 219, p p . 8 4 - 5 ] . ^^^ The 
more wi dely d i v e rsified are a firm's activities (subject to 
important considerations men t i o n e d  below) the less 
vul ner able is the firm to reverses in any p articular area of 
its operations.
TTj In a survey of 110 corporations rated as excellently-  
managed, about 90 per cent.of respondents to a questionnaire 
were of the opinion that 'staying abreast or out ahead in 
the innovative race is more important to their long-range 
busine ss success than a "defensive" po licy of basing prices 
closely on costs' [Earley, 61, p.59].
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Although a firm may not depend on existing activities 
for future sustained growth, the rate, type and direction of 
its diversification must usually depend both qualitatively 
and quantitatively on the amounts and growth rates of the 
productive services, resources, and knowledge which are 
employed in, and which derive from, existing activities. 
These factors affect, for example, the extent to which a 
firm will resort to acquisition as the means of 
diversification, rather than internal development.
Firstly, the existence of spare or under-utilized 
resources, whether managerial or plant, provides both a 
strong impetus to expand in new directions and a potential 
source of competitive advantage for this purpose. It is 
particularly likely that existing activities will fail to 
utilize fully a firm's economic potential as this grows 
over time during normal operation and expansion. Many 
resources tend to be both indivisible and capable of 
alternative uses. This means, on the one hand, that 
management cannot trim resources strictly according to ebbs 
and flows of existing operations, and, on the other hand, 
that pressures may develop for fuller utilization of those 
resources, on grounds of efficiency and sectional 
self-interest. Resources, included in a firm's economic 
potential, to which these remarks apply, consist not only 
of physical productive assets, but also of various kinds of 
knowledge and technical, organizational and entrepreneurial
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( 2 )capabilities. I n divisi bility and flexibility together
imply that the logical scale of total operations is the 
least common multiple of the full range of resources. In 
many firms
a large number and variety of indivisible resources  
are used. None of these need be very large, but if 
each is capable of rendering not only d i f ferent amounts, 
but also different kinds of services, a c ombination  
that achieves the full utilization of all of them may 
perforce call for an output much larger and more «varied 
than can be organized by a firm in any given p e r i o d  of 
time [Penrose, 200, p . 6 9 ] .
Clearly, the greater the degree of functional 
spe cia lization, the higher the least common multiple, and 
the less likely that existing activities will fully utilize 
available resources. If these acti vities cannot be 
app ro pr iately expanded, there is an inbuilt impetus to 
diversify. S p ecialization  at points of common costs is an 
attribute of size, and is therefore one benefit of 
successful previous diversification. It is a means of 
reducing unit costs of both existing and future products 
and, as such, a source of competitive strength.
The second principal connection between a firm's 
existi ng acti vities and its divers i f i c a t i o n  strategy 
concerns the fact that scope for expansion depends 
im po rt antly on the types and qualities, as well as amounts, 
of pro du ctive services, knowledge and techniques used in
In his study of Du Pont's 'venture management' approach  
to di v e r s i f i c a t i o n  Peterson observes that
the e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  function is c o n t i n u o u s .. .By contrast, 
the small busi n e s s m a n  gets his new venture started and 
then retreats into a conventional oper ating role...he 
typically remains engrossed in daily operations and does 
not use again the specific talents he developed in 
p io ne ering his enterprise [201. p.73] .
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connect ion with, and developed from, existing activities.
Con glo me rate diversificatio n, that is, into new areas having
no connection with existing activities, pr obably cons titutes
only a small prop ortion of total diversification. [Penrose,
( 3)200, p . 131 ; Miller, 185, p.122]. Long-run growth
depends on a firm's ability to establish one or more strong 
and com preh ensive technological bases from which o perations 
can be dive rsified into new products and markets. [Ansoff,
7, Ch.6; Miller, lo c . c i t . ; Penrose, 200, p .13 7] .
The main components of long-run growth strategy derive 
from the n e c e ssary dependence of a firm's scope for 
di ve rs i f i c a t i o n  on its present activities, resources and 
knowledge. In crude terms this means that what a firm can 
do depends on what it (the firm) is. This important 
relation is unde rlined by the fact that, under uncertainty, 
cash flow projections of potential new investments are at 
best unreliable. M a n a gement needs tangible factors on which 
to con centrate for purposes of eval uating the s uitability 
of new projects. The components of strategy meet this need. 
They include pr o d u c t - m a r k e t  scope, growth vector, 
comp eti tive advantage, and synergy. In combination they 
provide the common thread between existing and future 
act ivi ties that is essential for long-run growth.
TT) The p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and even survival of a firm which fails 
to concentrate on the intensive deve lopment of any of its 
existi ng fields, and instead jumps from one type of 
pr od uction to another in response to changes in external 
conditions, depends entirely on the ability of its 
entr epreneurs to make shrewd financial deals, to judge 
corre ctly market changes, and to move rapidly from one 
pro duct to another in response thereto...no enduring  
industrial organization is ever m a i n tained by this type 
of adaptation or growth ...Sooner or later such "firms" 
either break up or settle down to the expl o i t a t i o n  of 
selected fields. The force responsible is that of 
compet ition [Penrose, 200, p.131].
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P r o d u c t -market scope specifies the industries to which 
the firm confines its activities, or the overall 
tech no lo gical area within the firm's competence. This is 
often too broad to enable a common thread to be 
ascertained. Scope may widen over time as the result of 
te ch nol ogical advances by the firm. Growth vector indicates 
the directions, both inter- and intra-industry, in which 
the firm is tending to move within its overall scope. 
Individual div e r s i f i c a t i o n  entries may tend to change these 
directions, and man a g e m e n t  will wish to assess the 
impl ica tions of such changes. The directions of movement 
take account of current and potential market penetrations, 
and de velopment of both markets and products. Competitive  
adv antage 'seeks to identify p a r t icular properties of 
individual product markets which will give the firm a strong 
compet itive position' [Ansoff, 7, p .110 ] ; it depends on the 
firm's absolute and comparative strength in research and 
development, production, marketing, and organization. The 
fourth component, synergy, is concerned with the desired 
c h a ra ct eristics of fit between existing activities and 
po ten tial product entries. [Ansoff, 7, p . 7 5 ] . Synergy, or 
joint effects, may arise in connection with development, 
produ cti on, investment, marketing, and management. If the 
firm enters products which are s y n e r g i s t i ca 1ly strong, and 
which also conform to the other components of strategy, it 
can expect to gain significant growth and other benefits 
from d i v e r s ification moves, subject to the usual ceteris
pari bus  proviso.
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One of the most important joint effects of diversifying 
into related areas, especially under uncertainty, is that 
e st ab li sh ed knowledge and experience may be utilized. Most 
of a ma nager's value lies in his ability to 'relate each 
busine ss p r o blem to a p a r t icular context in which the 
m a n ag er  increases his chances of a correct decision because 
he un derstands the para met ers of that industry' [Miller, 185, 
p p . 125-6]. Initial costs of div e r s i f i c a t i o n  partly depend 
on this understanding, and on the degree to which the firm's 
other skills and resources are compatible with the 
req ui re me nts of new ventures. These costs include learning 
and making mistakes in new environments, acquiring new 
skills, and e stablishing new rules and procedures.
Co mp et itive and other benefits may be lost if u n f a m i 1iarity 
delays e s tablishment in expl oding markets. [Ansoff, 7, 
p p . 8 3 - 4 ] . Also, since the cost of acquiring knowledge must 
be taken into account, concentric d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  (into 
rela ted  areas) has the advantage that the incremental cost 
of adding new data to an existing stock of knowledge is 
pr ob ab ly much lower when that stock is already large. 
[Malmgren, 169, p . 4 1 4 ] . Existing knowledge is also often 
capable of re peated use for new purposes without  
c o r r e sp onding repeated costs being incurred.
If a firm diversifies in markets in which it has 
mon o p o l i s t i c  or oligo p o l i s t i c  advantages, it may obtain 
ma rk et  synergy from fresh exploitation of goodwill 
e s t a b li shed by previous products. Its a p p r o p r i a b i l i t y  is 
p r o b a b l y  also greatest in these markets. Aggressive 
innovat ion by one or more members of an oligopolistic
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industry may induce or stimulate matching responses by 
competitors, leading to a climate of growth in the industry. 
[Villard, 259, p. 493; Williamson, 266, pp.67-8] . The
notions that rewards of innovation increase with market 
control [Kaysen and Turner, 133; Schumpeter, 219; Villard, 
259], and that innovation varies with the degree of monopoly 
power, are not generally accepted. It is alleged that 
monopoly power allows large firms to neglect innovation or 
to restrain it in the interests of stable inter-firm 
relations; and that differential advantages of innovation 
are greatest when competitive conditions prevail. [Kaysen 
and Turner, 133, p.85; Williamson, 266, p.68]. These 
questions partly depend on motivation, which is not at issue 
here. The essential point is that use of established 
marketing organization and knowledge is a source of 
considerable advantage in diversification, and that this 
advantage may importantly influence the directions in which 
a firm will expand.
Some benefits from diversification derive from the size 
of the firm in question, or from its increased size 
following successful expansion. Other benefits relate to the 
diversification process itself. This distinction reflects 
the fact that 'growth is a process; size is a state'
[Penrose, 200, p.88].
Economies of size are present when a larger firm, 
because of its size alone, can not only produce and 
sell goods and services more efficiently than smaller 
firms but also can introduce larger quantities or new 
products more efficiently [Penrose, 200, p.89] . (4)
T4T~The term 'benefits' refers here to the desirable results 
of diversification (growth, prestige, profitability, 
efficiency, etc.). 'Economies', on the other hand, are one 
of the factors by means of which the benefits of 
diversification are achieved.
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Benefits attributable to size alone clearly introduce an 
element of d ifferential advantage into the d i v ersification  
act ivi ties of different firms. A large firm has an absolute 
advantage over a small firm in most fields that the two may 
enter, and some fields are e f f e ctively barred to firms below 
a certain size . Size yields benefits in the areas of 
technology, marketing, finance, and research. Although 
these benefits are partly derived from the three basic 
'principles' of bulk transactions, massed reserves, and 
mu lt ip les which together form the economies of large-scale 
op era tion [Sargant Florence, 81, pp.50-1], the advantages 
of size are more comprehensive than this. They also include 
financial security, command of a wider range of 
op po r t u n i t i e s  than that available to small firms, and, 
especially, the capacity to enter big markets, in which 
they may often enjoy relatively greater growth and 
pro fit ability, free from the comp etition of the many.
Whilst it is unde rstood that size is a relative concept, 
vary ing  according to the circumstances of different 
industries, div e r s i f i c a t i o n  by large firms constitutes the 
exercise of their e stablished advantages in this respect. 
Above a certain (industry-dependent) size, that is, large 
firms pr obably do not expect to gain incremental advantages 
of size from further diversification. Smaller firms, on the 
other hand, often expand through di v e r s i f i c a t i o n  in order to 
attain that m i n i m u m  size at which their competitive position  
and command over a range of op p o r t u n i t i e s  are transformed. 
Meanwhile, they are at a disa dvantage relative to large 
firms and must rely on superior entrepr e n e u r i a l  ability,
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p a r t i c u l a r l y  with regard to selection of suitable
( 5 )o p po rt unities from those available.
Econ omies of growth are the internal economies 
available to an individual firm which make expansion 
pr ofitable in par t i c u l a r  directions. They are derived 
from the unique collection of productive services 
available to it, and create for that firm a 
differential advantage over other firms in putting on 
the market new products or increased quantities of old 
products. At any time the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of such 
economies is the result of the p r o c e s s . . . b y  which 
unused p r o d u c t i v e s e r v i e e s  are c ontinually created 
within the firm [Penrose, 200 , p.99] .
Growth benefits arise from the process of
di ve rs i f i c a t i o n  itself (or from expansion of existing lines):
they are not available in the absence of growth. Therefore,
they are available to large and small firms alike, although
in greater degree to the former, since 'all the economies
of si ze ...also provide economies of growth for any firm that
can take advantage of them' [Penrose, 200, p.100; also
Robinson, 213, p.67] . Depe ndence of these benefits upon a
firm's par t i c u l a r  resources is a principal determinant of
growth strategy, as discussed above. Correspondingly,
strategic e f f i ciency enables a firm to fully exploit its
o p p o r t un ities for obtaining growth benefits, because this
ef fi ci ency includes careful selection of o p p o r tunities for
expan sion on the basis of their compa t i b i l i t y  with the
firm's existing resources and advantages. Ability to obtain
(5)
Ac co rding to Hall and Weiss, 'there is considerable 
evidence that average growth rates (though not the 
var ia nc es of growth rates) are in fact independent of size' 
[102, p.32 3] . This evidence includes, inter alia , Collins 
and Preston, 40; Hymer and Pashigian, 1 1 9 ; Mansfield, 170; 
and Simon, 223. For purposes of their study Hall and Weiss 
accep te d Baumol's definition of firm size as the 'amount of 
owned and borro w e d  money capital' [11, p.38]. See also
Ch apt er 4, footnote 13.
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growth benefits also depends on types and qualities of 
productive services, and, as stated by Penrose, on the extent 
to which they can be spared from existing activities.
The existence of unused productive services is the 
first prerequisite for obtaining growth benefits, as it is 
of the growth process itself. These benefits include all 
the favourable effects of putting to work currently-idle or 
under-utilized potential. Irrespective of firm size, if 
this potential is already fully taxed, there is no room for 
further growth, and, therefore, no scope to obtain its 
benefits, until such time as this potential can be either 
enlarged or otherwise released from present uses. Needless 
to say, this underlines the importance of entrepreneurial 
strategic efficiency with regard both to selection of 
projects, and to abandonment decisions. Resource 
deployment decisions that are efficient and (given partial 
ignorance about future opportunities) lucky enable 
management to eke out the scope for growth with limited 
resources. Firm size, on the other hand, is a constant 
source of advantage in a large firm's existing markets. 
However, it is growth through diversification which really 
exploits size, since the latter is a valuable property 
which shares a common characteristic with some types of 
knowledge, that of being capable of repeated use without 
depletion.
A further determinant of benefits from diversification 
consists of the direction of growth and the method employed 
for this purpose. These are bound up with the efficient 
selection of opportunities in particular cases, having
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regard to the nature of the resources available. Me thods 
and di rections of growth both tend to be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  
acc ord ing to p a r t icular requirements. Marris [173, Ch . 4] , 
for instance, d i s t i nguishes divers i f i c a t i o n  on the basis of 
wh et he r it is imitative or d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  with respect to 
existing products. Penrose [200, Ch.7] classifies entries
be tw een  changes in one or more of market, product, and 
pr od uc tion (technological) base. Thus, for example, a firm 
may attack new markets with new pr oducts from an e x i s t i n g  
p r o d uc tion base, or it may seek to expand in existing 
mark ets  with new products from a n e w l y - d e v e l o p e d  base.
Penrose also d i s t i n guishes entries acco rding to their 
purpose: that is, a firm may dive rsify to stabilize
p r o d uc tion against temporary or seasonal fluctuations, to 
counter permanent, adverse changes in demand for ex i s t i n g  
products, or simply because its present growth rate is too 
low. Ansoff [7, Ch.7] d i stinguishes d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  in two
ways: firstly, whether it is horizontal or vertical;
secondly, whether it is concentric or c onglomerate (that is, 
rela ted  to existing activities, or n o t ) . Miller [185] 
analyz es problems conn ecte d with the following types of 
div er sification: combination of new ventures with ex i s t i n g
acti vi ties for the purpose of sharing existing facilities; 
b r e a k - t h r o u g h  moves, in which part i c u l a r  existing re s o u r c e s 
are applied to a new venture in order to create an initial 
entry advantage; and establ i s h m e n t  of product clusters, in 
each of which the c onstituents have enough common or 
c o m p l em entary business c h a r a c teristics to be a d m i n i s t e r e d  
as a group. Most of the above types of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  also
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often involve the further distinction of the method of 
growth; viz. internal d e v e lopment of products or 
acq ui si tion of other firms. This distinction, as well as 
the foregoing, affects the par t i c u l a r  question of the role 
of real investment in diversification, in addition to the 
be nef its of growth.
A P e nrose-type c l assification provides perhaps the 
best illustration of the diff erent types of diversification  
moves. These are shown in Figure 3.2-1, which suggests 
that p r o d u c t - m a r k e t  scope depends c onsiderably on 
t ec hn ol ogical strength. A firm that is unable to develop, 
or acquire, new production bases is confined to moves I,
II, III, and VIII, of which the latter is merely 
a cq ui si tion of close competitors in existing markets, while 
the first constitutes market d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of existing 
products. There is pr obably limited scope for growth by 
means of I and VIII, neither of which depends on scientific 
research. Moves II and III, however, do necessitate 
re sea rch  and development, and, in the case of III, the 
abil ity  to conduct imitative or di f f e r e n t i a t e d  
di v e r s i f i c a t i o n  in expl odi ng markets. A type III move into 
a market which is already established, although new to the 
firm, may be a p a r t i c u l a r l y  difficult venture, unless the 
firm pos sesses a strong competitive advantage not shared by 
firms already in the market. The p roduction base from which 
the firm is attacking could provide this advantage if it is 
superi or to those of other firms. Move II is known as 
ful l-line diversification, wh ereby a firm exploits both 
t ec hn ol ogical and marketing synergy to serve a wider variety
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Production
Base Product Marke t
Existing
New
VIIIVIII
VII
IV V III V
Figure 3.2-1
Scope for diversification
(Diversification paths between 'production base' 
and 'market' are traced by twin pairs of numerals
- e.g. VI-VI)
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of the needs of its existing customers. A firm which 
initiates II gains cons i d e r a b l y  in short-term competitive 
advan tag e and forces competitors to follow suit. This 
var ian t is especially important in ol i g o p o l i s t i c  industries, 
nota bly  in those p r o d ucing consumer durables. [Penrose,
200 , p p . 134-6] .
In each of II and III the firm may dive rsify either as 
initi ato r or as imitator. Growth benefits may depend 
c o n s i de rably on which of these is the case. An initiator 
can enjoy the benefits of q u a s i - m o n o p o l y  during at least 
part of that phase of a pro d u c t ' s  life when price 
e la st ic it y of demand is b e l ieved to be lowest; namely, when 
demand is exploding. [Kaplan e t a 1. , 129, p p . 59-60; Marris,
173, p p . 143-4]. Various p r o d u c t i o n  and m a r k eting 
adv ant ages may also arise from being first in the field.
On the other hand, product innovation is expensive and 
uncertain. The market may fail to explode, or imitators may 
succeed in capturing a large share of the market. An 
imitat or is subject to less unce r t a i n t y  when he enters an 
a l r e a d y - e x p l o d i n g  market; and he may be spared a part of 
initial costs of research and development. [Marris, 173, 
p.187]. Owing to unce r t a i n t y  the total market size of a new 
pr od uc t may not be known in the early stages. The initiator 
therefore knows his own sales, but not the b e h a v i o u r  of his 
marke t share. This comp licates the p r o b l e m  of devising 
tactics against encroachment, e s p e c i a l l y  if absolute sales 
and profits figures continue to rise satisfactorily. Other 
things equal, the more t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y - s o p h i s t i c a t e d  a 
firm's m a rket entries of types II and III, the greater the
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lag before imitators appear, and, therefore, the higher the 
proportion of the exploding phase of product demand will 
the initiator be able to exploit unchallenged.
If a firm possesses sufficient resources and technical 
competence to develop new production bases, its scope for 
growth through diversification widens to include moves 
IV - VII, subject to relations between the respective uses 
of the new and existing bases. Move IV, for instance, is a 
variant of II (full-line diversification) and may gain for 
the firm a considerable competitive advantage in its 
existing markets. New production methods or materials, which 
are relevant to existing markets by way of new products, may 
also be used to transform the physical characteristics, 
quality and marketability of existing products in existing 
markets (move V I ) , and/or to attack markets new to the firm 
where this was not previously feasible (move VII). Markets 
new to the firm for purposes of VII may either be initially 
developed by the firm or already established prior to 
diversification. Again, the firm may diversify either as 
initiator or as imitator. The extent of competitive 
advantages and growth benefits to be gained from these 
moves depends materially on these considerations. Moreover, 
it should not be overlooked that the above moves, or rather 
the new techniques underlying these moves, may conflict 
with the firm's investment in existing methods. In that 
case, if the firm has initiated the technical advance, 
diversification may be deferred until the old investment can 
be liquidated. If another firm initiates the new methods, 
the firm may be forced to cut its losses on previous
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investment and to adopt the new methods to save its 
competitive position. Much depends on the specificity of 
previous investment.
Move V represents diversification into new markets 
with new products developed from a new production base.
This move may simply constitute a market extension of IV, 
as, for example, when technica 1ly-new products, which are 
relevant to a firm's existing markets, can also be exported. 
Market synergy and competitive advantage in existing 
markets will then assist efforts to sell the same new 
products in new markets. In the absence of market synergy, 
growth benefits of move V depend on other types of synergy 
(if any) , on managerial efficiency, whether the firm is 
first in the new field, and on the degree and timing of 
competition from other firms. A complete lack of synergy 
in move V would entail great reliance on technical and 
managerial resource, and on financial strength, if 
diversification is to succeed. Ability to diversify 
conglomerately is a prerogative of size coupled with 
efficiency, and, perhaps, of entrepreneurial and 
organizational flair of managements of smaller firms.
Success in all types of diversification depends on technical 
and market strength backed by research and development 
effort, and by managerial enterprise and efficiency. All 
directions of opportunity for a firm are also potential lines 
of attack by other firms. An efficient and growth-minded 
firm prepares itself through research, etc. to respond 
swiftly to both threats and opportunities.
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The main constraints on d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  by internal
developm ent, apart from financial resources, are managerial
and technical. This refers to the quantity and quality of
ma na ge rial and technical staff available to plan and
execute diversi f i c a t i o n  moves. If these resources are
ov er- extended, costly errors are likely to ensue, because
speed and ac curacy of judgment are more critical when
op er at ions are new and unestablished. This applies
e s p e ci ally to decisions to divert resources from projects
that have failed to gain market momentum, or to provide
extra support n e c e ssary to make marginal projects succeed.
The more products there are to watch, relatively to 
the number of efficient managers, the less efficiently, 
be yond a certain point, will each be controlled, and 
the more capital will be wasted, locked up in products 
which have failed to explode, or be lost irrevocably  
through tardy diversion [Marris, 173, p.233] .
Fai lur es in this respect p a r t i c u l a r l y  affect fixed capital
and other overheads. To the extent that fixed capital has
al ter native uses, the importance of quick mana gerial
reaction is g r e a t e r ,because o p p o r t u n i t y  costs of
r e a l l oc ation are then considerable. Mi stakes will be
ref le ct ed in a tendency for the overall c a pital-output
ratio to rise. The more complex a new venture in relation
to its size, and the larger this absolute size, the more
man ag er ial resources will be needed to supervise it, and to
solve problems of co-or d i n a t i o n  with ex isting activities.
[Penrose, 200, p p . 207-8 ; Robinson, 213, p.56]. Managerial
pro bl em s are m u l t i p l i e d  when a firm d iversifies into
unf am il iar fields. In these cases, 'some kind of reliable,
e x p e r i e n c e d  business judgment is needed just at the time
when the old judgment standards no longer apply' [Miller,
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185, p.128]. Even fields which appear to be technically 
similar to existing activities may give rise to problems
(g )not foreseen when expansion was undertaken.
Technological complexities tend to lower the most 
efficient growth rate that can be attained. However, the 
simpler the technology applied in a firm's existing 
production bases, the less likely it is that abilities will 
be developed which enable the firm to move into new areas.
On balance, the attainable diversification rate will be 
lower the weaker a firm is technologically. The same 
applies to marketing strength. [Penrose, 200, pp.118-20]. 
Miller reached similar conclusions in his empirical studies 
of diversification.
Many of them [diversifying firms] overestimated the 
importance of the production function as a whole, and 
underestimated the product development and marketing 
problems of their diversification moves. This 
generally resulted in excessive facilities cost, 
inadequate product pricing, and premature high-volume 
production for new ventures that simply were not ready 
for full-scale operation. They needed a means of 
adjusting themselves to the real requirements of the 
new venture [185, pp.121-2].
Miller also identified a further constraint, which he termed 
proliferation of commitments. For instance, a new line may
(6 )
One diversification move examined by Miller [185, 
pp.25-31] involved production by an automobile manufacturer, 
Briggs, of drawn steel bathtubs. The attraction of this 
move lay in application of automotive steel stamping 
techniques, which were expected to yield advantages of 
light weight and low cost that existing manufacturers of 
cast-iron bathtubs could not provide. It was discovered, 
however, that automobile presses ran too fast and that the 
steel tore during stamping. Special presses and different 
steel had to be developed. The project succeeded admirably, 
but only because management realized in time that this move 
could not be regarded merely as a means of achieving fuller 
utilization of automobile presses, and that substantial 
separate supervision and support were needed for the new 
project to succeed.
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be combined with existing facilities simply to spread 
overheads and to achieve fuller plant utilization, with no 
intention that the venture will exert its own claims on 
resources. Miller found, however, that in some cases, 'as 
soon as unit production costs became an important 
consideration, the new venture began to generate its own 
requirements, and the flexibility of existing resources 
became a critical factor' [185, pp.118-9]. In this way a 
non-growth venture may inhibit future diversification by 
diverting attention and resources.
Competition, both actual and potential, exerts a 
constraining influence on the directions in which most 
firms can diversify.
In a competitive and technologically progressive 
industry a firm specializing in given products can 
maintain its position with respect to these products 
only if it is able to develop an expertise in 
technology and marketing sufficient to enable it to 
keep up with and to participate in the introduction of 
innovations affecting its products. If this 
proposition is valid for firms specializing in given 
products, then it is equally valid regardless of the 
number of products a firm produces. Thus if a firm 
chooses to produce a large number of products not 
closely related in technology and marketing, it must 
be in a position to devote sufficient resources to the 
development of each type of product to maintain its 
competitive position in the market for that type of 
product [Penrose, 200, p.132].
The force of this constraint clearly depends partly on firm
size, since this governs the amount of resources available
for product development. Large firms are able to service
wider ranges of products than small firms, and the broader
the technological bases from which the former diversify, the
more varied the content of their market postures. A firm's
scope within the competitive constraint also depends on
circumstance; for example, on the amount of resources needed to
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sustain each venture. This often cannot be known initially, 
owing to partial ignorance about a venture's likelihood of 
success and the eventual size of the firm's market share. 
Inability to service a range of products is often the result 
of wea kn esses in strategy, as when management neglects to 
appraise the technical, managerial and m a r k eting connections 
between new and existing activities. Other possible 
reasons are that a firm's capa bilities are too specialized, 
shallow, or obsolete to generate oppor t u n i t i e s  in areas 
related to existing activities. Mana g e m e n t  may then easily 
ov er re ac h itself, because it is unfamiliar with the 
req ui re ments of new fields. [Cf. Ansoff, 7, p p . 135-6].
Di v e r s i f i c a t i o n  by a cq uisition of other firms is a
possib le alternative to internal d e v e l opment in all the
(7 )cases pr e v i o u s l y  considered. When available, this method
of growth often allows a firm to alleviate, though not to 
remove, some constraints on growth by internal development.
To this extent a c q u i sition may raise the attainable, 
ef fic ien t growth rate, but it does not exempt a firm from 
the ne ce ssity of p o s s e s s i n g  the same technical expertise that 
would enable it to enter a given field through internal 
development. If the firm does not understand the parameters 
which affect the business of its acquisitions, it will 
exper ien ce great d i f f iculty in integrating them with 
existing activities. A c q u isition may, however, enable the 
firm to effect considerable savings in development effort, 
and to gain valuable technical skills pre v i o u s l y  lacking.
J T )
A firm may also acquire close competitors in existing 
markets, viz. move VIII in Figure 3.2-1 above.
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Manager ial problems of c o - o r dination and control may be 
even greater in connection with a cquisition than in internal 
development, and the effi ci ent absorption rate is no less 
c on st ra in ed by limitations of m a n a gerial resources than is 
growth by internal means.
Firms therefore mostly do not acquire businesses 
simply because they are on offer at apparently favourable 
terms. As Penrose has observed, like a family with a new 
baby, a corporate acquisition changes all existing 
relationships. [200, p.128]. An efficient m a n a gement will 
attempt to observe the strategic requirement that 
a cq ui si ti ons constitute logical additions to the firm's 
exi st in g activities, in the manner p r e v iously discussed.
The potential a dvantages of a cquisition are 
considerable. Often with little or no direct cash outlay 
a firm can acquire esta b l i s h e d  m anagerial and technical 
teams and market positions, whilst at the same time 
e l i m in at ing actual or potential competitive pressures. On 
the debit side, as Miller's study shows, firms often 
experie nce great difficulty in making acquisitions  
a c c o rd in g to plan. Firstly, the causes and timing that 
determine a firm's a v a i l a b i l i t y  for acquisition may not 
coincide with such plans. Secondly, during the absorption 
process it is often necessary to proliferate commitments to 
an unf or eseen extent in order to make an acqu isition succeed. 
This can happen despite the fact that the original 
ac qu is ition was a logical addition to the firm's
ac tiv iti e s .
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Much of what we call management judgment is 
actually experience in a particular business context. 
Diversification to a new business context necessarily 
tends to upset that judgment. it places upon 
management the burden of major decisions that cannot 
easily be delegated or postponed and that depend 
heavily upon just such judgment [Miller, 185, 
pp. 126-7] .
Thirdly, both a firm's digestive capacity and the
availability of suitable victims are limited in any given
period, owing to restrictions on managerial capacity, the
need to evaluate candidates carefully, and to a simple
scarcity of acquisition possibilities. The size of the
acquiring firm is also a factor, both with regard to the
ease with which other firms may be integrated, and to its
scope for acquisition. However, the larger the firm, the
less likely is it that acquisitions can be relied upon to
raise or even maintain the overall growth rate. It may
therefore be expected that acquisitions will be
proportionately less significant in the expansion
programmes of very large firms than in those of medium-sized
firms. [Butters et a 1. , 30, Ch.9; Penrose, 200, p .212] .
Finally, it would not be strategically prudent for a firm
to rely exclusively for its growth upon acquisition.
Technological and, therefore, competitive strength usually
necessitates an active programme of internal research and
(8 )development as well. [Cf. Simon, 228].
(8 )In the field sample of 12 manufacturers of automobile 
components studied by Miller, however,
the preferred means [of diversification] was acquisition 
rather than internal development. No company relied on 
internal development alone, though one-third of them 
relied on acquisition alone...the typical effort was 
to support a development by subsequent acquisition and 
to support the acquisition by subsequent internal 
development [185, p.ll] .
Manufacture on licence is an alternative to both internal 
development and acquisition.
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The particular role of real investment in diversification 
is a very subjective one. This role is also affected by a 
certain amount of controversy concerning the definition of 
real, as opposed to financial, investment. Real investment 
is conventionally regarded as 'capital expenditure on 
physical productive assets, e.g. machinery, factory 
buildings, roads, bridges, houses and so on' [Gilpin, 87, 
p.110; also Hanson, 105, p.362 ] . If, however, investment 
is defined more generously as 'an outlay on resources 
which is expected to give rise to income in the future, 
usually over a number of years' [Barna, 9, p.21], then many
items outside the range of physical productive assets will 
qualify for inclusion. Some non-physical assets, such as 
purchased goodwill and patents, are usually capitalized in 
the manner of fixed assets. Other items, including research 
and advertising expenditures, which are also intended to 
produce benefits in future periods, and which serve to 
increase the firm's capacity, are treated as current 
outlays for both business and tax purposes. For purposes 
of this study it is expedient to adopt a fairly broad 
concept of real investment at this stage. Most expenditure 
in connection with diversification, whether on fixed assets 
or otherwise,represents a strategic disposition of scarce 
resources for the purpose of securing future growth 
benefits. Moreover, as stated above, it is very difficult 
to generalize about the role of real investment (narrowly 
defined) in diversification moves.
Real investment in productive assets for diversification
purposes will be greater,
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(1) the higher is the diversification rate, since the 
proportion of exploding products and the growth 
rate of required capacity should then both be 
g r e a t e r ;
(2) the bigger the saturated size of markets at which 
diversification is aimed, and the faster the rates 
at which demand explodes in those markets, given 
the appropriate efficient capital-output ratio in 
each case;
(3) the more technologically-advanced the industries 
in which diversification occurs and, therefore, 
the higher the appropriate efficient capital-labour 
r a t i o s ;
(4) the more specific are the uses of existing 
capacity and/or the higher the utilization rate 
of this capacity;
(5) if there is conflict of technical standards between 
new and existing activities (see footnote 6);
(6) the higher the proportion of diversification moves 
undertaken by means of internal development rather 
than by acquisition; and
(7) the less technica1ly-efficient is diversification, 
since the capital-output ratio then rises, and the 
capacity needed to produce a given output 
increases.
There are considerable inter- and intra-industry 
variations in fixed-asset capitalization, due to technical 
factors. Corresponding variations are found between 
successive stages of individual production processes within
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(9 )firms. The type and direction of div e r s i f i c a t i o n  play a
large part in d etermining a ssociated capital investment.
For instance, combination of new lines with existing 
activi ties often aims simply at fuller capacity utilization, 
and does not involve fresh investment. The same may be 
true of market d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of existing products. In any 
case, however, the relation between any given 
div er s i f i c a t i o n  move and asso c i a t e d  capital expenditure is 
by no means d etermined entirely by technical factors. The 
scope of internal policy for influencing this relation is 
of great interest, both for the study of capital 
accumulation, and for the impact of corporate tax policy on 
growth decisions. Thus, mana gerial decisions to purchase or 
to rent plant, to purchase new or second-hand assets, and to 
und ertake individual processes internally or to subcontract 
them, e t c . , materially affect the growth rate of productive 
capacit y even when the rate, types and dire ctions of 
div e r s i f i c a t i o n  are given.
(9)
'In the making of television sets, for instance, assembly  
is lightly c a p i talized but the manufacture of some 
compone nts is heavily capitalized' [Barna, 9, p.23].
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3.3 Investment in Existing Lines
(a ) Net New Investment
Investment decisions under this heading may be 
classified into expansion of existing productive capacity, 
cost-redueing investment, and 'non-productive' investment 
in offices, welfare projects, etc. Any such classification 
is open to objections [cf. Barna, 9, pp.30-1], but this one 
is adequate for present purposes. Net new investment for 
purposes of cost reduction is subject to the same criteria 
as replacement, and these will be discussed in the 
following Section. This Section is devoted to the first 
category.
The acceleration principle purports to explain net 
induced investment by existing firms in existing lines, as 
fo1lows:
= K - Kt-1 (1)
where I denotes investment, K, capital stock, 0, output, 
t, the time period, and a, the acceleration coefficient 
(traditionally assumed constant) . This simple version 
states that net induced investment depends entirely on the 
growth rate of output, and it is fundamental to the 
principle that firms maintain some optimum relationship 
between capital stock and output, both measured in real 
terms. It is immediately possible to improve on (1), 
because investment cannot usually respond to current 
movements in output unless t is quite long. This gives 
rise to a lagged formulation, as follows:
a (C) -0 At-n t-n-1 (2 )
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In more complex lag formulations the adjustment process is 
spread over several periods, so that investment in any 
period depends on output changes of several previous 
consecutive periods. [Chenery, 35, p.12; Eisner, 68, 
p . 17 7 ; Kuh , 144, p.216] . This is the distributed lag
formulation, whereby
I = a { 0 -0 } + a { 0 -0 }t 1 t-n t-n-1 2 t-n-1 t-n-2
+ . . . + a { Cl _ -C) }m t-n-m+1 t-n-m (3)
If net investment is strictly a function of the growth 
rate of output, as the acceleration principle states, 
investment should not be 'lumpy' and there should be no 
economies of scale. [Chenery, 35, p.2; Eckaus, 62, p .215 ; 
Hicks, 114, p . 5 8 ; Knox, 140, p.280]. Also, operation of 
the principle is generally regarded as asymmetrical between 
upward and downward changes in output, since, when output 
falls, gross investment cannot be negative. [Knox, o p .cit.; 
Smyth, 234 ; Tinbergen, 252] .
These considerations, together with the assumption of 
a constant acceleration coefficient, reflect adversely upon 
the ability of the principle to explain investment. However, 
the main objection against the principle is its neglect of 
the influence of existing capital stock in investment 
decisions, or specifically, of the rate at which this stock 
is utilized when additional capacity is under consideration. 
Other things equal, a firm is unlikely to invest in 
additional productive capacity if the utilization rate of
(10)
An adequate supply of funds is generally regarded as a 
prerequisite of the principle. [E.gs. Duesenberry, 56, 
p.42; Meyer and Kuh, 183, pp.218 , 229] .
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its existing capacity is below normal when output increases. 
On the other hand, pressure of demand on existing capacity 
is likely to stimulate further investment. When capacity 
is fully utilized the causation specified by the 
acceleration principle becomes impossible; i.e. further 
output increases, whereby investment is induced, cannot 
occur. Instead^it is additional investment which 'causes' 
output to increase. [Hicks, 114, p.99n.; Neisser, 193, 
pp.253, 257, 259; Somers, 237, p.82].
Criticism of output as a determinant of investment 
applies also to sales, which is linked to output through 
limitations on inventory adjustments. However, the extent 
of these limitations differs between industries, along with 
the possibility of utilizing capacity more intensively than 
normal. [Eckaus, 62, pp.221-2; Hicks, 114, p.39; K u h , 144,
p.22, n.24] . This criticism has led to capacity
formulations of the principle, as follows:
It
Kt-1
t-n
‘t-1
b ,
(4)
where k is the desirable long-run output capital ratio, and
b is the (constant) proportion of capital stock deficiency
{ kO -K ,} that firms choose to make good in each period, t-n t-1
It is therefore assumed that firms desire to maintain a 
stable output-capital ratio in the long run, but that full 
adjustment to demand changes is not usually effected within 
one unit period. If either or both of the desired
(11)
Output and sales formulations of the accelerator have 
been widely blamed in the literature for the principle's 
poor empirical performance. [ Eisner , 68, p.173; Meyer and
Kuh, 184, pp.16,134; Smyth, 2 34, p.193; Tinbergen, 252,p . 176],
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output-capital ratio or the reaction coefficient (b) changes 
over time, (4) would need to be modified by a trend term. 
[Smyth, 234, p.186].
Output changes therefore affect investment via 
pressure on capacity as the output-capital ratio reaches and
passes the value considered desirable: however, output leve1
(in relation to capacity) is emphasized in capacity
formulations. Investment in any period does not necessarily 
correspond to the output change in any particular previous 
period. If, as a limiting case, full adjustment is made 
within one period to the higher output level of one previous 
period, then (4) becomes
t t-n
Kt-1 “ °t-n-l
(5)
- 1 ,
which resembles (1) above.
In capacity formulations of the acceleration 
(12 )principle the investment rate depends on feedback from
successive incremental divergences of desired from actual 
capital stock, although the relationship is not necessarily
smooth.
for the individual firm, whatever the causal variable, 
activity may be expected to develop in jumps. The 
rate of sales may increase over a number of years 
until finally the decision is reached to launch that 
major expansion or build that new factory. In each 
firm, at any time, there may be some quantitative rate 
of increase of sales, or some length of time for which 
sales have been higher, or some expectation of future 
sales in relation to the past and present that will be 
just sufficient to bring the firm over the 
decision-making threshold and lead it to plan or incur 
the capital expenditure [Eisner, 68, pp.165-6].
(12 )
Variants of the capacity formulation include, inter 
alia, Chenery, 35; Goodwin, 89; Kaldor, 124 and 125; 
Kalecki, 127; and Klein, 136 and 137.
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The hypothesis, that firms attempt to stabilize the
output-capita1 ratio through investment over the long
(13)period, has been successfully tested empirically.
This seems reasonable in view of technological 
considerations which usually link quantities of output and 
capital. Having stated this, however, it still appears 
likely that marked differences will exist between the 
investment policies of thrusting and sleeping firms, on the 
basis of motivation, competence, and industry circumstances, 
etc. Long-term stability of the capital coefficient implies 
very different behaviour in the two cases.
Output or sales changes in recent past periods can 
provide two types of information for managerial investment 
decisions. Firstly, these changes directly determine 
present capacity utilization rates, which represent a known 
fact. If these rates are high, capacity is under pressure 
and may need to be augmented. Secondly, management may base 
projections of future capacity requirements upon these 
changes, thereby using them for predictive purposes. If 
current utilization rates are high, but a downward trend is 
discernible, additional capacity may be deferred. 
Correspondingly, management may wish to act before capacity 
comes under intense pressure.
However, output and sales levels and changes in past 
periods may not be a reliable basis on which to predict the 
future. They represent that which was achieved, not
(13)
See, for example, Eisner, 68, p p . 17 7 , 187-8 ; 69, p.238 ;
Evans, 75, p.158; Hicks, 114, p.39; Jorgenson and 
Stephenson, 122, p.17; Kuh , 146, p.266; Meyer and Glauber,
182, p.13; Meyer and Kuh, 184, p.132.
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necessarily what could have been achieved; also they may
have been subject to a host of demand and supply factors
peculiar to those periods. Some measure of effective
product demand in each period is probably the best single
guide for predictive purposes, provided that special
periodic influences are taken into account. [Duesenberry,
56, p.44; Eisner, 71, p.386; Hart, 107; Hicks, 114, p . 9 9,n . ;
Kuh , 144, p.50; Meyer and Glauber, 182, p.17; Neisser, 193;
Smyth, 234, p.191; Tsiang, 256].
One good measure of effective demand for an individual
firm is net orders outstanding, in which case investment
will be influenced by the ratio of net orders to capacity.
Hart, who has generated an index of this ratio, ORCA,
defines it as 'the ratio of production to capacity,
multiplied by a ratio of new orders to output' [ o p .cit. ,
p.135, n.]. ORCA focuses attention on the present and the
future, whereas the output-capital ratio alone reveals
little about whether extra capacity will continue to be
needed in future periods.
Current output in a sense represents obsolete 
information - relevant chiefly as a basis for 
estimating future output. While even the orders 
arriving in the current quarter will probably be 
largely worked through in most industries before 
facilities for which appropriations have been made in 
the current quarter can be brought into use, current 
orders are information several months closer to the 
cutting edge than current output. Hence, if a ratio 
of output to capacity is useful, a ratio of orders to 
capacity should be more so [Hart, op . cit . , p.126] . (14)
Also, the influence of past periods on current investment
decisions is believed to decline at a rate approximating
In some industries, e.g. capital-producing industries, 
managements may be able to look even further ahead by taking 
account of interested enquiries, of which a certain 
proportion, perhaps estimatable on the basis of experience, 
will become orders.
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the exponential. [Cf. Evans, 75, p.151; Hart, op .cit., 
p.125; Koyck, 142, Ch . 2; Meyer and Glauber, 182, p.23].
Managements must try to determine whether demand in
periods (t + n) , (t + n + 1), etc. justifies appropriations
in period t, subject to a delivery and installation lag of 
(15 )n periods. Investment decisions frequently create
excess capacity deliberately, to provide for future 
economies of scale or to deter potential entrants to an 
industry. As a general rule, however, investment will not 
be induced unless and until management believes that 
existing capacity is permanently inadequate, in the sense 
that expected future demand will employ the proposed 
additional capacity during the latter's expected working 
life. [Bissell, 17; Eisner, 68, p p .17 6 , 183, 185; 71,
p.386; Kmenta and Williamson, 138, p.175; Meyer and Kuh,
18 3, p . 2 2 9 ; Smyth, 234, p . 19 9; Tsiang, 256, pp. 327-8].
Product demand is determined at national, industry, and 
firm levels. Managements formulate their beliefs about the 
future on the basis of information and impressions derived 
from each of these levels. On the other hand, their ability 
to mould future demand is confined to the firm and (to some 
extent) industry levels. For instance, the degree of 
maturity of product demand is a determinant at industry
_____
This lag depends on fixed investment lead times, which 
in turn are governed by circumstances in the
capital-producing industries, and by the size and complexity 
of capacity ordered. Lead times are a principal determinant 
of lags between demand increases and net investment, on the 
one hand, and between investment plans and realizations, on 
the other hand. [Eckaus, 62, p.218; Eisner, 69, p.246 and 
70, p.190; Evans, 75, p.151; Jorgenson and Stephenson, 122; 
Mayer and Sonenblum, 179; Meyer and Glauber, 182, p.27;
Smyth, 234, pp.191, 194].
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level, and there may be very little that an individual firm 
can do about this if demand is already saturated and market 
shares are firmly established. [Cf. Kmenta and Williamson, 
138]. Similarly, the general level of economic development, 
and changes therein, are parameters at national level for 
individual firms. [Cf. Frankel, 82]. To some extent, 
therefore, managerial expectations regarding future 
investment requirements may be based on factors beyond the 
reach of corporate policy-making. Some writers also believe 
that managements can more easily form views about general 
economic trends and other 'large' matters than about events 
closer to their firms, and therefore more within the ambit 
of firm policies. If so, expectations of the former type 
may be held more confidently than those of the latter type, 
and would be likely to exercize mo re influence over 
investment. [E.g. Eisner, 68, p.168; Katona, 130, pp.64-5].
Under imperfect competition there is considerable 
scope for managerial policy-making for product demand. 
However, action within this scope, including formation of 
expectations, depends directly upon the motivation and 
competence of management. Expectations do not form 
themselves: they have to be worked out on the basis of
relevant data collected for this purpose. Data collection 
requires managerial initiative to establish the necessary 
machinery for delivering pertinent facts in timely fashion, 
subject to constraints on costs of collection. As Katona 
has observed, 'in the absence of definite expectations... 
business is often conducted in a habitual way, according to
prevailing rules of thumb; the firm continues to do what it
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has always done' [130, p.64j. Managerial initiative in 
this respect is therefore a principal source of difference 
between thrusting and sleeping firms, especially with 
regard to investment behaviour. Upon the quality of
managerial expectations and the confidence with which they 
are held depend the precision with which increases in 
demand are anticipated, both as to quantities of investment 
and its timing.
Sleeping managements, by definition, usually fail to
anticipate demand developments and also tend to be inactive
with regard to stimulation of demand by policy 
(17 )initiatives. Of these firms it is likely to be true,
given lags between decisions and expenditures, and between
expenditures and installation of capacity, that
typically the new facilities become fully available 
just as output is slacking off, and that the need for 
new facilities created by an upswing, in sales typically 
becomes visible just as the slacking off in capital 
installations set off by the last recession is fully 
effective [Hart, 107, p.133] .
A vicious circle or chain of causation is involved, in 
that managerial competence is initially responsible for 
guiding the firm into markets where the scope for profitable 
growth is greatest. Once involved in these markets (in 
which, by definition, demand is determined relatively more 
by variables within managerial jurisdiction, and 
relatively less by parameters outside its control),managerial 
competence again ensures that maximum advantage will be taken 
of the scope for satisfying and developing demand through 
investment, marketing and other policies. Correspondingly, 
when demand has become saturated, a competent management will 
reallocate investment towards new markets.
(17) Managerial deficiencies which directly or indirectly 
hinder expansion include: reluctance to admit existence of
problems; failure to achieve a proper degree of 
specialization; readiness to treat variables as parameters; 
refusal to cater for the wants of customers; skepticism 
regarding the necessity for large-scale production; 
resentment of technological change; lack of cost 
consciousness; tolerance of divisional failures; and neglect 
of managerial training. [P.E.P. 204, Ch.10] .
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Such failures of market intelligence would doubtless be 
rationalized as precipitate investment action, and the 
resulting 'prudence' would cause future growth 
opportunities to be missed even more. Investment decisions 
depend on the confidence with which expectations are held, 
which, under uncertainty, depends in turn upon opinion as 
to the reliability of data on which expectations are based, 
and upon decision-makers' past records of success or 
failure.
The acceleration and capacity principles have been 
criticized for implying that business 'behaves like a 
thermostat towards capital' [Meyer and Kuh, 184, p.14].
This criticism is justified on the above grounds that the 
response of investment to demand is conditioned by 
motivation, competence and business confidence. Large 
firms possess an advantage over small firms to the extent 
that confidence must be purchased by allocation of skilled 
resources and money to the tasks of data collection and 
evaluation.
Expansion of capacity in particular lines in response 
to increases in demand depends also on competing claims for 
limited resources, which often arise concurrently. The 
top-management function of resource allocation, subject to 
corporate goals and constraints, often demands
entrepreneurial competence and organization of a high order. 
The volume, composition and timing of investment are 
affected by these goals, particularly by their priorities 
and the methods by which they are pursued. Current 
investment decisions also depend upon past allocations of
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resources, since these determine existing markets, capacity 
and competitive position. Thus, just as diversification 
investment depends significantly upon existing lines, so 
investment in the latter is also a function of previous, 
current and projected diversification decisions. Other 
things equal, the higher the rate of successful 
diversification in the past, the greater will be current 
investment requirements. Schemes are often deliberately 
planned to allow for supplementary investment at later 
stages for purposes of product differentiation and 
improvement, etc. Correspondingly, the higher are current 
and projected rates of diversification, the smaller will be 
the amounts of managerial time and investible resources that 
can be allocated to expansion of existing lines. It may be 
equally true of existing lines, as of new projects, that 
the more complicated a proposed expansion the longer it 
will take to work out, and the more likely it then is to be 
affected by inelasticities in the supply of managerial 
planning and executive resources.
These factors affect the total volume of investment, 
because projects differ in managerial requirements (which 
determine the length of time before decisions are made), and 
in capital requirements, including the scope for gaining 
future economies of large-scale production. Also, the 
total amount which may be invested in a particular period is 
not necessarily fixed independently of capital requirements. 
Finance available internally may be supplemented by
borrowing.
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To a large extent corporate production functions are 
technologically determined, so that quantities of various 
types of capacity needed to produce a given output are 
fixed and known in advance. Consequently, equivalent 
percentage or absolute increases in demand, given current 
rates of capacity utilization, impose differing 
requirements for additional capacity on different 
industries. Induced investment is affected by output 
elasticity of existing capacity, the scope for gaining 
economies of large-scale production, and the associated 
principle of multiples. These were discussed in connection 
with diversification. On the one hand, increases in demand 
over considerable periods may not induce investment in 
additional capacity because these increases were anticipated 
in previous investment decisions. As Chenery has observed, 
'an industry with a good reason for maintaining excess 
capacity also has a good reason to react slowly to changes 
in demand' [35, p.15]. On the other hand, when additions to 
capacity are eventually made, they may be very large both in 
relation to currently unsatisfied demand, and absolutely. 
These decisions are probably very flexible as to timing and 
will not be made until long-term e xpe c tations are 
favourable and confidently-held.
However, technological factors by no means entirely 
determine the productive capacity which is provided to 
produce a given output. Capital coefficients often lie 
significantly within the jurisdiction of corporate policy, 
thereby causing intra-industry variations in investment 
rates. This jurisdiction includes purchase or leasing of
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capacity, purchasing new or second-hand assets, and 
arranging own production or sub-contracting various stages. 
Firms are also often able to choose between machines of 
varying capacities and costs to perform a particular 
function. Investments associated with research and 
development are largely subject to managerial policy.
These activities may be entirely neglected, or firms may 
acquire technical knowledge through licensing arrangements.
Effects of these policy choices on investment rates
depend partly on managerial motivation and competence,
including adequacy of pay-back period or other criteria by
which these decisions are made, and partly on specific
circumstances. [Barna, 9, pp.23-4]. The durability of
capital assets is an important factor in investment
decisions, owing to the risk of premature obsolescence
and/or insufficient growth of demand. Some managements may
be reluctant to invest in long-lived assets, or ones of
high functional specificity. [Eisner, 68, p.177; Knox,
140, p.283; Tinbergen, 252, p .16 5; Tsiang, 256, p.335].
If demand tends to fluctuate, production techniques may need
to be kept flexible. Firms will be less able to gain
economies of scale through investment and the average
proportion of reserve capacity permissible may also be
(18)reduced. [Chenery, 35, p.ll].
(18) However, this depends on whether demand is rising or 
falling on trend, i.e. on whether the industry is growing or 
declining. Some disturbances must be expected and should not 
affect investment much provided their amplitude is small.
The amplitude of investment-determining variables is a basis 
of distinction between induced and autonomous investment. The 
latter type 'is only expected to pay for itself over a long 
period' [Hicks, 114, p.59], and 'is based on a very broad 
permissible range of fluctuation...' [Kuh, 144, p.57].
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The conclusions of this Sub-section are(i) that
induced investment is heavily affected by managerial 
motivation and entrepreneurial competence, and that (ii) 
after due allowance has been made for these qualities, 
investment for expansion depends on the strength of demand, 
and on the ability of managements to be reasonably 
confident that demand will not weaken for reasons beyond 
their control. This is especially important for small and 
growing firms, which are relatively susceptible to 
recessions. [Eisner, 70, p.195; Friend and Bronfonbrenner, 
83; Meyer and Glauber, 182, p.136; Meyer and Kuh, 184,
pp.166-7]. While large firms often appear to react less 
quickly through investment policy than small firms to 
increases in demand, 'there is some evidence that large
firms respond [more] quickly when a downward adjustment is
(19 )involved' [Eisner, 68, pp.175-6; also pp.179, 182].
This is due to the greater output elasticity of large firms'
capital stocks, and to their generally superior forecasting
abi1ity .(2 0 )
(19)
A conference experience recounted by Hart is 
illuminating in this respect.
I still remember with a shiver a comment made by an 
economist from a large corporation at the Conference on 
Stabilization of Business Investment a few years ago. I 
had protested in the discussion what seemed to me an 
excessive emphasis on forecasting mere dates of 
turning-points, as against forecasting the strength of 
the forces at work and the amplitude to be expected in 
the absence of shifts in policy. "But," said this 
commentator - "but it is enough to forecast turning-point 
dates. As soon as we spot a downturn, we can't go wrong 
in suspending our investment programs"' [107,p.133, n.17].
(2 0 )
Viz. 'Discrepancies between anticipated and actual 
investment, measured as ratios of fixed assets, were found 
to be a decreasing function of size of firm' [Eisner, 68, 
p.187].
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(b ) R eplacement of Fixed Assets
Modern replacement theory derives from the work of 
Taylo r [ 247] , H o t e lling [116] , P reinreich [205] , F. and V. 
Lutz [165], and Terborgh [249]. With the exception of the 
latter, these writers were concerned with criteria for 
rep la ce ment under the assumption of no t e chnological  
pr og re ss or obsolescence. Taylor p r o vided a formula for 
d e t e rm ining the length of a machine's life such that the 
unit cost of its output is minimized. Hotelling sought to 
bring  repl acement under the aegis of profit m a x i m i z a t i o n 
with his h y p o thesis that a firm will seek to maxim i z e  the 
p r e se nt  value of a machine 's output less its o p e r a t i n g  
costs. He surmised that 'considerations of profit [may] 
lead him to scrap the machine at some diff erent time from 
that which makes unit cost. ..a minimum' [116, p.341].
Pr ei n r e i c h ' s  important c o n t r ibution was to show that 
the eco nomic life of a single machine cannot be det e r m i n e d  
wi th out  regard to the lives of all machines in a chain of 
future r eplacements exte nding to the firm's profit horizon. 
He then argued that the firm should maximize the present 
value of the 'aggregate goodwill' of all replacements,  
com pr is ing the present value of the earnings of future 
replacements, less the present value of the costs of those 
r e p l a c e m e n t s .
The most significant advance was made by Terborgh, 
who ext en ded the theory to account for obsolescence. He 
agreed  with P r e i nreich that replacement cannot be 
d e t e rm ined with regard only to the economic life of a 
single machine. He then pro c e e d e d  to show that r e p l a c e m e n t
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is eventually induced by the 'inferiority gradient' of 
existing plant, caused partly by obsolescence - the amount 
by which the earning rate of the most modern new plant 
exceeds that of existing capacity when the latter was new - 
and partly by physical deterioration of existing plant - the 
amount by which the latter's earning capacity has declined 
since it was new. The timing of replacement is then 
determined by comparison of the performance of existing 
plant with that of the latest available. Existing plant 
should be discarded as soon as its discounted annual cost - 
capital cost plus 'operating inferiority', which includes 
both revenue and cost factors - exceeds that of all future 
replacements, where the latter are assumed to occur 
optimally. Terborgh has also provided formulae for 
computation of the economic lives of future contenders for 
replacement ('challengers') and their corresponding 
discounted annual costs, based upon time averages of the 
various components of plant cost.
As Smith has observed, it is 'somewhat puzzling to find 
such tenacious adherence to a profit maximization formulation 
of the model [in the pre-Terborghian literature], since, in 
the absence of technological changes in equipment, the 
replacement decision cannot possibly affect either price or 
output' [233, p.131]. If obsolescence occurs under the 
influence of steady, as opposed to major and discrete, 
technological advances, then replacement decisions are 
concerned, not with the firm's revenue goal, but with 
minimizing the overall net plant cost of producing a given 
output, provided only that price and output decisions are
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independent of replacement decisions. That is, if price 
and output policies are dominated by product demand and 
market competition rather than by cost considerations, 
replacement decisions are directed towards productive 
efficiency rather than towards expected profits. [Barna,
9, p . 31; Neild, 192, p.32; Smith, 233, p . 161] .
In this connection it is necessary to distinguish 
replacement from induced investment for expansion. The 
latter does contribute to cost reduction because it 
represents technologically more advanced capacity than 
existing plant. However, its revenue-increasing role is 
more dominant. The well-known practical difficulties of 
isolating the pure replacement content of reinvestment may 
be disregarded for present purposes, if it is assumed that 
replacement is piecemeal, so that the expansion effect is 
gradual and insignificant.
The proposition, that replacement is concerned with 
cost minimization, implies that effects of aging and 
obsolescence are felt in terms of rising costs of a given 
normal output, and not, as frequently assumed, in terms of 
diminishing plant earning capacities. Old and obsolescent 
plant retains its original capacity for work (short of 
actual breakdown), but this capacity can only be achieved 
at higher operating costs.
In replacement decisions a firm must weigh the balance 
of cost advantage between replacing now or later. Given 
steady technological progress, operating expenses of 
existing plant will be higher the longer that replacement 
is postponed, whereas those of the eventual replacement
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will be lower, because delay allows more advanced plant to 
be installed. Allowances should be made for the 
utilization rates of existing and new plant, and for 
reduction over time in the former's scrap value. If the 
current replacement is deferred, the (optimal) dates of 
all future replacements are correspondingly put back. The 
cost of postponing replacement now is therefore reduced by 
the discounted gains which accrue from the fact that all 
future replacements will be more efficient. Calculation 
should include interest on both the present value of these 
future savings and reduction in scrap value caused by 
delays in replacement.
An optimal replacement policy is therefore 'one that 
minimizes...the constant outlay stream that has the same 
present value as all the operating cost and net investment 
cost outlays associated with a unit of equipment in an 
infinite chain of equipment replacements' [Smith, 233, 
p.137] . However, if technological progress causes shifts 
in the production function or alters the production 
coefficients, replacement policy then becomes concerned 
with minimizing overall total unit cost, not just the flow 
cost of plant alone, with respect to plant life. It is by 
way of replacements that new techniques are introduced, 
although firms also make net investments (not merely the 
net investment content of replacements) specifically for 
cost reduction purposes. ^ ^
(2 1 )
As previously explained, the fact that demand-induced 
investment also reduces unit costs is incidental to its 
main purpose.
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There has been controversy in the literature regarding
which of output level (capacity utilization rate) or age of
(22)plant is more important in replacement decisions. In
terms of the foregoing normative analysis this controversy
is misguided, because replacement is concerned with
minimizing the cost of a given (normal) output, while age
of plant affects decisions through comparison of the flow
costs of existing and new plant, given the rate of
technological progress. The age of plant must indeed be
expressed as a function of the components of the inferiority
gradient of existing plant, namely, physical deterioration
and obsolescence. In the absence of the latter, the only
relevant measure of plant age is machine hours worked (i.e. 
(23)output level). Once a rate of obsolescence is
introduced, however, actual machine hours worked must give 
way to normal utilization for purposes of calculation.
It has proven difficult to test hypotheses about 
replacement, because of problems of isolating the 
replacement content of gross investment, and of measuring 
plant age. Meyer and Kuh, for instance, attempted to test 
the 'echo effect' theory, which states that replacement
(2 2 )
Proponents of output level include Clark, 36; Frisch,
84; and Kuznets, 148; whereas Boulding, 21; Einarsen, 66; 
and Haberler, 100; have stressed the importance of plant age. 
(23)
In Smith's opinion,
equipment operating cost depends most directly upon 
cumulative use, and perhaps also upon the current 
utilization rate. Equipment age is an indirect 
determinant of equipment operating cost due to the 
relation between cumulative use and age ... The re fore, 
operating costs ought to be expressed as a function of 
both the utilization rate and equipment age [233, 
p .135 , n . 11 ] .
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demand is greater the older is existing capital stock.
They found low and consistently negative simple and partial 
correlations of their age variable (depreciation provisions) 
with gross investment, which they tested as a proxy for 
replacement. [184, Ch.6] . This result does not support
the theory, suggesting that the 'senility effect' theory 
may better describe actual behaviour. The latter theory 
states that, if two established firms have capital stocks 
of different average ages at a given point in time, then 
(i) firm A with the younger capital stock will tend to 
invest at a higher rate than firm B; and (ii) the average 
age of B's capital stock will tend gradually to rise, owing 
to the low investment rate. Meyer and Kuh observed that 
the typical firm which entered the postwar period with 
relatively old plant subsequently invested at a lower rate 
than a firm which commenced this period with newer plant. 
They attributed the senility effect to lack of trade 
position motivation. [184, p.96; also Campagna, 31, p.210; 
Meyer, 181, pp.304-5 ; Meyer and Glauber, 182, p.ll].
Depreciation charges and provisions are not good 
measures of plant age, especially for purposes of inter-firm 
comparison. Annual charges are calculated arbitrarily owing 
to uncertainty, and asset depreciabi1ity varies considerably 
both within and between firms and industries. [Cf.
Campagna, 31, p.210; Eisner, 69, p.243; Knox, 140; P.E.P.,
204 , pp.125-6] . A more reliable measure of average 
physical age of capacity might be the ratio of plant 
maintenance expenditure to gross fixed assets. Grunfeld
includes this category of expenditure in gross investment,
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'because of the large degree to which these expenditures 
can (and apparently do) substitute for purchases of new 
plant and machines' [99, p.212].
Despite these problems, however, empirical work has 
established fairly conclusively that wide inter-firm 
variations exist in replacement behaviour, and that many 
firms' policies fall woefully short of the goal of cost 
minimization. Available evidence, some of which is cited 
here, unmistakably identifies deficiencies in managerial 
motivation and competence as the basic cause of these 
shortcomings. Before this evidence is examined, it is 
necessary to discuss briefly the extent to which 
best-practice replacement policies in the real world may 
be expected to fall short of, or diverge from, the 
normative optimum described above.
Most lapses in this area are associated with uncertainty. 
Some writers believe that 'a replacement decision is a 
simpler decision surrounded by fewer uncertainties than a 
major expansion, or a venture into a new market' [Neild,
192, p.32]. This may be true, although it is unsafe to rely 
on arguments involving the quantification and comparison of 
uncertainties. (Cf. Chapter 2). Nevertheless, replacement 
is subject to uncertainty, mainly about future rates of 
capacity utilization, obsolescence, relative factor prices, 
and the behaviour of competitors.
The first two aspects, utilization rates and 
obsolescence, mean that managements are unable to estimate 
in advance the expected lives of proposed replacements. 
Contrary to normative assumptions, future rates of
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technological progress cannot be predicted in advance, and 
it is usually out of the question for managements to 
calculate the correct timing of even the next-but-one 
replacement, still less the timing of each of an infinite 
chain of such decisions. Uncertainty about future output 
levels means that the rate of physical deterioration (which 
depends on utilization) cannot be known for sure.
Managements may also not know the extent to which given 
rates of utilization will cause physical deterioration; 
that is, how capacity will stand up under stress. Moreover, 
since replacements often incorporate an inseparable element 
of increased capacity over that of existing plant, and since 
there is also often a range of machines of differing 
capacities with which existing plant may be replaced, 
uncertainty about future output levels poses real problems 
in selecting successors. On the one hand, managements 
prefer to replace with larger capacity, if that is more 
economical. On the other hand, however, expensive capacity 
may be underworked.
Uncertainty about relative factor prices can affect 
replacement decisions in at least two ways. Firstly, 
managements do not know the extent to which future wage 
increases will increase the operating inferiority of 
existing capacity (which probably needs more labour for 
operating and maintenance purposes) compared to new plant. 
Moreover, since the latter will also need upkeep, if 
managements are uncertain about both the rate of physical 
deterioration of new plant (i.e. the rate at which it will 
attract labour for maintenance purposes) and about future
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labour costs, it may be difficult to establish the 
operating advantage of new plant over existing capacity. 
Secondly, since relative factor prices partly determine the 
degree of capitalization, or labour-capital ratio, 
uncertainty in this respect complicates managerial decisions 
about the (capacity) level at which replacement should 
occur, assuming a choice in the matter.
Finally, uncertainty about the behaviour of competitors 
affects replacement policy in the sense that management 
cannot afford to let its costs get out of line with the 
rest of the industry. Although, under imperfect competition, 
management may be content merely to keep abreast of other 
firms in this respect, if a decisive discrepancy is allowed 
to develop, it may well be turned to good account against 
the firm in its markets.
It is concluded that managements are clearly unable to
optimize replacement policies in the normative sense owing
to uncertainty. However, replacement may still be efficient
in the more restricted sense that decisions are directed
towards cost reduction in the light of known technological
improvements, and are not merely initiated by physical
(2 4 )breakdown of existing capacity.
Available evidence indicates that managements recognize 
replacement needs in terms of physical deterioration as 
often as in terms of expected cost savings. [E.g. Istvan,
T2T)
However, as explained in the next Chapter, worthwhile 
replacement projects may be deferred by an efficient 
management in favour of expansion projects, in order to 
increase long-term benefits from overall resource 
allocation.
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(25)120, p.57; Neild, 192; P.E.P., 204]. This is
especially we 11-i11 ustrated by managerial statements quoted
in the latter, the P.E.P. 'Report on Attitudes in British
Management'. For instance, the works director of a very
large earthmoving equipment firm stated:
We very rarely chuck out a machine tool because there 
is something better available. We would normally go 
to the normal length of that machine too, which is, 
say, ten years, and we will then replace it willynilly. 
If we find something better to replace it with, 
obviously we will, but if there isn't anything better 
then we will replace it with the same again [204,
p.118] .
Likewise the works manager of a domestic appliance firm:
Even if the machine was performing well and had been 
depreciated, there wouldn't be a case for replacement, 
would there? . . .11' s earned its keep at work. . .There's 
no case if it is producing effectively to say, "Well, 
look it's been a faithful servant. We've had it many 
years. We must get rid of it". I should say, "No.
If it is a good performer, we'll keep it" [204, 
p .117] .
On the other hand, the works manager of a large electronics 
firm stated:
You must have someone who's looking and saying, "How 
can we do better? Is there any automatic lathe that 
will do this? Is there any automatic way of welding 
these things or an automatic way of pressing these 
things out?" [204, p.119].
Empirical enquiries have also concluded that a high 
proportion of firms do not maintain records which enable 
them to assess the cost behaviour of existing capacity for 
replacement purposes. Similarly, many firms neither compile 
written evidence supporting replacement decisions, nor make
(25)
This may be less true of American than British industry, 
in view of the greater emphasis on these problems in the 
academic, professional and technical literatures of the 
former country. [Hutton, 118, p.85; Neild, 192, p.35].
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full financial assessment prior to decision. Where cost
estimates are made, most firms employ the payoff period or
cash-throwback method for decision-making. Other criteria,
including percentage of annual cost savings to capital
outlay, MAPI [Terborgh, 248 and 249] , and DCF, are used by
(2 6)only a small minority of firms, mostly of large size.
Large firms also predominate among those making written
estimates. Not surprisingly, firms attaching importance to
obsolescence for replacement purposes, as opposed to
physical deterioration, tend to be more active in making
written estimates of expected cost savings from replacement
proposals. [Barna, 9, p.33; Is tvan, 120, pp.58-60; Neild,
192, pp.35-43; P.E.P., 204, pp.116-7, 120-1].
The efficacy of calculations, employed by firms which
make written estimates for replacement purposes, is impaired
by the fact that the majority of these firms adopt the
(2 7 )payoff period method for the purpose. This method is a
rule of thumb which, because 'estimating the expected life 
of a piece of plant is an intractable problem' [P.E.P. , 204,
(26)
Istvan's study of 48 U.S. corporations, each among the 
largest in its industry, concludes that
there has not been extensive adoption among the firms 
studied of the theoretically superior techniques of 
capital-expenditure analysis. This is especially true 
in the area of economic evaluation. The second 
[conclusion] is that this investigation has failed to 
disclose any basic agreement among the managements of 
the companies regarding the degree of concern and effort 
that should be expended on the development and 
implementation of a capital-expenditure decision-making 
process. There is not even any general agreement among 
the member firms of a given industry [120, p.97].
(27)
E.g.67 per cent, of the firms considered by Neild [192, 
p.40]. See also Phelps Brown, 203, p.246.
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p.125] , reduces to a mere subjective judgment. This
conclusion is evidenced by Neild's discovery of a strong
tendency on the part of firms to use a limited number of
lengths of life, specifically three, five and ten years
respectively. In his view, this 'can be explained only by
(28)the choice of fashionable numbers' [192, p.35].
Tha payoff period approach is a crude method of 
counteracting the uncertainties which attach to replacement. 
Its use is necessarily subjective, and must therefore 
depend on managerial motivation and competence. A 
conservative firm will be tempted to demand very rapid 
rates of cash throwback from replacement proposals (relative 
to actual rates of obsolescence and deterioriation). 
Proposals will then be difficult to justify, and many will 
not obtain approval. The rate of replacement will be low 
in consequence, and the average age of the firm's capacity 
will steadily increase. However, the main objection to the 
payoff period method is that it is a liquidity measure, and 
not, as needed for replacement purposes, a measure of 
contribution to cost reduction. If this method is used as 
the sole criterion, emphasis in replacement decisions will 
therefore be directed away from their proper goal, and 
replacement will tend to be dominated by physical 
deterioration alone.
(28)
A classic instance in depreciation policy also 
illustrates this point. 'The company secretary of a 
medium-sized domestic appliance firm' stated that most plant 
was written-off over ten years. 'Asked why he chose ten 
years, he replied: "It's just the accountancy training I
suppose. Plant and machinery ten per cent - that seems to 
be customary in this area"' [P.E.P., 204, p.125].
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Another common defect in managerial replacement 
decisions involves undepreciated balances of the original 
cost of existing capacity. Many firms incorrectly treat 
these balances as a cost in determining operating 
advantage of new plant, to which they are actually 
irrelevant. If replacement is currently justified on the 
grounds of operating advantage, undepreciated costs merely 
mean that depreciation charges in previous periods were 
inadequate. Owing to difficulties of fixing correct 
depreciation rates in advance, such e x po s t adjustments are 
to be expected and should not deter replacement.
Indications are, however, that they do in many cases, which 
again suggests that factors other than cost efficiency often 
influence replacement decisions. [Istvan, 120, p.60; P.E.P.;
204, p . 12 5 ; Skinner, 230]. Neild's observation [192, p.43], 
that low selling prices of old plant tend to perpetuate 
their usage and thus delay replacement, coupled with 
Istvan1s finding that 'over two-thirds of the firms 
indicated that salvage recovery was usually a negative 
figure because the costs of removal exceeded revenue from 
sale' [120, p.57, n.3]f also suggest that replacement is 
often delayed far too long from the cost-efficiency 
viewpoint.
Durability of assets partly explains these delays, and 
may also account for ill-founded objections to 
replacement, on the grounds that existing assets are 
incompletely depreciated. The following statement was made 
by the 'works manager of a domestic appliance firm' to the
P.E.P. research staff.
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Well, we usually find that it's worn out, that it 
doesn't do its job properly. That doesn't happen very 
often you know because British machines, which mainly 
we've bought, are wonderfully robust and, if they are 
kept well, they seem to last for ever, these darn 
things'. What we seem to mainly do is to buy new 
machines for additional work and then we do eventually 
scrap some of the older ones. We never run a machine 
until it's worn out and then buy a new one. We usually 
are in advance of that. We buy in advance of 
everything going out and then we decide later on, "Oh 
well, we'd better get rid of this thing" [204,
p.118] .
This firm apparently does not conduct a replacement
policy in the usual sense, because its investment is
entirely demand-induced. Existing capacity is counted
present and correct so long as it can be propped up by
maintenance expenditure, except that, when demand conditions
permit, the most marginal capacity may be discarded. The
relative operating inferiority of this firm's capital stock
must continually increase, because existing assets are
insulated from cost-redueing technological improvements
until ultimate decrepitude, except to the extent that
demand-induced additions are made. Moreover, these
additions, which will eventually 'replace' the most marginal
capacity, are made well in advance of the latter being
discarded: they must therefore be technologically
1ess-efficient than the latest new capacity at the time of
such discard, assuming some positive rate of technological 
(29)progre s s .
(29)
'A survey of obsolescence of machine tools in 1960 
showed that in the ten years since 1950 new machine tools 
had become about 40 per cent more productive' [P.E.P., 204,
p.126] . The survey in question was 'The First Census of 
Machine Tools in Britain' , Metalworking Production Research 
Dept., 1961, p.31.
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In conditions of uncertainty an enterprising firm 
compares results of at least larger replacement decisions 
with their originating proposals. This exercise, known as 
the postaudit, enables firms to learn from their mistakes. 
For present purposes postaudits are of interest only as 
evidence that firms pursue efficient replacement policies. 
Results indicate that only a minority of firms conduct 
postaudits on a systematic basis. For instance, Barna 
found that 'one firm in four had some inquiry into the 
success of projects though not as a regular exercise; there 
may be an occasional personal inquest by the managing 
director, an inquiry into a major failure, or an assessment 
of the results of a cost-saving scheme' [9, p.34], Neild
[192, p.42] found that 23 per cent.of firms in his sample 
conducted postaudits of replacements in all cases; 58 per 
cent, did so 'in some cases', and 19 per cent, did not do so 
at all. Istvan found that, out of 48 firms interviewed 
(all among the largest in their industries), '19 make a
postaudit of all implemented projects; one does it for 
expansion projects; one for replacement projects; and one 
for projects over a minimum dollar amount; two firms simply 
take a random sample' [120, pp.38-9].
Some firms consider replacements too numerous and too 
small relative to expansion projects to justify postaudits. 
Replacements may also be considered more predictable and 
therefore more accurate than investment for expansion. 
However, postaudits may be more justified for replacement 
than for expansion projects, because results of the former 
are more accurately measurable than those of the latter.
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In practice some degree of selectivity in postauditing is 
justified by staff shortages, and by costs involved in 
relation to benefits gained. [Cf. Istvan, 120, p.39].
To the extent that replacement policies, and other 
investment decisions primarily directed towards cost 
reduction, are less obviously involved than demand-induced 
investment with sales pressures, the onus on managerial 
motivation and competence is correspondingly greater. 'The 
economic reflection of managerial attitudes is in costs of 
production ... Cost-consciousness is a state of mind which 
either permeates a firm or not' [Barna, 9, p.55]. Over 
considerable periods, therefore, opportunities and pressures 
to invest for cost-reduction, whether on account of 
technological progress, rising operating costs, or mass 
production and marketing, are only effective if the firm is 
willing and able to respond appropriately to them.
* * * * *
(30)
During the 'lotus-eating years of the 1950s' , one 
engineering firm
developed a wider and wider range of products. We were, 
I maintain, industrial spivs in those days in the sense 
that we made all kinds of things that were completely 
uneconomic. Here we were, a small company [with about 
1,200 employess] making some machines in half-dozens 
against people turning them out in hundreds with huge 
factories equipped solely for making them. That wa s in 
the days when the waiting list was two years. There 
was no incentive to improve efficiency, lower costs, 
buy new equipment or anything of that sort [P.E.P.,
204 , p . 107] .
This behaviour evidences Denison's finding [32, pp.274-8] 
of the lower 'residual efficiency' of British industry 
compared to that in America and Europe.
CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE AND DETERMINANTS OF PROFIT
4.1 Introduction
In the Introduction to Chapter 3 it was stated that 
conclusions about effects of corporate tax changes arrived 
at from the viewpoints of objectives and the state of 
uncertainty are not conclusive. Real investment 
decision-making, which describes how objectives are pursued 
under uncertainty, must also be taken into account.
This Chapter continues the analysis of decision-making 
by examining the role of profit in decision processes, 
including its relation to managerial objectives and 
uncertainty. Preliminary attention has been given to these 
latter aspects in earlier Chapters. It is again convenient 
and meaningful to arrange the discussion in order of 
diversification decisions and those relating to investment 
in existing lines.
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4 •2 Profit in Relation to Diversification Strategy
Managements are interested in making profits for their 
own security and to finance future growth of their firms.
The long-run scope of existing activities to satisfy 
managerial profit requirements may well be limited, just as 
these activities provide limited scope for future growth.
Once an industry has settled down into established market 
shares and demand has matured, profitability can only be 
extended by cost reductions, price increases, winning 
bigger market shares, or through secular increases in demand. 
A firm's ability to increase profitability by these means is 
limited. Price increases, for instance, tend to upset the 
firm's accumulated experience of demand at a given price.
They may also adversely affect demand if price elasticity 
rises as demand matures, or if they initiate price 
competition in the industry. Neither price competition nor 
any other form of internecine warfare for market shares is 
a particularly enticing method of achieving profitable 
growth.
Diversification into new products and areas creates new 
prospects for growth and profits, and frees a part of the 
firm's activities from restrictions of saturated markets.
No entrepreneurially-competent management would willingly 
delay diversification until such restrictions became really 
serious. The importance of profits in a firm's growth 
strategy therefore depends partly upon the relation between 
the trend of its present profits and the level of its 
minimum profit constraint. Profits will bulk larger among
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the objectives of managerial plans for diversification if 
profitability of existing operations is unsatisfactory, 
than if it exceeds the minimum constraint.
It should be noted, however, that the profit constraint 
has two aspects. Firstly, the absolute profits of each 
period should appear in favourable and stable relation to 
those of either one or more recent past periods, or of an 
average of profits of past periods. Secondly, since the 
amount of productive resources is not fixed, but changes 
over time, the rate of return on resources employed should 
also be favourably and stably related to those of past 
periods. The latter is perhaps the more important of these 
two aspects. Diversification must therefore not only 
contribute to total profits but must also maintain and, 
perhaps, increase the firm's overall rate of return on 
capital. The ease with which new ventures can meet the 
latter requirement depends on the merits of these ventures 
and on the level of profitability which the market has been 
accustomed to expect from the firm in the past. The task 
of management with regard to profitability is not 
facilitated by the consideration that, if rates of return 
on some projects are very high, the market may be led to 
expect standards which cannot be maintained. Management is 
also concerned to ensure that profitability requirements do
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not ha mper the firm's growth rate to a greater than 
. , (1 )nec es sa ry extent.
Under u n c e r t a i n t y  as defined in this study, m a n a gement
does not know, at the time resources are committed for
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  purposes, the degree of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  that
will result from its decisions. Nor does man a g e m e n t  know
wh eth er the 'best' o p p o r tunities have been selected from
those avai lable for pr ofit purposes. U n c e r t a i n t y  therefore
means that ventures cannot be evaluated and selected on the
basis only of their p r ofit ability: the techniques of
capital b u d geting are in s u f f i c i e n t l y  reliable on their own
to provide a solid basis for decision-making. [Cf. Ansoff,
( 2 )7, p.76]. Other objectives, p a r t i c u l a r l y  that of growth,
TT7 However, profits are needed to assist in financing future 
growth, so that man a g e m e n t  will wish to earn that rate of 
pr of it  which is c o n s istent with safe and sustainable growth. 
[Cyert and March, 44, p.42; Marris, 173, p.241; Penrose, 200,
p .3 0; Simon, 228 , p.55] . From the financing viewpoint this
is the rate which, after p r o v i s i o n  of n e c e ssary dividends on 
capital, provides, together with depre c i a t i o n  allowances, 
such total retentions as will enable the firm to maintain  
its de sired physical growth rate, having regard to the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  and d e s i r a b i l i t y  of raising a p r o p ortion of 
capital r e q u irements externally. Baumöl states:
In practice, the de t e r m i n a t i o n  of a mi n i m u m  acceptable 
prof it level pr o b a b l y  comes down to no more than a rough 
a ttempt, . . .par tly by rule of thumb, to provide 
c o m p e t i t i v e l y  acce ptabl e earnings to stockholders while 
leaving enough over for investment in future output 
exp ansion at the m a x i m u m  rate which m a n a g e m e n t  considers 
to be reas o n a b l y  safely m a r k etable [11, p.53].
(2 )
In a recent book devoted to 'the c o mputational treatment 
of the corporation, income and capital gains taxes and 
inv es tm ent incentives in long term company financial 
planning' [152, p . v i ] , Lawson and Windle state:
In a world ch a r a c t e r i s e d  by risk and u n c e r t a i n t y  the 
a c c uracy of [capital budgeting] estimates is inevitably 
in doubt. Thus, i m p r e s s i v e - 1 ooking though m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  
correct DCF investment criteria may be, they cannot of 
the ms elves improve the quality of estimates. Hence the 
use of DCF methods can only be regarded as a way of 
ma ki ng correct comparisons, or of u n d e r taking correct 
analysis, of a s s u mptions in the form of estimates [152, 
p . 149] .
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n o r ma ll y ensure that ventures will not be evaluated and 
selected only according to profitability.
The tangible factors, to which managements resort 
under u n c e rtainty for purposes of selecting new projects, 
comprise the components of strategy, which were discussed 
in Chap ter 3. The p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  depends 
on the efficiency of this strategy, subject to 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  for investment which can be uncovered by 
search activity, and to the amounts and quality of 
p r o d uc tive services at the firm's disposal. Profitability, 
that is, is det e r m i n e d  by the same strategic advantages and 
dis ad v a n t a g e s  of t e c h n o logical skills and other resources, 
p r o d u c t - m a r k e t  scope, degree of competitiveness, and 
e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  efficiency, etc. to which the firm is 
subject for growth purposes. Owing to uncertainty, 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  is a conceptual, as well as an accounting, 
residual, because the big decisions which u ltimately  
deter mine it are made on the basis of other factors.
A prime example of these 'other factors' consists of 
amounts outlayed on mar k e t i n g  new products, and on 
a s s o ci ated research and development. M a n a g e m e n t  
r e a l i s t i c a l l y  expects that a certain p r o p ortion of new 
ma rk et  entries will fail. Some products are d e l i berately 
cu rt ai led when it becomes apparent that initial hopes will 
not be realized. This action is designed to enable 
sa ti s f a c t o r y  growth rates to be achieved without always 
incur ri ng full costs of d e v e l opment and marketing. It is 
an imp ortant device, under uncertainty, for o f f s e t t i n g  the 
con se qu ences of an inevitable time-gap between a
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diversification decision and knowledge of its outcome.
With regard to individual projects, however, it is often 
very difficult to assess whether and when failure has 
occurred. Management may be persuaded that further 
determined marketing effort will tip the scales between 
success and failure, as is often the case. Personal 
reputations become involved in particular projects, thus 
creating 'political' obstacles to abandonment. Above all, 
there is the problem of perceiving the best course of 
action in an uncertain situation.
Profitability depends on entrepreneurial decisions of 
the above types, and large sums must often be committed in 
advance of reliable intelligence about product demand and 
market shares, etc. Other things equal, the desire to push 
projects to success, and to achieve a high overall success 
ratio, operates to reduce the overall rate of return if 
pressed beyond a certain point. Delays in abandonment 
decisions have the same effect, as do delays in responding 
to feedback in successful projects. Profitability is 
therefore affected by managerial efficiency and speed of 
reaction, which in turn are partly determined by whether 
managerial resources are available to deal with problems as 
they arise .
The total outlay on particular projects is often 
subject to tactical decisions regarding the method to be
TT)
For this reason a firm's diversification rate may exceed 
its resultant growth rate. [Marris, 173, p.185] . The
success ratio, a policy variable, is found by dividing the 
latter rate by the former.
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adopted to determine success or failure. Management may, 
for instance, decide to push a product by sustained and 
costly effort over a limited period, after which, if 
take-off has not occurred, the product will be withdrawn. 
Alternatively, development and marketing outlays may be 
more limited, but spread over a longer gestation period.
The approach adopted in each particular case depends on 
market and product characteristics, strength of financial 
and other resources, and on other commitments. The approach 
should, of course, be flexible in response to feedback.
Both the profitability of individual projects and the time 
profiles of such profitability depend on which approach is 
selected in each case.
Pricing policy affects the profitability of 
diversification through price elasticity of demand for new 
products, the overall success ratio, the degree of 
competition, development and marketing policies, and market 
synergy, etc. Some writers believe that price elasticity of 
demand is relatively low during initial stages of a product's 
life cycle, when the growth rate of demand is usually 
highest. [Kaplan et a1 . , 129, pp.59-60; Marris, 173, p.143;
Penrose, 200, p.105]. If so, prices of new products may be 
pitched at profitable levels without damaging sales. The 
strength of this effect on overall profitability varies 
according to the product of the diversification rate and 
the overall success ratio.
However, the success ratio itself depends partly on 
efficiency of pricing policy, having regard to the degree 
of competition in each market, and to whether or not the
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firm is first in the field in each case. The stronger is
competition in a given market the more serious the
consequences of errors in pricing policy. On the other
hand, if there is competition and the firm diversifies by
imitation, prices may be determined externally for the
firm. It is necessary to distinguish between tactically-low
and inadequate product pricing. In the former case,
management uses pricing policy to increase either or both
of total size of market and the size of its own share of
that market. A product's chances of success may be greater
(4 )if its price is lower. Inadequate product pricing, on
the other hand, results from ignorance about, or 
misjudgment of, costs and market parameters. [Marris, 173, 
pp. 228-9 ; Miller, 185, p.122].
Considerable uncertainty may attend pricing policy in 
a product's early stages, when both demand and costs are 
not fully known. Marketing synergy between a firm's new and 
existing activities would then enable management to draw on 
previous experience for purposes of pricing new products. 
This is, incidentally, an example of the tangible factors to 
which managements have recourse for strategic purposes in 
conditions of uncertainty.
Both profitability and profit of diversification 
depend on the size of markets into which a firm moves.
Market size is a function of many factors, including product
14)
However, a product may fail because a low price 
generates consumer suspicion of its quality. Moreover,if, as 
already suggested, price elasticity of demand is low during 
a product's initial stages, market leverage exerted by low 
pricing may be quite insignificant.
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characteristics, price, general living standards, size of 
national population, etc. Profitability also depends on the 
firm's share in each market, which mainly depends on 
competitive strength. Large firms have both absolute and 
comparative advantages over smaller firms for entry into 
big markets,and for establishing and maintaining in those 
markets shares of profitable proportions. As Penrose 
observe s :
There is good reason to believe that the amount of 
resources administered by a firm has in itself a 
significant influence on the opportunities for 
expansion open to the firm, that is, that smaller 
firms as a group are in a different position vis a vis 
the external world from that of large firms as a 
group [200, p.217].
The advantage of large firms lies in their capacity for 
making the great initial outlays necessary to develop big 
markets; that is, entry into these markets is subject to a 
capital requirements barrier. [Bain, 8, p.156; Baumöl, 11, 
p.33; Hall and Weiss, 102; Penrose, 200, p.227]. Large 
firms also often have advantages of organizational strength 
and research capacity that smaller firms are unable to 
match. The comparative advantage of large firms in big 
markets causes them to concentrate on those markets,in which 
they compete as oligopolists against firms of similar size. 
Subject to other opportunities, large firms tend to avoid 
small markets (except as extensions of big markets) because 
they do not provide opportunities for reaching high-level 
production from big investments which large firms need in 
order to exercize the advantages of size.
Although there is evidence to support the view that 
average growth rates of firms are independent of their
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( 5 )size, some observers believe both that the p r o f i t ability
of large firms is relatively greater, and that the variance 
of their profit rates is relatively less, than is the case 
for smaller firms. [Baumöl, o p . c i t . ; Hall and Weiss, o p . 
c i t . ; Williamson, 264]. Then, 'if large firms grow no
faster than small ones, there is little danger that high 
prof its  are the cause of size rather than size being the 
cause of high profits' [Hall and Weiss, 102, p.323]. This 
follows, as explained, from the superior ability of large 
firms to enter big markets.
If deve lopment costs are thought of as an 
overhead to be recovered from the profits of ultimate 
sales, then a firm whose process of d i versification
(5)
See Chapter 3, footnote 5. The greater absolute growth 
of large firms is offset for perc entage purposes by their 
bigge r size. Penrose, however, believes that 'we should 
expect the rate of growth of the m e d i u m - s i z e d  and m o d e rately 
large firms to be higher than that of the very new and very 
small firms, and higher also than that of the very large 
firms' [200 , p p . 212-3]. With regard to the latter Penrose 
state s :
For the larger firms in competition with each othe r...it 
seems that all of the factors which tend to increase the 
m a n a gerial services required per dollar of expansion are 
pres ent in an increasing degree; the only significant 
o ff se tting factor in the very large firm arises from the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of increasing the capital intensity of 
exp ansion [200, p.212].
If this view is correct, it would appear to follow that the 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of large firms will gradually decline. Other 
factors should also be considered, however, including: (i)
the great size of individual expansions typically undertaken 
by these firms (including large mi n i m u m  sizes of plant; (ii) 
their relatively greater scope for a c q u iring other firms;
(iii) their greater strength in both p u r c h a s i n g  and selling;
(iv) their superior ability to d i v e rsify over much wider 
ranges of markets than can smaller firms; and (v) their 
greater capacity to retain managerial and technical talent 
and to undertake research and development activities.
(6 )
A study by Barna , however, yielded the conclusion that 
'averages [of profit rates] calculated for groups of firms 
classi fied according to size do not show significant 
dif fe rences and it does not appear that size is a factor 
which can explain differences between individual firms'
[9, p . l l ] .
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consists in attacking a succession of large markets 
will, other things equal, experience a higher long-run 
rate of return than a firm which only attacks small 
markets [Marris, 173, p.170] .
The greater profitability of big markets derives mainly
from those economies of size which can be achieved in
high-volume production. For purposes of diversification
economies of size support profitability as economies of
growth. Small firms' profitability can also benefit from
economies of growth, but to a lesser extent. Through
successful diversification some small firms eventually
attain a size at which they can tackle bigger, more
(7 )profitable operations. Research activity is an important
source of future opportunities, but such activity cannot be 
sustained by many small firms. It is profitable for large 
firms to make considerable investment in research because 
these costs will be spread over great volumes of output.
Plant and other technical discontinuities, because of which 
diversification into big markets often involves investment 
increments of large minimum size, are at once a source of 
economies of size which cause the greater profitability of 
large firms, and an obstacle to the entry of small firms 
into big markets. [Cf. Penrose, 200, Ch.6; Sargant Florence, 
81] .
Given that small firms are at a relative disadvantage 
with respect to available opportunities for diversification, 
the profitability of their growth depends heavily on
T T )
Progression through market operations of increasing size 
is often by no means smooth. At various stages in its 
growth a firm is likely to be confronted with scale 
requirements considerably larger than those of its existing 
activities.
4 . 2 189
efficiency, e specially of their strategy. Since 'both in 
terms of growth and in terms of profits it always pays to be 
efficient' [Marris, 173, p. 249 ] , small firms must exploit 
fully economies of growth that are available. These
eco nomies derive, as p r e v i o u s l y  explained, from the
«
pr od uct ive services available to each firm. Profi t a b i l i t y  
benefits from more intensive and efficient utilization of 
free pr oductive services in new ventures, except that, 
beyon d a certain point, m anagerial services are insufficient 
for pla nn ing and supervision of growth. Apart from 
ut il iz ation of prod uctive services, p r o f i t a b i l i t y  depends on 
the choice of projects in which these services will be used. 
If these projects are closely related to the firm's 
exi sti ng activities, initial costs can be reduced. Much 
depends on the state of comp etition in markets available to 
a small firm, whose p r o d u c t - m a r k e t  scope is d e t e rmined by 
ent re preneurial, t e chnological and mar k e t i n g  strengths. A 
small firm which is weak in one or more of these areas is 
likely to experience effective competition in all available 
markets, and to achieve little in the way of either growth 
or profi tability.
The growth of a small firm should be a c c o m panied by 
in cr eas ing prospects of profit ability, as a consequence of 
the growth process itself. Greater quantities and va riety of 
pro du ct ive services enable the firm to contemplate bigger 
ventures, from which economies of size may be derived which 
affect existing acti vities  as well. Increasing size also 
permits greater functional specialization, including the 
en tr ep r e n e u r i a l  and planni ng functions. Research and
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development capacity can be instituted which increases the 
firm's competitive advantage and broadens its product-market 
scope. Growth from small size therefore benefits 
profitability through both costs and revenue, as the nature 
of a firm's comparative advantage gradually alters.
However, it appears that the markets which constitute this 
developing advantage impose their own requirements on 
profitability.
For any given product larger firms probably do 
require a larger margin over direct cost for profitable 
operations, not because of a larger administrative 
overhead as is sometimes alleged, but because of the 
kind of oligopolistic competition in which they become 
engaged [Penrose, 200, p.226].
Growth of the firm therefore not only increases a 
firm's ability to earn profits; it may also stimulate a 
competitively-oriented requirement for greater profitability. 
The latter is due to the fact that profitability is, inter 
alia, a function of the state of competition in a firm's 
markets. As the firm grows it eventually becomes able to 
enter big, oligopolistic markets, whose cost structures and 
profitability differ from those of smaller, less-organized 
markets. Large firms are geared to compete in big markets 
and need to earn the higher rates of return appropriate to 
these markets if they are to survive. The growth process 
may therefore be accompanied by changes in the type of 
market into which a firm will diversify, with important 
consequences for profitability.
It has been stated that, in principle, there is no 
long-run conflict between managerial objectives of growth 
and security, on the one hand, and profitability of 
diversification, on the other hand. In practice, however,
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it is no easy matter to ensure that this relation is 
correc tly maintained, or even to asce rtain what it should
( g )
be. Given that firms are unable to rank d i v e r s ification
o p p o r tu nities neatly acco rding to expected profitability, 
there are four principal ways in which growth may proceed 
at the expense of profit ability, at least in the short run. 
Firstly, the rate of div e r s i f i c a t i o n  may be higher than that 
which can be e fficiently supervised by available managerial 
resources. This leads to costly delays and mistakes. 
Secondly, m a n a gement may fail to make timely abandonment 
decis ion s for projects which have not succeeded within a 
rea sonable time, thereby favouring the success ratio at the 
expense of profitability. Thirdly, m a n a gement may, by way 
of pr ici ng or m a r k e t i n g  policy, seek to achieve a higher 
share of a new market than is w a r r anted on pr ofit grounds. 
This action is as likely to result from unce r t a i n t y  about 
market para meters and costs as from deliberate policy 
decisions. Finally, the firm may be induced by actions of 
co mp eti tors or suppliers to make div e r s i f i c a t i o n  decisions 
whose results contribute less to p r o f i t a b i l i t y  (and, 
perhaps, to growth as well) than would alternative uses of 
the same productive resources. Examples include backward  
in teg rat ion for security or prestige reasons [cf. Penrose, 
200, p.146] and full-line div e r s i f i c a t i o n  n e c e s s i t a t e d  by
compet itive considerations.
In conclusion, the factors which p r i n c i p a l l y  determine 
the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of divers i f i c a t i o n  will be briefly 
restated. These factors exercize a deciding influence on
IT)
See B a u m ö l 's comment, footnote 1.
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the nature and extent of any impact of corporate income tax 
changes on managerial diversification. Owing to uncertainty, 
whereby costs and revenues are not initially known, new 
projects cannot be selected on the basis of their respective 
profitabilities. Instead, managements select projects on 
the basis of ascertainable strategic considerations, which 
include the firm's comparative market advantage, previous 
experience in similar areas, and technical and other 
relations between new projects, on the one hand, and 
existing activities and available productive services on 
the other. These factors, the components of growth 
strategy, enable management to guide the firm's development 
in directions most appropriate to its particular resources 
and productive advantages, which change over time as a 
result of the growth process. To the extent that this 
objective is achieved the firm will, subject to certain 
provisos, attain the most efficient and profitable growth 
rate possible in the circumstances.
Assuming that the most appropriate strategy is adopted 
in each case, profitability of diversification is likely to 
be considerably affected by firm size and by the nature and 
quality of productive resources: these factors govern
product-market scope and competitive advantage. Apart from 
availability of suitable opportunities, ability to diversify 
at any time depends on the existence of spare productive 
services, especially management. This affects profitability 
through the attainable diversification rate and the success
ratio.
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Apart from firm size and competitive advantage the most 
important determinant of profitability is the efficiency 
with which diversification is carried out. Overall 
efficiency includes strategy (entrepreneurial competence 
in selection of projects and in correctly-timed abandonment 
decisions where necessary), as well as technology, marketing, 
and general operation and organization. All aspects of 
efficiency are affected by the tempo of a firm's activities, 
beneficially up to a point, adversely thereafter.
Efficiency, and therefore the cost of growth, is especially 
susceptible to mistakes and delays which occur when 
managerial capacity is overtaxed. In conditions of 
uncertainty, profitability, growth, and even survival depend 
on speed and accuracy of reaction to data which become 
available to management as feedback after initial investment
decisions have been made.
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4.3 Profit and Investment in Existing Lines 
(a) Demand
Given costs and prices, the relation between profit
and current sales is simple and direct. When sales change,
profit changes proportionately in the same direction.
Various writers have observed that this structural relation
implies that 'the expectationa1 hypothesis for profits
cannot, and perhaps should not, be distinguished from the
sales level or capacity accelerator hypothesis' [Kuh, 144,
(9 )p.208]. Short-term deviations of output from sales are
absorbed by inventory adjustments and do not affect this 
relation. Orders or future sales should similarly be a 
good predictor of future profits. [Hart, 107, p.131].
If actual orders or expected demand outstrip existing 
capacity, sales, and therefore profit, cannot increase 
unless there is either new investment or a part of 
production is subcontracted. Satisfaction of demand by 
running down inventories is only a short-term expedient. 
Thus, when full capacity utilization is reached (which 
depends on output elasticities of productive processes) , 
effective causation extends from demand, through new 
investment, to incremental sales and profit. Owing to the 
structural relation involved, it makes no difference at 
this juncture whether management invests for growth (sales) 
or profit.
1 9 )
See also Eisner, 70, pp.191, 201; Evans, 74, pp.356, 363 ;
Jorgenson and Siebert, 121, p.705; Kuh, 146, p.262; Meyer, 
181, p . 315 ; Meyer and Glauber, 182, p.21; Meyer and Kuh,
184, p.131; Williamson, 264, p.5.
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The relationship between demand, sales, investment 
and profit acquires meaning only in relation to managerial 
behaviour in the environment provided (or created) by 
various important market considerations. These include the 
state of competition, total size of markets, a firm's shares 
of those markets, and degrees of maturity of market demand.
Managerial behaviour, which reflects motivation and 
competence, determines sales and profit both through the 
original decisions to enter its present markets and through 
its sales efforts within those markets. Behavioural 
differences between thrusting and sleeping managements, 
relating to data-gathering^ formation of expectations, 
anticipation of investment needs, and efforts to increase 
sales and market shares, have already been discussed. It 
is evident that qualitative factors exercise a profound 
influence on profit from the sales point of view, and also, 
therefore, on the volume of demand-induced investment which 
is required to supplement existing capacity.
The state of competition in a firm's markets is an 
important determinant of profit, although it is difficult to 
isolate its effects on the sales side from those which 
involve production costs and pricing policy. This applies 
also to the total size of markets, a firm's share of each 
of its markets, and maturity of demand. The degree of 
competition is intimately associated with the size and 
growth of firms in terms of both sales and assets. As a 
firm grows in size its comparative advantage lies in 
increasingly large markets, in which, by virtue of size, 
there tend to be fewer competitors. It cannot be stated
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from the viewpoint of sales alone that large, oligopolistic 
markets will be relatively more profitable, in terms of 
rate of return on resources employed, than smaller, more 
competitive markets. However, the structural relation 
between sales and profit means that, at a given price, 
profit will be greater in larger markets. Also, owing to 
differences in relative ease of entry by new competitors, 
increased sales in one period in a large, oligopolistic 
market are less likely to precipitate new competition than 
in a market where barriers to entry are lower. Evans found 
that lagged sales have a strong negative influence on the 
profits of competitive industries, 'since high sales in one 
year lead to new entrants next year and a resulting loss of 
profits' [74, pp. 36 2-3 ]. Competitive firms are unable to 
plan new investment to meet expected increases in industry 
demand on the basis that they, or even their existing 
competitors, will reap the lion's share of such increases. 
This inhibition adversely affects the growth of these firms' 
sales and profits.
Oligopolists, on the other hand, are widely believed, 
following the work of Baumöl and others, to be sales- and 
market-share-oriented. Since this tendency alone should
benefit profit, any explanation of the well-known allegation 
that sales and market shares are pursued at the expense of 
profit must be sought in terms of oligopolistic costs and 
pricing policies. Sales-wise the oligopolist is in a much 
more stable position than a competitive firm for purposes 
of planning the demand-induced investment upon which his 
future profit partly depends. Inter-firm variations in
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managerial motivation and competence, however, affect the 
degrees of effort and skill devoted to sales and market 
shares in different cases, with consequent effects on profit 
results.
The comparative maturity of industry demand exercises 
a long-term influence on sales and profit which differs 
from and underlies cyclical and seasonal fluctuations. An 
initial period of adolescence, during which demand and 
(perhaps) profit grow rapidly, is followed by a middle 
period of maturity, when the growth rate of demand declines 
appreciably to, say, that of the population. In maturity 
'the industry, while still expanding, is no longer a 
dynamic sector relative to the rest of the economy' [Kmenta 
and Williamson, 138, p.173] . Market shares and the state 
of competition are normally settled before maturity, and 
new entries into oligopolistic industries after 
adolescence are comparatively rare. This is due partly to 
barriers imposed by capital requirements, and partly to the 
fact that low industry-wide growth rates of demand and 
established market shares reduce the scope for profitable 
entry. Over the whole life of an industry, therefore, 
average profits of member firms are likely, given costs and 
prices, to follow the trend of total demand.
The overall development of demand is obviously highly 
particular to individual industries. Factors and decisions 
are involved of which many are beyond even industry 
jurisdiction. At individual firm level it can only be 
concluded that profit prospects are brighter, other things 
equal, the younger the average age of the firm's
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product-mix in terms of saturation of market demand. This 
depends both on managerial strategy (the ability to 
reallocate resources away from declining industries), and on 
competitive power (which determines the size of market in 
which the firm can seek profitable growth). [Marris, 173,
pp.184, 251], Within the shorter term of a firm's sales
and profit horizon, qualities of managerial enterprise are 
best exercised in the absence of exogenous restrictions on 
demand in growing markets.
(b ) Costs
Profitability is determined in relation to costs by 
the following factors: managerial motivation and competence;
the size of markets, growth rates of demand in those 
markets, and demand fluctuations relative to existing 
capacity; the degree and type of market competition; 
technological progress; and changes in factor prices. The 
rate of real investment is an instrumental variable in 
profit-determination, within a firm's production and 
marketing contexts. Since it is understood that all the 
above factors operate concurrently, frequent use of the 
ceteris paribus assumption may be left implicit.
Unit costs are lower the closer is output level to 
the technical or physical optimum utilization rate of a 
firm's 'fixed' factors. These include managerial and 
other services whose supply cannot easily be increased in 
the short period, as well as real productive capacity.
Optimum utilization refers to the lowest common multiple of
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individual factor capacities, owing to their lack of 
homogeneity. Unit costs increase with under-utilization 
because fixed costs are spread over small outputs. Above 
the optimum unit costs also increase, owing to breakdowns, 
bottlenecks and errors. However, these increases are not 
always attributable to fixed capacity: managerial services
may become overtaxed first. Within the range of optimum 
utilization rates set by productive service elasticities of 
fixed factors, therefore,the direct relation between 
utilization rate and unit profitability turns over and 
becomes inverse. During any period shorter than that necessary 
to increase the supply of the most inelastic factors, unit 
profitability is higher the smaller the average variance of 
actual utilization from the optimum range.
Productive service or output elasticities of existing 
capacity, which determine how far unit costs fall as 
utilization approaches the optimum, result from previous 
investment decisions. These were based upon expectations 
about future sizes of markets or market shares. Therefore, 
the larger are the latter, the greater the output for which 
capacity may be designed, and the lower will be unit costs, 
if and when markets develop as expected. Profitability 
then depends upon opportunities for investing to secure 
economies of large-scale production. Since relevant
(10)
Assuming that firms are optimally scaled for their 
industries, profitability is greater in industries whose 
minimum efficient scale is larger. Also, a firm which is 
suboptimally scaled in a given industry will be less 
profitable than optima1ly-sca1ed competitors. However, 'a 
small firm may find suboptimal operations in an industry 
requiring large scale to be as profitable as the best 
alternatives available for a firm of its size' [Hall and 
Weiss, 102, p.319, n . 1] .
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decisions must often be taken years in advance, and involve 
choice between various alternatives, profitability is 
basically dependent upon entrepreneurial competence and 
motivation of management, in perceiving opportunities and 
being willing and able to act accordingly.
In both initial entry decisions and subsequent 
investment decisions, a competent management seeks to make 
the 'largest' possible allocations of available resources, 
since these favour both growth and profitability. Subject 
to expectations, a given quantity of capital is 'more 
productive in its best employment' [Hall and Weiss, 102, 
p.330] than a number of separate lots totalling the same 
amount. This requirement is a possible source of difficulty 
for both small and diversified firms, however. Markets in 
which small firms are optimally scaled tend to be 
competitive and not of the growth variety. Apart from other 
disadvantages, therefore, these markets do not enable small 
firms to reduce unit costs through growth economies, and 
are, if possible, avoided by enterprising managements. In 
larger, growing markets, on the other hand, small firms are 
at a scale disadvantage relative to bigger firms, and may be 
unable to establish themselves. These firms' costs and 
profitability depend on managerial ability to exploit 
growth interstices in the economy. [Penrose, 200, Ch.10].
The special cost problem of diversified firms, even 
quite large ones, is similar to that faced by small firms. 
This problem consists of attaining and maintaining the 
optimal scale of operations in each separate field of
endeavour, given limited resources. Managerial services are
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often important in limiting cost reduction in these firms, 
owing to shortage of time. Apart from the size and growth 
rate of each market, unit costs of diversified firms tend to 
be lower the greater the degree of synergy between different 
activities, and the greater the extent to which problems and 
opportunities arise sequentially, rather than concurrently. 
These factors help to safeguard the efficiency of 
managerial decision-making, and may also simplify the 
resource-allocation problem of servicing capital 
requirements of different activities.
Large markets, from which scale economies are derived, 
are usually imperfectly-competitive, owing to barriers 
raised by capital requirements, etc. This attribute 
satisfies a prerequisite of investment for large-scale 
production, that of stable market shares. Owing to 
benefits from entry restrictions, the cost structures of 
large oligopolists may be more favourable than those of 
smaller firms in competition. In the latter, lagged sales 
tend to have a strong negative influence on profits, as 
noticed in connection with demand, owing to ease of entry 
Oligopolists' costs and profits are affected only by 
fluctuations in industry output levels, whereas competitive
( I D
Samuels and Smyth have suggested that 'the usually 
higher capital-intensity in the larger firms... should lead, 
other things being equal, to lower profit rates' [216,p.130]. 
In this case, however, other things are not equal, because 
oligopolists are in a better position to protect their 
market shares. Evans found that profits of competitive 
industries are generally more susceptible to variations in 
capacity utilization than those of oligopolists. He 
attributed this result to the situation in which oligopolists 
earn close to their average profit rates even at low rates 
of capacity utilization, through market-sharing and 
price-fixing schemes. [74, p.351].
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firms are also susceptible to redistributions of given
( 1 2  )outputs within an industry.
The cost impact of an oligopolist's inherent market 
advantage then depends on managerial efforts to maintain 
and increase sales and market shares, and on industry 
growth rates. The competitive advantage of a management 
content merely to maintain sales in a growing market may 
quickly be eroded, and its ability to reduce costs 
impaired.
The effect on unit cost of new, demand-induced 
investment depends upon several factors. Firstly, given 
technological progress and fixed factor prices, new 
capacity will be relatively more efficient than existing 
stock, in the sense of producing a given output at lower 
unit cost. If prices of fixed assets have risen, this 
reduction will be correspondingly lower. Secondly, 
reduction in unit costs will be greater the larger the 
expansion of productive capacity in proportion to existing 
capacity; that is, the greater the increase in expected over 
current normal demand. [Duesenberry, 56, p.58]. This
determines the reduction in average technological and 
physical age of the enlarged capital stock, and the extent 
to which expansion may be planned to secure economies of 
scale. The latter are associated with large, discrete 
expansions rather than with frequent, piecemeal additions.
If a large expansion entails the concurrent scrapping of
(12)Evans' opinion is that 'in the manufacturing sector, 
cyclical fluctuations in output and profits of the firm are 
usually caused by fluctuations in industry output [sales] , 
rather than by changing market positions within the 
industry' [75, p.158].
4.3(b) 203
part of existing capacity, future unit costs will be even 
lower, subject to factor prices. Finally, reduction in 
unit costs depends on the degree to which managerial 
forecasts of future demand prove to be justified, and on 
the length of time before the new normal utilization rate 
is attained. Even the best forecasts are vulnerable to 
general restrictions of demand, crises of confidence, etc., 
which hit growing markets relatively severely, and are 
beyond managerial control.
Previous discussion clearly indicates that replacement 
policy is an important determinant of profitability, since 
its proper objective is minimization of the capital cost 
(or, when technological progress causes the production 
function to shift, the total production cost) of a given 
output. In fact, this aspect of managerial behaviour is a 
very good indicator of efficiency and effective interest in 
profitability. [Cf. Barna, 9, p.55] . An optimal
replacement policy, or even a 'good' suboptimal policy, 
ensures that profitability is greatest from the viewpoint 
of plant and related costs, despite the theoretical 
separation of cost minimization from overall profit 
maximization. [Smith, 233, p.161, supra].
Cost reduction is achieved in relation to 
technological progress and physical deterioration as plant 
ages in use. The former means that plant or total cost of 
producing a given output with the latest available new plant 
is lower than that of existing plant when it was new. The 
latter, a function of machine hours worked, means that the 
plant cost of a given output is higher the older is
4.3(b) 204
existing capacity. Output profitability will therefore be 
lower the older is existing capacity in both senses. 
[Campagna, 31, p.210; Duesenberry, 56, Ch . 4 ; Meyer and Kuh,
184, p.94; Neild, 192, p . 3 2] . Correspondingly, the older
is existing plant when either replacement or expansion 
investment is made, the greater, given the rate of 
technological progress, the reduction in unit costs. In 
fact, the rate of cost reduction at full capacity via 
replacement cannot exceed the rate of technological progress 
in the long run unless the latter also induces factor 
substitution and scale effects to operate beyond the 
interim period of adjustment in the age pattern of capital 
stock. [Neild, 192, pp.30-1] .
Other factors, which affect the contribution of 
replacement policy to cost reduction, include capital and 
current input prices (and changes therein) , product demand, 
uncertainty, and competing claims of long-term investment 
for expansion. Firstly, cost savings from 
techno1ogica11y-newer plant are lower if capital goods' 
prices rise. Put another way, the operating inferiority 
gradient of existing capacity is made less steep by these 
price rises, and introduction of new plant may be delayed.
If current input prices increase, however, replacement or 
additional investment will be stimulated. [Duesenberry,
56, p .61 ; Smith, 233, p p . 87, 114].
Product demand affects the timing of replacement in at 
least three ways. Firstly, it determines the utilization 
rate and, therefore, the rate of increase in unit costs due 
to physical deterioration. Secondly, given the rate of
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technological progress, the higher the utilization rate the
smaller the reduction in unit costs as a result of
replacement, which then occurs earlier and at a lower degree
of technological sophistication. (Knox, 140; Kuznets, 148].
Moreover, this may affect the timing of all future
replacements. Thirdly, when demand increases it may pay to
replace existing facilities with larger new ones, from which
economies of scale are gained, as well as lower costs due
to technological improvement. Also, replacement
may provide the mechanism whereby the firm can escape 
over-investment in facilities and, depending upon the 
durability of the equipment, the adjustment process 
eventually can be reversed even in the case of 
indivisible capital goods [Smith, 233, p.113].
Uncertainty affects cost reduction through replacement
mainly in relation to technological developments and future
product demand. Prediction of the working lives of
proposed replacements is very difficult, because
obsolescence and utilization rates cannot be known in
advance. Uncertainty also attaches to appraisal of
competitors' actions regarding cost reduction, which
management must aim to forecast and, if possible, anticipate.
In these respects cost reduction depends on managerial
judgment and temperament, and on development of
data-co1lection procedures for purposes of replacement 
evaluation.
Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the relation 
between replacement and cost reduction is overall resource 
allocation. Replacement proposals compete with long-term 
expansion investment and with working-capital requirements 
for limited resources. Lundberg has made some interesting
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remarks on this subject. He first takes note of 'the great
dispersion in the expected internal rate of return (before
tax) of planned investment projects. . . [both] between
branches of activity and between firms but also within a
firm' [164, p.669]. He then states:
In a firm there always seem to exist many "golden" 
investment opportunities in the form of new 
labour-saving machines to replace old ones, of methods 
of saving fuel, investments to expand bottlenecks and 
the like, promising very high and quick returns...
The yields will, of course, depend upon the 
expectations of the length of economic life of the 
machines in question, but mostly the returns will seem 
very high in comparison with the expected returns on 
investment in long-term expansion programmes. And 
these expansion programmes are given priority although 
they are only expected to yield a 10 or 20% rate of 
return, compared with a stock of "golden" investment 
opportunities yielding perhaps 30-50% on a comparable 
basis of estimate. These highly remunerative 
investments are squeezed out in order to make room for 
the financing of the expansion programme. Over a 
ten-year period companies have to make quite 
substantial investments in welfare or community 
projects of various kinds with no expected direct 
yield at all, but with opportunity costs corresponding 
to the postponed or neglected golden investment 
opportunities [164, p.670].
This behaviour is apparently in conflict with both cost
reduction and the profit goal. Ability of management to
have confidence in the outcome of investment may also be
less in the case of expansion programme s than for
replacement, owing to the differing lengths of time
involved. However, as Lundberg explains,
the golden opportunities of bottleneck investments are 
dependent on the general development of the firm and 
the profitability prospects of the firm's total capital. 
It may, therefore, be more profitable for the firm in 
a given situation to postpone investments which seem 
much more profitable than the long-term investment 
programme. In this case it can be said that the 
profitability estimates are not accurate guides, either 
for the investment policy of the firm or for the 
economist trying to understand something about the 
marginal efficiency of investment [164, p.671].
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Subject to availability of investible resources,
therefore, a far-sighted management will forgo to some
extent cost savings on existing operations in favour of
first broadening the firm's production base. This does not
mean that existing capacity will be worked until it falls
apart. The type of firm which adopts a long-term
investment approach is not content to allow replacement
needs to be signalled by dilapidation. Instead the firm
will seek to apply an efficient replacement policy to an
expanding volume of productive capacity, thereby gaining
economies of growth and scale in the process. This is
tantamount to favouring long-term growth and profitability
(13)over short-term profitability.
Many of the arguments presented so far point to the 
conclusion that large oligopolists are more profitable than 
smaller firms, even those not subject to effective 
competition. Two notions are involved here; namely, that 
profitability is directly related to firm size, and 
inversely related to degree of competition, usually 
measured by concentration ratios. The first hypothesis, 
usually attributed to Baumöl [11], was first advanced by 
Steindl [241] as the asymmetry principle.
Testing of the size-profits hypothesis has been 
complicated by difficulties of measuring firm size and 
changes therein. Sales, for instance, are a very bad
(13)
Competitive conditions may induce a firm to concentrate 
its investment on replacement, in order to reduce costs and 
thereby avoid loss of profits and market shares. That is, 
oligopolists may need to replace faster than monopolists, 
leaving aside managerial motivation and competence.
[Duesenberry, 56, p p . 130-3].
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measure of size, especially across industry lines, and the 
relation between sales and net profitability is not very 
meaningful anyway. [Kamerschen, 128, p.437; Stekler, 242
and 243]. Total assets are more acceptable as a stock 
measure of size, whilst value-added has been proposed as a 
suitable flow measure. [Kamerschen, loc.cit . ] ♦
If the size-profits hypothesis is correct, 'we should 
find higher rates of return in large enterprises even in 
the long run and even in the absence of barriers to entry 
other than those directly associated with availability of 
capital' [Hall and Weiss, 102, p.319]. These writers found 
that
size does tend to result in high profit rates as 
Baumöl proposed, that there is a significant though 
probably not enormous capital requirements barrier as 
a result, and that this barrier very likely has a 
greater effect on profit rates than concentration, 
the traditional index of market power [102, p.329j.
Samuels and Smyth [216], on the other hand, have concluded
that the size-profits relation is inverse, and that size was
a significant determinant of mean profits over the ten-year
(14)period 1954 to 1963. Kamerschen notes that
the (unweighted) average annual profit rate (net 
income to net worth) [of the 'Big Three' automobile 
manufacturers] over the 1950-1960 period as reported 
in Fortune was as follows: General Motors, 21.5 per
cent, Ford 14.5 per cent, and Chrysler, 10.5 per cent.
(14)
Two years earlier, Williamson had stated in the same 
Journal that 'there is no more reason to expect 
profitability to decline with size than there is evidence 
to suggest that it does' [264, p.l] .
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The descending firm sizes are therefore associated
with descending profit rates [128, p.441]. (15)
Moreover, he found that the relationship between 
profitability and the concentration ratio was statistically 
insignificant. [ 1o c . cit . ] .
By contrast with the size-profits relation, there is 
apparently widespread agreement that time-variabi1ity of 
profits is inversely related to firm size, and that there is 
greater variability in profit rates among small firms of 
given size than among large firms. [Alexander, 3; Dyckman 
and Stekler, 60; Hall and Weiss, 102; Hymer and Pashigian, 
119; Mansfield, 170; Samuels and Smyth, 216; Stekler, 243; 
Stigler, 244]. It is also interesting that Samuels and 
Smyth were unable to explain their negative relation between 
size and profits in terms of profit variability. Their 
results rejected the hypothesis that profitability is an 
increasing function of its time-variabi1ity. The latter 
was found to be directly related to the degree of 
competition; that is, to the concentration ratio. [216, 
pp . 135 , 139 ] .
From the costs viewpoint there are grounds for 
supposing that the size-profits relationship is in fact 
indeterminate, and that testing should reveal a direct 
relation in some cases and an inverse one in others.
Effects of large scale and restricted entry, which support
(15)
Also, his results 'are not necessarily inconsistent with 
the Hall-Weiss finding that the positive size-profits 
relationship approximately held over "...the whole range of 
large scale firms observed"' [loc.cit., n.13]. Hall and
Weiss stated that 'General Motors is perhaps the prime 
example of the Baumöl [size-profits] hypothesis in the 
American economy today...' [102, p . 32 7 ] .
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the hypothesis of a direct relation, do not constitute a 
complete explanation, although they undoubtedly contribute 
to its completion. Protected by capital requirements 
barriers, etc. and capable of great output volumes, large 
oligopolists have evolved a type of competition all their 
own. It is based, not on price changes but on product 
characteristics and differentiation, service, and corporate 
image. These factors direct emphasis onto sales and market 
shares: they also involve huge expenditures on product
promotion, which is a category of preferred expense from 
the viewpoint of managerial self-interest, along with 
staffing and managerial emoluments.
Promotional expenditures bulk much larger in the cost 
structures of big oligopolists than in those of smaller 
competitive firms. These expenditures represent a trade-off 
of cost advantages bestowed by large-scale production for 
oligopolistic markets. The two elements are closely 
linked, because the advantages in question are realized 
through promotional efforts, which in turn are made possible 
by ability to operate on large scale. ^^^^ There is no 
corresponding trade-off in smaller, non-oligopolistic 
firms, because neither the ability nor the need to make
(16)
Cf. Samuels and Smyth:
Certain economic pressures might be supposed to be 
working in the direction of higher rates of return for 
the larger companies, such as technical and marketing 
opportunities associated with size. In the opposite 
direction the usually higher capita1-intensity in the 
larger firms... should lead, other things being equal, 
to lower profit rates [216, p.130] .
This study takes a rather different view of the causations 
involved. See also footnote 11 above.
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this promotional effort exists to any comparable extent.
Of course, as growing firms tackle incre asingly-1arge 
markets,they are eventually confronted by the need to make 
unprecedented promotional efforts. This is as much a part 
of the capital requirements and organizational barriers, 
which such firms must surmount in order to continue 
growing, as is the need to make diseretely-1 arger 
investments in productive capacity, for purposes of entering 
large, oligopolistic markets.
Indeterminacy of the size-profits relationship is 
likely because the extent, to which oligopolistic profit 
advantage from the scale viewpoint is traded-off in 
promotional and other preferred expenditures, varies between 
firms and industries and for given firms over time. These 
expenditures are not always entirely within managerial 
jurisdiction. The importance of sales and market shares 
means that competitors' initiatives must be matched, even if 
budgets are exceeded. Market leaders tend to set the pace. 
These firms' scale advantage over competitors permits them 
to emerge as relatively the most profitable, whilst other 
industry members may then rank in profitability according 
to market shares.
These arguments also help to explain the observed 
inverse relationship between time-variabi1ity of profits 
and firm size. When an oligopolistic industry is hit by 
recession, member firms are able to retrench promotional 
expenditures, and to gather up various strands of 
organizational slack. Smaller firms' cost structures may
be relatively less output-e1astic in these respects. Large
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firms are also able to afford to develop superior 
forecasting ability, whereby unit costs may be stabilized 
through timely anticipation of fluctuations in activity.
These firms also tend to be more diversifed than smaller 
firms.
Changes in factor prices are of interest in relation 
both to their impact on costs, and to action which may be 
taken (other than through pricing policy) in response.
Each of these aspects depends upon which factor's supply 
price has increased, and that factor's relevant 
characteristics. These may be defined according to whether 
the factor is respectively a fixed or a variable cost, 
subject to managerial expense preference or not, 
substitutable or not, and important in relation to total 
unit costs or not. Managerial costs, for example, include 
salaries, bonuses, and sundry perquisites. They are 
respectively a fixed cost, definitely a preferred outlay, 
not substitutable for other factors, and not usually 
important in relation to total costs. They are also likely 
to respond to one or more standards of achievement, and to 
changes in levels of managerial rewards in other firms and 
industrie s .
Raw materials, on the other hand, are a variable cost, 
not subject to expense preference, sometimes substitutable 
as to source of supply and technical specification, and often 
important in relation to total costs. An efficient 
management seeks to minimize this component of unit cost, 
but would not normally reduce output in order to do so.
Direct labour resembles raw material costs in some respects,
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but differs in others. Firstly, labour costs tend to vary 
(as a component of unit costs) directly with output above a 
certain level, due to overtime rates, bottlenecks, etc. 
Secondly, it may resemble a fixed cost at low levels of 
output, unless hired and fired strictly in accordance with 
output variations. Thirdly, s u bstitution out of direct 
labour usually involves investment policy (often in 
co nju nction with effi c i e n c y  studies) . Durable assets may 
be su bs tituted for direct labour if the latter's supply 
price rises, p r o vided suitable plant is available, and 
m a n a ge ment is confident that foreseeable levels of activity 
will support extra capacity. [Smith, 233, pp.70-2, 87].
Rising costs of indirect labour have also stimulated 
c o s t - re ducing inve stment in office machines in recent years. 
In many cases the incentive for substitution has come from 
labour shortages, as well as from cost increases. The 
incentive to substitute durable assets for labour may fall 
if the former's supply price also rises, and the growth rate 
in op erating infe riority of existing plant may also be 
lower for repl acement purposes. In reality it is often 
dif fi cu lt to determine the extent to which prices of durable 
assets have risen, because new plant is t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y 
superior. [Duesenberry, 56, p.61; Lundberg, 164, p.675; 
Smith, 233, p p . 87-114].
Effects of factor price changes on p r o f i t a b i l i t y  depend 
therefore on factor c h a r a c teristics and on mana gerial 
initiative within the scope for action. C o s t - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  
is a prin cipal point of departure between thrusting and
sleepy managements. Two other points stand out. Firstly,
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quite apart from pricing policy, action in response to 
factor price changes does not necessarily always involve 
investment policy. Secondly, managements will not 
willingly, given satisfactory demand, reduce output in 
response to factor price increases, unless the latter are 
so severe that production ceases to be a viable proposition. 
Net revenue forgone by acceptance of cost increases, if no 
means for offsetting them presents itself, would need to be 
considerable to match the opportunity costs, in terms of 
managerial goals, of curtailing activity in an otherwise 
satisfactory market.
(c ) Pricing Policy
There is a fair measure of agreement in the literature 
about business pricing policies, the third dimension of 
profitability. Oligopolistic firms tend to follow long-term 
pricing policies based on variable cost plus a stable 
percentage markup. Prices tend to be formed at industry 
rather than firm level, according to the circumstances of 
the strongest members, and with regard to what the market 
will bear. Short-term variations in demand and costs (due 
to fluctuations in utilization rates, etc.) are not 
reflected in prices, which are adjusted intermittently in 
the light of cumulative cost changes. [Duesenberry , 56, 
pp.53, 131; Gordon, 97; Hall and Hitch, 104, p.12; Kmenta
and Williamson, 138, p.175; Kuh , 144, p.19; 146, p.262;
Machlup, 166; Marris, 173, p.230; Smith, 233, p.311]. 
Profitability therefore varies to a greater extent than
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either prices or the percentage markup, although some 
writers believe that short-term marginal cost functions are 
relatively constant oyer wide ranges of output [Duesenberry, 
56, pp.54-5; K u h , 146, p. 2 62 ; Simon, 226, p . 10] , or at
least that firms behave as though they are.
Oligopolistic prices are sticky because price 
competition is reckoned to be contrary to members' 
interests (except in unusual circumstances) , and because 
it would destroy the stability of expectations upon which 
business planning is based. [Simon, 228, p.54]. That is,
it would tend to dissipate the collective benefits 
provided by restricted entry and relatively-stable market 
shares, which permit members to compete in more congenial 
and more rewarding ways. In competitive industries these 
conditions are absent, and individual firms are not strong 
enough to 'rationalize' the market. These firms must bear 
the considerable direct and opportunity costs of frequently 
using the price system for competitive purposes. [Cf.
Coase, 38; Malmgren, 169, pp.400-1; Smith, 233, p.311].
The greater scope for planning enjoyed by oligopolists 
belies the traditional view that a competitively-determined 
price system signals free-of-charge to its users 
information on how much to produce. [Koopmans, 141, p.23] . 
In oligopoly price competition is conducive to uncertainty 
(i.e. lack of information) about price elasticity of 
demand and reactions of competitors. Therefore, apart from 
deliberate collusion in price-fixing, a firm must be 
reasonably convinced, when it makes price increases, that 
competitors will welcome the move for reasons similar to
its own.
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Since o l i g o p olistic prices are usually fixed for 
con sid er able periods, albeit at what the industry believes 
the ma rket will bear, short- and m e d i u m - t e r m  p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
is d e t e rmined by sales and costs. Firms interested in 
pr of it ab le deve l o p m e n t  of markets cannot afford to let 
their costs get out of line with those of competitors.
Even if a firm does not lead in cost stabilization, it 
must aim to match the efforts of competitors, in order to 
safeguard p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and market shares. [Kuh , 144,p . 53].
Action d e s igned to avoid rising costs and loss of 
ma rke t shares at high levels of capacity u t i l i zation must, 
when prices are fixed, involve investment policy to a 
greater extent than when prices are variable. As 
Du es e n b e r r y  has observed, 'we have only succeeded in moving 
the i n d e t erminacy from the area of price theory to the 
area of investment theory' [56, p p . 130-1]. This refers to 
the choice, in the above circumstances, between attempting  
to capture excess demand by further squeezing existing 
capacity, or making addi tio nal investment, or holding 
output at the current level. In the first case, market 
shares may be m a i n t a i n e d  at the expense of profitability,  
whereas addi tional capacity may enable a firm to maintain 
market shares with increased profitability. If the firm 
decides to backlog demand at existing prices, competitors 
may erode its market shares. Price rigidity therefore 
place s a particular onus on mana gerial initiatives with 
regard to investment policy, costs, and market intelligence, 
etc., because it is in these areas that competition is
w a g e d .
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4 . 4 The Medium of Decision
There is no substantial agreement about the actual 
role of profit in investment decisions, either as an 
objective of decision-making, or as a medium in terms of 
which decisions are made. In Chapter 1 it was decided 
that managements have a specific, but limited, interest in 
profit, to the extent of satisfying shareholders and 
providing finance for future growth. In Chapter 2 it was 
argued that uncertainty precludes maximization of either
profit or growth, and that managements depend on the 
quality of their own judgments, and on the efficiency of 
data-collection and evaluation processes.
Still unresolved is the question of whether profit 
is the medium of investment decisions for existing lines. 
This is not true of diversification into new fields, 
because the necessary data is not available when initial 
entry decisions are made. The position may, however, be 
different for established lines, because the profitability 
of past and current periods is known, and managements are 
presumably familiar with cost and market characteristics.
Arguments in favour of the so-called 'proxy' role of 
profit in investment decisions state that the current 
profit rate, adjusted for any known or expected 
developments, provides the rule of thumb upon which firms 
must rely under uncertainty, especially since profitability 
tends to be correlated with some of the main forces which 
cause investment changes, and also with investment itself. 
Expected profitability then determines investment, both as
a managerial objective in its own right, and on behalf of
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other factors. [Eisner, 68, p p . 186-8; Knox, 140]. These 
views have not been accepted here. It is considered more 
reali sti c that investment is determined by those factors 
which also determine profitability.
Investment in existing lines occurs in response to a 
need, which must first be p e r c e i v e d  by management. Under 
un ce r t a i n t y  p e r c eption does not usually precede existence 
of the need, which arises in the form of pressures on 
capacity, threats from competitors, o p portunities to 
improve efficiency, etc. Quite often the need is already 
subsumed in current profits before investment action is 
taken. On the other hand, expected profit may rise as the 
result of previous investment decisions without any effect 
on current investment. Also, many investment decisions 
are not a c c o m p a n i e d  by increased expected profitability.
As Gru nf eld has observed, 'not all rises in profits signify 
increases in the incentive to invest; and, correspondingly, 
not all increases in the incentive to invest are reflected 
in rises in profits' [99, p . 2 16 ] . ^
Evidence p r e v i o u s l y  cited indicates that most firms do 
not make detailed calculations of ex pected profitability,  
do not employ DCF and other techniques in investment 
decisions, and do not conduct efficient repl acement 
po li ci es (in the sense of atte m p t i n g  to minimize c o s t s ) , 
etc. This evidence makes it diff icult to sustain the view 
that firms typically approach investment m a inly in terms of
(17)
Cf. T inbergen's classic assertion that 'it is almost a 
tauto logy to say that investment is governed by profits 
expectations' [251, p.34].
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ex pe ct ed  profit ability. However, the type of mana gement  
which tends to be efficient in these respects is the 
g r o w t h - o r i e n t e d  thruster, who earns high profits in 
ex pan ding markets, and proba b l y  has rela tively less need 
to co ncentrate on p r o f i t a b i l i t y  as a m a n a g e m e n t  problem.
In one important sense, p r e v i o u s l y  mentioned, an 
ef fi ci ent and expanding firm may actively reject the 
c on ve nt ional notion of expected p r o f i t a b i l i t y  in its 
invest ment decisions. That is, repl acement projects are 
often both more p r o f itable and less risky than investment 
for expansion, yet the former are limited in favour of the 
latter in the interests of long-term growth and 
pro fit ability. By so doing, man a g e m e n t  aims to gain 
growth and scale economies from expansion, and to secure 
much greater benefits from r e p l acement at later stages, 
when the volume of capital is greater. Thus, although 
opp o r t u n i t y  costs of expansion may be high in the shorter 
term, beneficial effects on p r o f i t a b i l i t y  over longer 
periods may be very considerable. In this sense of 
i n te rd ependence of investment decisions, the relevance of 
co nv ent ional p r o f i t a b i l i t y  estimates may be quite limited. 
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  is then determined partly by the length of 
the in vestment horizon, which is a consequence of growth 
mo tiv ati on. [Cf. Lundberg, 164, p p . 670-1].
M a i n t enance of adequate periodic p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
with in the investment horizon is a constraint on long-term 
inv est ment strategy. This task resolves itself, however, 
into pro bl ems connected with reception, eval uation and 
ut il iz ation of data from various sources, including
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realized profit figures, about difficulties and 
opportunities which impinge upon profit performance either 
directly or indirectly. Almost any factor which affects 
business decisions may be expressed in terms of an effect 
on profits. Many such difficulties and opportunities, 
however, would be first perceived in relation to a factor 
(e.g. market shares) which is conceptually distinguishable 
from profits, and might be resolved by management without 
explicit reference to profits. It is also important to 
note that many such problems are resolved by means other 
than real investment.
Of all the different aspects of corporate policy, 
investment, especially for expansion, may actually be one 
of the furthest removed from direct 'contact' with 
expected profitability, in the sense of being directly 
induced or deterred by the latter. Replacement investment 
is closer in this sense, but only if it is deliberately 
geared to cost minimization for profit and competitive 
purposes. The sleepy management replacing capacity in 
the face of ultimate decrepitude cannot be accused of 
running a profit-oriented replacement policy. Even in a 
thrusting firm the 'proximate' cause of replacement may 
be competitive (growth) advantage rather than expected 
profitability as such.
In imperfect markets pricing policy is probably most 
directly affected by profit considerations. In fact, it 
may be argued that attention devoted by management 
specifically to profitability manifests itself mainly in
the form of setting a full-cost price on the basis of what
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the market will bear. Output, marketing and investment
policies, etc. then proceed in their own environments,
subject only to the general proviso that realized profits
(1 8 )must be satisfactory. As Gordon has stated:
Although the influence of profits on investment is a 
controversial topic, the weight of recent econometric 
evidence suggests that output is the only current 
variable which has an appreciable influence on 
investment, and that the effect of profits, if any, 
operates with a considerable lag [98, p.1363].
Profit is therefore largely confined to the 'permissive'
role of contributing towards investment finance. [Knox,
140, p.294; also Eisner, 71, pp.386-7; Evans, 75, p . 15 2 ;
Meyer and Kuh, 184, p.125].
This conclusion, which differs from the views of tax
theory about the role of profit, is profoundly significant
for the question of incentive effects of corporate income
taxation.
* * * * *
(18)
Marketing outlays, for instance, are often set at some 
conventional fraction of turnover, or are varied according 
to competitors' tactics. As is often the case with product 
prices, a firm may be incapable, by virtue of relative 
market power, of applying its own policies. It must be 
content to follow those of market leaders.
CHAPTER 5
CORPORATE TAX CHANGES AND INVESTMENT 
5.1 Introduction
Positive theories developed in the previous Chapters 
have supplied an array of determinants of the main types of 
managerial real investment under uncertainty. The 
interrelationships of these determinants have been explored 
qualitatively for each type, and the relative significance of 
each determinant has been assessed. There has also been 
preliminary discussion of increases in corporate tax rates in 
relation to investment incentives.
In conditions of uncertainty, as defined in this study, 
it has been considered as important to concentrate on the 
methods by which incentives or desires to invest are worked 
out, as it is to explain these desires in terms of rankings 
of personal objectives. The link between the will and the 
way under uncertainty is entrepreneurial competence, without 
which even growth-oriented motivation is ineffective as a 
determinant of real investment over the longer period.
The objectives of investment decision-makers, the 
conditions of knowledge under which they operate, and 
therefore the methods employed to translate objectives into 
action, have all been found to differ profoundly from those 
usually visualized for purposes of analysing effects of 
corporate tax'changes on investment. The role of profit is 
an especially significant example of these differences in 
each of the three respects above.
It therefore remains to assess effects of corporate 
tax changes on investment decisions in relation to these 
positive theories. This discussion involves concomitant
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consideration of the comparative roles of investment 
objectives and methods by which those objectives are pursued 
under uncertainty, as determinants of effects of the 
corporate tax. Changes in the tax which are considered 
include increases in its rate, and introduction or 
variation of several tax incentive measures which are 
specifically intended to encourage investment.
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5.2 Effects of Changes in Corporate Tax Rates
During the course of the previous Chapters several 
well-established notions have been rejected which affect the 
status of the tax from the incentive viewpoint. These 
i nclude:
1. investment constitutes risk-taking, of which the 
reward is p r o f i t ;
2. the probability of loss may be quantified ex ante 
as risk;
3. tax increases exercise a disincentive effect on 
real investment because the profit reward has been 
cut while risk remains unchanged;
4. the incentive to invest may be restored by 
allowing full tax offset for losses;
5. profit acts as a proxy for other factors in 
investment decisions.
The incentive to invest has been found to depend on the 
extent to which management interprets its own self-interest 
in terms of this activity, mainly for purposes of growth and 
security. Profit is needed for both these purposes, but it 
is incorrect to assume that investment serves managerial 
objectives only to the extent that it earns, or is expected 
to earn, profit. Moreover, due partly to uncertainty, 
investment decision processes are not organized in terms of 
profit, but of other factors which collectively determine 
profit, as well as serving managerial objectives. With 
certain exceptions these other factors are by no means 
inimical to the profit result, and high profits are quite 
consistent with sustained growth. Since profit is not a
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m a n a g e r i a l  o b j e c t i v e  as such, b e y o n d  the level  n e e d e d  for 
s e c u r i t y  and f i n a n c i n g  p u r p o s e s ,  t he re  can be no g e n e r a l  
p r e s u m p t i o n  th a t tax c h a n g e s  e x e r c i s e  any e f f e c t  on the 
i n c e n t i v e  to invest. In C h a p t e r  2 it was c o n c l u d e d  that 
loss o f f s e t  p r o v i s i o n s  for tax p u r p o s e s  are l a r g e l y  
i r r e l e v a n t  to the q u e s t i o n  of the i n c e n t i v e  e f f e c t  of the 
tax .
G i v e n  t ha t the m a i n  f a c t o r s  u n d e r l y i n g  t hes e d e c i s i o n s  
are m o t i v a t i o n ,  c o m p e t e n c e  and o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  i n v e s t m e n t  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  or n e e d s  w il l  not be f i r m l y  g r a s p e d  if e i t h e r  
m o t i v a t i o n  (incenti ve)  or c o m p e t e n c e  is lac ki ng .  U n c e r t a i n t y  
i m p o s e s  r a t h e r  m o r e  of a b u r d e n  of searc h, e v a l u a t i o n  and 
r e v i e w  a c t i v i t i e s  on m a n a g e m e n t  t han  is the case u n d e r  risk. 
The c o r r e s p o n d i n g  d e p e n d e n c e  of i n v e s t m e n t  on m a n a g e r i a l  
d e s i r e  and a b i l i t y  to p e r c e i v e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  is o b vi ou s .
A. r e c e s s i o n  in d e m a n d  i m p a i r s  n ot the i n c e n t i v e  b u t  the 
o p p o r t u n i t y  to in ves t. M o r e  p r e c i s e l y ,  a r e c e s s i o n  r e d u c e s  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  sc o pe  for p u r s u i n g  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t h r o u g h  
inve s t m e n t .
The l i t e r a t u r e  on e c o n o m i c  e f f e c t s  of t a x a t i o n  has 
a l w a y s  m ad e  the g e n e r a l  p r e s u m p t i o n  r e f e r r e d  to a bo ve  of a 
b a s i c  d i s i n c e n t i v e  e f f e c t  of the tax, a l t h o u g h  v a r i o u s  
m i t i g a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  h av e  a l so  b e e n  i d e n t i f i e d .  In the 
l i t e r a t u r e  of real i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ,  on the o th e r  
hand, c h a n g e s  in c o r p o r a t e  tax r a t e s  are a c c o r d e d  h a r d l y  any 
i m p o r t a n c e ,  e x c e p t  in c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  i n v e s t m e n t  f i n a n c i n g .
It seem s fair c o m m e n t  tha t the c o r p o r a t e  tax l i t e r a t u r e  has 
c r e a t e d  a s u b s e r v i e n t  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t  a r o u n d
the tax by a s s u m p t i o n .
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The incentive or desire to invest is a parameter of the 
investment decision process, rather than a variable 
susceptible to changes either in 'quantities' of desired 
benefits actually obtained or expected, or in movements of 
subsidiary factors, such as profit (above a minimum 
constrained level). The incentive to invest, that is, has 
been defined as the desire to utilize the process of real 
investment within the corporate environment for purposes of 
furthering individual or collective managerial self-interest. 
Corporate tax changes may affect managerial 'opportunities' 
to obtain benefits which are properly objectives of their 
incentive to invest, but they do not affect the latter as 
such .
Moreover, if tax effects are confined to profit, even 
the opportunity to pursue objectives of the incentive to 
invest may not be affected, except through financial 
capacity, unless profit stands in some key position vis a 
vis managerial investment objectives for decision-making 
purposes. As already stated, this is not the case. Profit 
is not usually the medium for making investment decisions 
for diversification and expansion purposes: it is rather
only the passive residual of a variety of intermediate 
production, marketing, investment and other decisions. This 
refers to the failure of the expectational role of profit, 
for which econometric evidence is available.
The empirical failure of profit in replacement 
decisions, in which the efficiency aspect is supposedly 
relatively clear-cut, is especially significant. This 
evidences the subordinate role of profit from the viewpoints
5 . 2 227
of c o m p e t e n c e  and a l l o c a t i v e  p r e f e r e n c e ,  r a t h e r  than from 
t ha t  of u n c e r t a i n t y .  I n e f f i c i e n t  m a n a g e m e n t s  r e p l a c e
p r i m a r i l y  in r e s p o n s e  to the p h y s i c a l  i n a b i l i t y  of p l a n t  to 
c o n t i n u e  in p r o d u c t i o n .  E f f i c i e n t  m a n a g e m e n t s ,  on the o t h e r  
hand, m a i n t a i n  m o d e r n  c a p i t a l  sto c ks  w h i ls t,  at the same 
time, u n d e r t a k i n g  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  and e x p a n s i o n  in o r d e r  to 
a c h i e v e  p e r s o n a l  and c o r p o r a t e  b e n e f i t s  of g r o w t h  and 
g r e a t e r  size. Th is i n v o l v e s  f a v o u r i n g  the f u r t h e r  fu tu r e to 
some e x t e n t  at the e x p e n s e  of the n ea r future. A l l o c a t i v e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of this ty pe  r e v e a l  the i n a d e q u a c y  of 
c o n v e n t i o n a l  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t  c o m p a r i s o n s  of d i f f e r e n t  
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  e v e n  a p a r t  f r o m  u n c e r t a i n t y .
The e x p e c t a t i o n a l  ( d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g )  f a i l u r e  of p r o f i t  
and the p r o f i t - ine 1 as t ic  ( pa ra met ri c) n a t u r e  of m a n a g e r i a l  
m o t i v a t i o n ,  t o g e t h e r  he l p to r e f u t e  the c o n v e n t i o n a l  
p r e s u m p t i o n  of an i n c e n t i v e  or d i s i n c e n t i v e  e f f e c t  of 
c h a n g e s  in tax r a t e s  on the rate of real i n v e s t m e n t .  [Cf. 
Lin t ne r,  157, p. 521 ] . Th is  c o n c l u s i o n  d oes  not d e p e n d  u pon
w h e t h e r  loss o f f s e t  p r o v i s i o n s  exist; nor do these  
p r o v i s i o n s  ha v e an y s u b s t a n t i a l  o p p o r t u n i t y  e f f e c t  of the 
k i n d  d i s c u s s e d  bel ow .  A n u m b e r  of o t h e r  a r g u m e n t s  t end  to 
r e i n f o r c e  this m a i n  c o n c l u s i o n .
F i r s t l y ,  the idea of an i n c e n t i v e  or d i s i n c e n t i v e  
e f f e c t  a p p e a r s  to c o n f l i c t  w i t h  o p p o r t u n i t y  cost  
c a l c u l a t i o n s .  To the e x t e n t  t ha t  c o r p o r a t e  p r o f i t s  f ro m all
TU
In the d i s c u s s i o n  of r e p l a c e m e n t  in C h a p t e r  3 it was 
c o n c l u d e d  that m a n a g e m e n t s  can, d e s p i t e  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  m a ke  
'good' d e c i s i o n s ,  if not 'optimal' ones, on the b a s i s  of 
r e l a t i v e  o p e r a t i n g  a d v a n t a g e s  of e x i s t i n g  p l a n t  and the 
l a t e s t  a v a i l a b l e  n e w  pl an t,  r a t h e r  t han  m e r e l y  a l l o w i n g  
r e p l a c e m e n t  n e e d s  to be s i g n a l l e d  by b r e a k d o w n .
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sources (except capital gains, perhaps) are subject to 
assessment, the tax has no opportunity cost. Thus, it is 
incorrect from the managerial point of view to claim that 
the tax may reduce expected returns below their opportunity 
cost. [Cf. Goode, 88, p . 1 2 9 ] . From a slightly different
angle, however, it is pertinent to enquire how an ambitious, 
efficient management should react when the tax rate rises.
If management allows itself to be 'discouraged', investment 
will presumably be retrenched across the board. The 
opportunity cost, in terms of sales and profits foregone, 
and market positions and competitive strength lost (perhaps 
irretrievably), would surely exceed the extra tax incurred 
by continuing the previous course of action. [Lintner, 157, 
p.525; Slitor, 231, p.238].
Opportunity cost calculations indicate, not that a 
disincentive effect should be modified by non-profit 
benefits from investment, but that actual commission of the 
effect in investment plans would damage both profit 
realizations and the latter benefits. Loss of market shares 
and competitive strength, referred to above, is an almost 
inevitable result of a firm's failure to service adequately 
its existing lines. The servicing requirement is an 
important constraint on the diversification rates of even 
very large firms, as explained in Chapter 3. If a firm 
chose to behave in response to a tax increase in the manner 
predicted by corporate tax theory, market shares abandoned 
by the firm would simply be snapped up by competitors. 
Disengagement from an existing line occurs only for the best
of strategic reasons, or in times of crisis, as when a firm
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( 2 )is forced out by competitors. Correspondingly, the
process of substituting new markets and products for 
existing ones is a long-term strategic matter, and would 
never occur as the simple consequence of tax changes.
If, on the other hand, an ambitious management is to be 
'stimulated' by a tax increase to recoup profit taken in 
tax, then, apart from price increases, some new action must 
be taken that was previously either not considered or was 
rejected. It is more plausible that actions involving 
satisfaction of capacity shortages in existing lines or 
diversification into new areas are no more or no less 
reasonable and desirable after the tax increase than before 
it. This follows from conclusions of the examination of 
determinants of investment for diversification and expansion. 
The former type was found to depend upon managerial 
motivation and competence, the existence of suitable 
opportunities, and availability of qualified managerial and 
other resources for diversification purposes. In the latter 
case, investment depends upon managerial motivation and 
competence, an actual or expected deficiency of productive 
capacity in relation to future product demand, and upon 
managerial belief that either such deficiency is of a 
semi-permanent nature, or that good reasons exist for 
creating excess capacity. Also, even if the firm is a 
monopolist, its behaviour must respond to, or seek to 
anticipate, that of (potential) competitors. This is likely
IT)
These remarks are not intended to refer to abandonment 
decisions involving fledgling ventures which have failed to 
'take-o f f ' .
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to a f f e c t  b o t h  the v o l u m e  and the t i m i n g  of i n v e s t m e n t .  
P o l i c i e s  of firms w h i c h  are not m a r k e t  l e a d e r s  m a y  be 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d i c t a t e d  fr om  o u t s i d e .  E ve n for firms  w h i c h  
ho ld  the i n i t i a t i v e  in th e i r  m a r k e t s  c o m p e t i t i v e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  are l i k e l y  to i n t e r p o s e  t h e m s e l v e s  b e t w e e n  
i n v e s t m e n t  p o l i c y  and an i n c e n t i v e  e f f e c t  of the tax.
V a r i o u s  b o t t l e n e c k  fa cto rs , such as s h o r t a g e s  of m a n a g e r i a l  
ca p a c i t y ,  hav e a s i m i l a r  e f f e c t  in r e d u c i n g  the i n f l u e n c e  of 
tax c h a n g e s .  [Cf. B ut t er s , 28, p .51 4; L in tn e r ,  157, 
pp .527-8 ] . '
M u c h  d i s c u s s i o n  ab o u t  i n c e n t i v e  e f f e c t s  of tax c h a n g e s  
c e n t r e s  a r o u n d  w h e t h e r  fir ms do and s h o u l d  m a k e  i n v e s t m e n t  
d e c i s i o n s  on the b a s i s  of p r e -  or p o s t - t a x  e x p e c t e d  r at es  of 
retur n.  The R i c h a r d s o n  C o m m i t t e e ,  for i n s t a nc e,  s u r m i s e d  
that firms may  not be a f f e c t e d  by tax c h a n g e s  b e c a u s e  they  
'look p r i n c i p a l l y  at the r e t u r n  b e f o r e  p a y m e n t  of tax' [210, 
para. 282; also Li n t n e r ,  157, p . 5 2 2 ] . Of firms i n t e r r o g a t e d
by Neild, o nl y 18 p er  cent, s t a t e d  that t h e i r  c a l c u l a t i o n s  
for i n v e s t m e n t  p u r p o s e s  we r e m ad e on a p o s t - t a x  basis.  
M o r e o v e r ,  this r e s u l t  a p p l i e d  i r r e s p e c t i v e  of firm size.
[192, p p . 3 5 - 6 ] . M o d i g l i a n i  and M i l l e r  c o n s i d e r  that the
a p p r o p r i a t e  m e a s u r e  of the c ost  of c a p i t a l  for i n v e s t m e n t  
p u r p o s e s  is the ra t i o  of p r e - t a x  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n  to m a r k e t  
value. [187, p . 2 8 0 ] . On the o t h e r  hand, G o r d o n  [93, p.51]
and S o l o m o n  [236, p.128] s t r o n g l y  a d v o c a t e  use of p o s t - t a x
rate s for p u r p o s e s  of s e l e c t i n g  a m o n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n v e s t m e n t  
p r o p o  s a 1 s .
U )
It s h o u l d  be n o t e d  th at  t he se  a u t h o r s  r e g a r d  such f a c t o r s  
as m o d i f y i n g  the d i s i n c e n t i v e  e f f e c t  of tax i nc re a s e s .
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Qu it e a p a r t  fro m the role of ra te s of r e t u r n  in 
i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n s ,  it is a p p a r e n t  t hat  the ' p r o f i t a b i l i t y '  
or e f f i c i e n c y  of i n v e s t m e n t  r e f e r s  to p r e - t a x  r at e s  of 
re t u r n .  A fi r m do es not t h e r e b y  b e c o m e  less e f f i c i e n t  in 
the p r o f i t  sense  b e c a u s e  a tax is l e v i e d  on its r e a l i z e d  
p r o f i t ,  or b e c a u s e  the rate of an e x i s t i n g  tax is 
i n c r e a s e d .  Th is o n l y  me an s, o t h e r  t h i n g s  equal, t hat  the 
f i r m ' s  a b i l i t y  to r e t a i n  p r o f i t  is r e du ce d . The p o s t - t a x  
rat e of r e t u r n  s i m p l y  m e a s u r e s  funds' flow.
For s i m i l a r  r e a s o n s  the a r g u m e n t ,  t hat  the d i s i n c e n t i v e  
e f f e c t  is less if firms ai m to e ar n o n l y  r e a s o n a b l e  pro f it ,  
is i n c o r r e c t ,  p r o v i d e d  o n l y  that a tax c h a n g e  d oes  not 
c a u s e  a firm to be c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  its m i n i m u m  p r o f i t  
c o n s t r a i n t  for s e c u r i t y  p u r p o s e s .  Tha t p o s s i b i l i t y  m a y  be 
e x c l u d e d  by the a s s u m p t i o n  that tax c h a n g e s  are c a p i t a l i z e d  
by the stock  m a r k e t .  O t h e r w i s e ,  p r o f i t  w h i c h  was a d j u d g e d  
're as on a bl e'  p r i o r  to a tax i n c r e a s e  d oes  not c ea s e  to be so 
(except, p e r h a p s ,  fr om the s e p a r a t e  v i e w p o i n t  of f i n a n c i a l  
c a p a c i t y )  by v i r t u e  of such i n c r e a s e .  [Cf. C o s c i a n i ,  43, 
p.48; S t r e et en ,  246] .
The a r g u m e n t ,  th at t a x a t i o n  is a c os t of p r o d u c t i o n  
w hi ch , if i n c r e a s e d ,  is l i a b l e  to c au se  p r o d u c t i o n  to be 
r e d u c e d  [e.g. C o s c i a n i ,  o p .c i t .] , is u s u a l l y  r e f u t e d  in 
t e r m s  of the m a r g i n a l  firm, w h i c h  m a k e s  no p r o f i t  and 
t h e r e f o r e  pa ys no tax. [E.g. Goode, 88, p . 5 1 ] . It is
p r e f e r a b l e  to ad mit , h o w e v e r ,  t h at  i n c om e t a x a t i o n  may  be 
r e g a r d e d  as a c o s t  in a s p e c i a l  sense, but t hat  it is also 
a b e l o w - t h e - 1 i n e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of r e a l i z e d  p r o f i t  and, in 
any case, not the type of c ost  w h i c h  n o r m a l l y  a f f e c t s
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production decisions. [Cf. Brown, 22, p.303; Due, 55,
C h . 1 3 ] . Many types of avoidable cost are incurred by firms 
which reduce profit efficiency (which the tax does not) and 
contribute to organizational slack. The latter costs do not 
affect production or investment; nor is there good reason to 
suppose that the tax does so, especially in view of the 
opportunity cost considerations discussed above.
One argument advanced in mitigation of the alleged 
disincentive effect relates to formation of new companies.
The latter, it is supposed, are not subject to a 
disincentive owing to the stimulus afforded by advantages 
of incorporation, and to the satisfaction of starting a new 
business: also because the uncertainties surrounding initial
stages of a company's life make too difficult the task of 
predicting future profit prospects. [Butters, 28, pp.506, 
515; Butters and Lintner, 29, Ch.2; Cosciani, 43, p.45;
Kimmel, 135, pp.37, 195; Petrie, 202, pp.174-7].
In this case the exception decidedly does not prove 
the rule. Advantages of incorporation, admittedly 
considerable, are capable of repeated and, perhaps, 
increasing use without depletion by established firms.
The motivation to obtain satisfaction from starting a new 
business differs little from that to achieve sustained 
growth in new and existing fields by an established firm. 
Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the profit prospects 
of a new firm is shared by managements of established firms 
which enter new fields by diversification, or even, in many
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(4 )cases, with regard to their established lines. In one
sense managements of new firms are more able than those of 
established firms to be discouraged by the tax. The 
opportunity cost (in terms of sales, profits, competitive 
strength and market positions foregone and sunk costs 
unrecovered, etc.) of retrenching investment plans is much 
lower for new firms than for established firms. In actual 
fact, however, this argument is no more plausible than its 
converse.
If management feels, despite the above arguments, that
a tax increase has reduced the profit 'reward' for its
efforts below an acceptable level, what is its most likely
reaction? Does it retrench real investment, thereby almost
certainly aggravating the profit result? Or does it increase
investment by way of an income effect? In the latter case
management must be able to select some course of action which
had previously been deferred or rejected, or commence to
(5 )search for fresh opportunities. These possibilities
cannot be excluded if one is willing to accept all their 
implications. A third course of action for a management 
'discouraged' by a tax increase is to improve efficiency by 
reducing costs (but without altering real investment p l a n s ) . 
However, if management is so interested in profitability, 
there should be little room for improvement in its cost
T_
It is necessary, in refuting the above argument, to avoid 
falling into the same trap as its proponents, the elementary 
one of attempting to quantify degrees of uncertainty. See 
Chapter 2 .
(5)
An income effect of the tax, if it existed, could not 
occur independently of demand expectations and capacity 
considerations.
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efficiency. Irrespective of managerial autonomy and freedom 
from effective competition in its product markets, 
organizational slack in the managerial area would be minimal 
because managerial concern for emoluments, and the desire to 
staff for personal prestige, would be thoroughly 
sublimated in the interests of the profit result.
Replacement policy would be close to optimal, because 
expansion plans would never be allowed to interfere with the 
short-term calculation of relative operating advantage.
This rather unrealistic situation is contradicted by 
the views of some authors, who feel that tax increases 
reduce managerial incentives to improve productive 
efficiency. [E.gs. Cosciani, 43, p.99; Due, 55, C h . 1 3 ; 
Slitor, 231, p . 2 3 7 ] . If managerial incentives favour
published profit, the efficiency goal will be aspired at 
irrespective of tax changes. The latter affect opportunities 
for its realization, rather than the incentive itself. 
Productive efficiency also serves ends other than profit, 
and even the opportunity effect is not clearcut in this 
respect, as explained below.
Despite failure of the tax to change managerial 
incentives, it may still affect the latter's practical 
application other than through its direct impact upon 
financial capacity. Incentives are a necessary but 
insufficient condition of the decision to invest: suitable
opportunities must also exist for management to obtain 
desired results from investment and other decisions.
Given managerial incentives, an opportunity effect of the 
tax may occur if its imposition, or a change in its rate,
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alters managerial opportunities for deriving benefits through 
decision-making. There is a clearcut distinction between the 
opportunity effect and the traditional incentive effect. In 
the former case, incentives do not alter as a result of the 
tax change. The effect depends entirely on whether the tax 
variation has altered managerial ability to express given 
incentives. Traditionally, on the other hand, tax changes 
have been supposed to alter aspirations as such.
No opportunity effect will occur unless managerial 
incentives and competence lead to evaluation of new potential 
created by the tax change, and carry through this evaluation 
to a decision. Sleepy managements, which fail to recognize, 
or to take up, attractive investment opportunities, are 
unlikely to adjust investment plans in response to indirect 
indicators. The opportunity effect should be distinguished 
from opportunity cost calculations, but is evaluated in 
terms of the latter. Thus, an opportunity effect may occur 
if a tax change creates a new opportunity cost (extra goal 
benefits attainable as a result of the tax change) of 
maintaining the previous course of action without making a 
specified decision response. It is then irrational not to 
respond to the tax in this particular way. This emphasizes 
the subjective nature of both the opportunity effect and 
evaluations which precede any decisions induced by this 
effect, because rational behaviour, defined in this study 
as the pursuit of perceived self-interest, is itself 
essentially subjective.
One straightforward instance of a negative opportunity 
effect would occur if a tax change impairs sales prospects.
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It co u l d  th en be s t a t e d  that m a n a g e r i a l  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  for 
r e a l i z i n g  g r o w t h  i n c e n t i v e s  h ave  b e e n  r e d u c e d  by the tax, 
and th at  the i n v e s t m e n t  rate is l i k e l y  to fall. I n s o f a r  as 
tax i n c r e a s e s  r e d u c e  firms' f i n a n c i a l  c a p a c i t y  to buy  from  
ea ch other, or ca use  d i v i d e n d s  to be r e d u c e d ,  etc., such an 
e f f e c t  d oes  occur . I r o n i c a l l y ,  h o w e v e r  (in v iew  of the 
c o n c l u s i o n  th a t e x p e c t e d  p r o d u c t  d e m a n d  is a p r i m a r y  
i n v e s t m e n t  d e t e r m i n a n t ) , it is w i d e l y  a g r e e d  t hat  the 
c o r p o r a t e  tax b e a r s  r e l a t i v e l y  l i g h t l y  on this v a r i a b l e ,  
c o m p a r e d  to o t h e r  taxes. A p a r t  f rom  any d ire ct , r e s t r i c t i v e  
e f f e c t  on sa les  r e a l i z a t i o n s ,  tax i n c r e a s e s  m a y  also be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  by m a n a g e m e n t s  as r e l i a b l e  e v i d e n c e  of g o v e r n m e n t  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  a b o u t  fu tur e d e m a n d  t ren ds . On the b a s i s  of 
this e v i d e n c e  p l a n n e d  i n v e s t m e n t  m a y i n c r e as e,  so that a tax 
i n c r e a s e  may  al so have a p o s i t i v e  o p p o r t u n i t y  effec t.
T h i s  st udy  has fo u n d  tha t p o s i t i v e  m a n a g e r i a l
m o t i v a t i o n  and c o m p e t e n c e  t en d to c o n d u c e  a b a s i c  b u s i n e s s
e f f i c i e n c y ,  ev en if p r o f i t  b e n e f i t s  are p a r t l y  d i s s i p a t e d
(t rade d-off) to s a t i s f y  m a n a g e r i a l  e x p e n s e  p r e f e r e n c e s .
W i l l i a m s o n  has o b s e r v e d  that, 'when the " pri ce " of t a k i n g
s a t i s f a c t i o n  in the fo r m of p r o f i t  i n c r e a s e s ,  the c o m p e n s a t e d
tax a d j u s t m e n t  a l w a y s  leads to a s u b s t i t u t i o n  of s ta ff  for
( 7 )p r o f i t . . . '  [265, p. 47 ].  The i n c r e a s e d  'price' or
TeT)
G o o d e ' s  s u g g e s t i o n ,  th a t the tax m a y  l ow e r  e x p e c t e d  
r e t u r n s  ev en b e f o r e  d e d u c t i o n  of the tax, o w i n g  to its 
e f f e c t  on e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  s h o u l d  be e v a l u a t e d  in r e l a t i o n  to 
b o t h  the n e g a t i v e  and p o s i t i v e  o p p o r t u n i t y  e f fe ct s . [88, 
p .116 ; also B u t t e r s ,  28, p . 5 0 7  ; S t r e e te n,  246],
(7)
This c o n c l u s i o n  is w i d e l y  s u p p o r t e d  in the l i t e r a t u r e .  
E.gs. Colm, 41, p p . 4 9 2 ,  498; C o s c i a n i ,  43, p.72; Due, 55,
C h .13; Slito r, 231, p . 2 3 7  ; Smith, 232, p .10 0.
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opportunity cost of profit following a tax increase 
constitutes a prime example of the opportunity effect, in 
that managerial ability to make expenditures consistent with 
their self-interest has been enhanced through the greater 
value of tax deductibility, at the expense of profit.
However, the extent to which profit can be traded-off 
owing to a tax increase may be quite limited. The exercise 
of expense preference necessitates what Williamson terms 
'discretionary profit', which is 'that amount by which 
earnings exceed...[the] minimum performance constraint'
[265, p.36]. As already explained, the performance or
efficiency constraint refers to pre-tax, rather than 
post-tax, profit. It is also desirable that the profit trend 
shall be maintained, besides exceeding a basic minimum. 
Therefore, an opportunity effect of this type usually occurs 
at the expense of an expected profit increase (over the 
previous year), rather than as a reduction of annual profit 
(below that of the previous year). This only means that 
managements are typically unwilling to pursue positive 
aspects of their self-interest very far at the expense of 
the negative security aspect.
The question now is the extent to which investment is 
involved in the above opportunity effect. This amounts to 
enquiring whether managerial self-interest will be served 
by trading-off profit in such a way that the volume or rate 
of real investment is altered. The conventional corporate 
tax literature would answer this question in terms of an 
income effect interacting with (if full tax offset for 
losses is not allowed) a risk (substitution) effect. Here
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it is deemed more anal y t i c a l l y  correct to evaluate the 
op po rt un ity effect in terms of the relation between real 
investm ent and managerial self-interest, having regard to 
the role of profit in investment decisions.
It is apparent that an oppo r t u n i t y  effect does not 
usua lly  override d e m a n d - c a p a c i t y  considerations. Additional 
investm ent will not be made if the resulting extra 
pro du ct ive capacity is not expected to be utilized within a 
reasona ble period. Corresp ondingly, mana g e m e n t s  will not be 
det er re d by tax increases from making induced investments 
for pu rposes of relieving p r e ssures on capacity, and of 
ma in t a i n i n g  market shares and competitive strength: nor
will man agerial incentives to diversify into new fields be 
affected. That is, the d e s i r a b i l i t y  of investment involving 
cr eat ion  of new productive ca pacity is not generally 
aff ect ed by corporate tax changes, and no o pportunity effect 
occur s .
However, there may be some exceptions to this general 
conclusion. Firstly, mana g e m e n t s  may utilize a tax increase 
to trade -off incremental profit potential for purposes of 
reducin g the failure rate of new projects. It is recalled 
from Cha pter 3 that success or failure of div e r s i f i c a t i o n  
often depends c onsiderably on the scale of the deve lopment 
effort accorded to projects. Stepping up this effort helps 
to increase the p r o p ortion of 'live b i r t h s ' , at the expense 
of short- or m e d i u m - t e r m  profitability. A tax increase 
subsidizes this effort, subject to the m i n imum profit 
constraint, as m e n t i o n e d  above. In the longer term, of 
course, it is quite possible that profit foregone will be
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amply recovered, but the initial decision is essentially in 
favour of growth and against profit. Secondly, when a 
proportion of excess capacity is considered strategically 
desirable, this may be facilitated (through tax depreciation 
allowances) by an increase in the tax rate, subject again to 
the minimum profit constraint. Thirdly, a tax increase may 
influence managerial lease-or-buy decisions, and those 
connected with the (flexible) investment content of projects. 
As previously observed, project capitalization is subject to 
wide variations within and between industries.
Replacement investment seems especially likely to 
nurture an opportunity effect of the type under discussion.
As previously explained, this category of investment is 
closely related to profit; it is (conceptually) free of 
problems associated with creation of additional productive 
capacity; and it is especially susceptible to managerial 
procrastination. Replacement also is indirectly related to 
competitive strength through productive efficiency.
Management may be persuaded by a tax increase that 
relatively less emphasis should be placed on cost reduction 
through replacement, on the grounds that profit efficiency 
is penalized by the tax. Resources thus freed may be 
devoted to other types of expenditure, including real 
investment, or they may simply be retained. In many cases 
the opportunity effect may take the form of substituting 
maintenance for replacement expenditure, owing to the 
former's superior deductibility. Much depends on the extent 
to which managements value cost efficiency for purposes of 
growth and security, rather than simply for profit-generation.
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If this need, which refers to pre-tax profit, is strong, 
there will be less scope for an opportunity effect. Firms 
which replace only in response to ultimate physical 
breakdown are also unlikely to revise replacement rates in 
response to changes in tax rates, because the latter will 
not be recognized as significant to the former.
In general, the opportunity effect against replacement 
may be most marked in firms of high overall efficiency, in 
which there are strong pressures on available resources for 
expansion purposes. Such firms were found to make long-term 
allocations of funds for expansion purposes despite the 
existence of more profitable and less risky replacement and 
bottleneck opportunities. It is not suggested, however, 
that an opportunity effect will induce efficient managements 
to abandon entirely the calculation of relative operating 
advantages of new and existing capacity, in favour of 
replacement only in response to physical decrepitude. The 
opportunity effect is more likely to be purely marginal in 
practice .
The last category of expenditure to be considered in 
relation to tax changes is research, although it is probably 
neither necessary nor desirable to separate out the latter's 
real investment content for separate discussion. Research 
normally needs the support of large turnover and resources, 
and is therefore generally regarded as the prerogative (or 
obligation) of big firms. The minimum level of expenditure 
required to make an impact is typically high and increased 
effort involves discrete allocations of resources. The height 
of the capital requirements barrier varies between industries.
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Apart from size of firm and the type of technology 
involved, perhaps the main determinant of research 
expenditure is managerial attitudes. These often seem 
confined to allocating some conventional proportion of 
turnover to the research function. Managements are likely 
to be relatively more research- oriented (a) the faster the 
growth rate of technologies with which their industries are 
associated, (b) the greater the extent to which market 
competition revolves around product differentiation and 
innovation, and (c) the more interested they are in growth 
through internal diversification. Licensing arrangements 
with overseas firms often act as a complete or partial 
alternative to internal research, and also constitute a 
growth interstice for smaller firms. The latter may also 
overcome their size disadvantage by various co-operative 
and other arrangements, perhaps at trade association level.
The opportunity effect of a tax increase will clearly 
tend to favour research, to the extent that such an effect 
occurs. However, it may be prudent, in this connection, not 
to overrate the extent to which 'a situation in which 
government is an automatic partner in every deductible 
outlay gives rise to what may be termed tax dynamism'
[Slitor, 231, p. 237 ] . Tax increases will not induce research 
effort if a firm is too small or too poor to sustain it, if 
its technological competence is too shallow to conceive it, 
or if management is too sleepy to value it. An existing 
research effort will not be increased unless management 
considers this warranted by expected or desired results. An 
opportunity effect on research expenditure may thus be
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confined to the situation in which profit realizations could 
accommodate a greater effort, and in which management had 
been constrained from implementing the latter by pressure on 
available resources.
The chief attribute of the opportunity effect is its 
permissiveness. It passively facilitates the pursuit of 
certain aspects of managerial self-interest through tax 
deductibility, subject to certain constraints and to 
managerial initiatives. If management is bent on making 
wasteful expenditure, an income tax increase will not deter 
this. Correspondingly, an opportunity effect will not help 
to transform a sleepy management into a thrusting growth 
leader. Expressions such as 'tax dynamism' should be 
avoided, because they impart an entirely illusory quality 
of goal-creating and goal-varying ability to corporate tax 
changes. Moreover, decisions involving acquisition of new 
productive capacity are, with a few exceptions mentioned 
above, largely outside the scope of corporate tax changes, 
although the latter may transmit signals about likely trends
of product demand.
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5.3 Tax Investment Incentive Measures 
(a ) Preliminary
Increases in corporate tax rates are generally 
considered to exercise disincentive effects upon real 
investment except, following Domar and Musgrave, when they 
are accompanied by loss offset provisions. In the postwar 
period, however, tax policy makers have made heavy use of a 
number of devices whose overt purpose is to stimulate rates
( g )of real investment. It is widely believed that these
devices operate most effectively under higher tax rates, 
since what they offer in return for increased investment is 
then more valuable. During this period corporate tax rates 
have tended to reach high levels in some advanced countries.
In this final Section the ability of these policy 
measures to increase firms' investment incentives will be 
analyzed in relation to the foregoing examination of 
determinants of real investment decisions. As before, 
investment incentives are interpreted strictly in terms of 
the 'desire' to invest, as opposed to the financial ability 
to do so .
The particular devices to be considered include 
accelerated depreciation, investment allowances (also known 
as tax credits for investment), and investment grants.
___
For instance:
Tax devices to stimulate investment have certainly been 
the greatest fad in economic policy in the past ten years. 
In a period when the trends in the use of policy 
instruments were in the direction of more general, less 
selective devices, all sorts of liberalized depreciation 
schemes, investment allowances, and tax exemptions were 
embraced with enthusiasm all over the non-Communist world 
[Eckstein, 63, p.351].
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These devices differ formally from one another, and 
different varieties of the same device (especially 
accelerated depreciation) are found in practice. However, 
in each case the question of an effect on investment 
incentives reduces to the same fundamentals. Therefore, it 
has not been considered necessary to discuss each measure 
separately, apart from drawing such distinctions between 
them as appear to be of interest for the particular purpose 
in hand.
Accelerated depreciation, as its name implies, consists 
of deductions from taxable profits of the cost of approved 
depreciable assets over a lesser number of fiscal periods 
than the economic life of those assets. The ultimate degree 
of acceleration results in depreciable assets being 
'expensed'; that is, their cost is fully deductible from 
taxable profits of the period in which they are p u r c h a s e d / 91 
Investment allowances consist of deductions from taxable 
profits (perhaps those of the period in which the depreciable 
assets are purchased) of a specified proportion of the cost 
of those assets in excess of their full cost. Over the full 
tax depreciation period, that is, a taxpayer is allowed to 
deduct (1 + a)t per cent, of the cost of assets, where a is 
the investment allowance and t is the tax rate. Investment
___ _ _
Acceleration methods employed in practice include 
straight-line, reducing balance and sum of the years-digits 
systems. An initial allowance may be provided in 
conjunction with each of these systems and enables a 
significant proportion of the cost of assets to be deducted 
in the first assessment following purchase. The balance is 
then deducted according to one of the systems indicated. 
Discussions of actual acceleration methods appear in Brown, 
25; Domar, 50; Hall, 101; and Hall and Jorgenson, 103.
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grants consist of cash payments of specified proportions of 
the cost of approved assets. These grants may be regarded 
as capital receipts which are not assessable to tax on 
corporate profits and which reduce the cost of assets to 
which they relate for purposes of tax depreciation 
allowances. Grants are guaranteed payable at the end of 
specified periods after submission of claims. [Cf. 
Department of Economic Affairs, 48]. Over the full tax 
depreciation period, therefore, a taxpayer receiving an 
investment grant of b per cent, obtains b + (1 - b)t from
the tax system. ^  ° ^
(b ) The Case for the Incentive Measures
Definition of the exact nature of the incentive effects 
that are claimed for these policy measures is not an easy 
matter, since their proponents are not always very precise. 
Perhaps this is due to the fact that 'the effectiveness of 
tax policy in altering investment behavior is an article of 
faith among both policy makers and economists' [Hall and 
Jorgenson, 103, p . 3 9 1 ] .
The incentive effect is frequently expressed in terms
(1 0 )
Despite the fact that investment allowances do not 
reduce the depreciable cost of assets for tax purposes, 
these allowances tend to be less valuable than investment 
grants of comparable rates. This is additional to the 
certainty of the latter. Thus, assuming the same 
depreciation system in each case, and that the rates of 
investment allowance and investment grant are both a per 
cent., the latter method exceeds the former in value by 
a + (1 - a)t - (1 + a)t = a(l - 2t) on a single asset. In
these terms, and ignoring minor discounting differences, the 
value of the allowance therefore equals that of the grant at 
a tax rate of 50 per c e n t . , and exceeds that of the grant at 
tax rates above this level.
5.3(b) 246
of 'the increase in the rate of return realizable on a given 
capital outlay...' [Ture, 257, p .341; also Agarwala and
Goodson, 1, p.386; Brown, 26, p.337; Chase, 34, p.37; Meyer
and Glauber, 182, p . 2 5 6 ] . This is equivalent to 'the
plausible argument that businessmen in pursuit of gain will 
find the purchase of capital goods more attractive if they 
cost less' [Hall and Jorgenson, loc . cit . ; also Neild, 192, 
p . 3 6 ] . Alternatively:
By increasing the present value of the stream of 
net returns that investment projects are expected to 
yield, depreciation acceleration induces a rightward 
shift of the schedule of the marginal efficiency of 
capital. Consequently, depending upon the elasticity 
of the schedule describing the supply of capital, it 
is likely to increase Ke , the equilibrium or desired 
capital stock, and k , the equilibrium capital-output 
ratio. The increase in k is defined as the "incentive 
effect" [Hochman, 115, p.221; also Chase, 34, p.39] . 0-1)
Hall and Jorgenson employed a similar model based on the
neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation, in which
The effects of tax policy on investment behavior 
enter the investment function through the rental value 
of capital input. A change in tax policy changes the 
rental value of capital input. This results in a change 
in the desired level of capital stock. A change in 
desired capital stock results in net investment (or 
disinvestment), bringing capital stock up (or down) to 
its new desired level...The change in tax policy 
continues to affect gross investment through 
replacement of a permanently larger (or smaller) 
capital stock [103, p.397; also Coen, 39, p . 2 0 9 ] .
(ID
Some authors allot a slightly different emphasis by 
expressing the incentive effect of tax policy measures in 
terms of removal of the disincentive effect of the corporate 
tax itself. For example, Kurihara states:
if the corporate tax cannot be cut for revenue or 
equity reasons, the closest practicable approximation 
to the instant depreciation scheme will largely wipe 
out the tax burden involved and so bring the marginal 
efficiency of capital after tax into approximate 
equality with that before tax... [147, p p . 221-2; also 
C h a s e , 34, p . 3 3] .
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A number of authors have tended to define the incentive 
effect in terms of reduction in risk or uncertainty. For 
instance, Domar states:
Much will depend on the awareness of businessmen that 
the risk of investing in fixed capital is considerably 
reduced because no income tax need be paid until a 
substantial part of the cost has been recovered; also 
on their understanding that such investment offers a 
perfectly legitimate method of tax avoidance, and on 
their readiness to consider these facts in their 
investment decisions [50, p.212] . (12)
In the opinion of Dobrovolsky [49, p.909] and Streeten [246]
accelerated depreciation can do much to alleviate uncertainty
about future revenues in the absence of provisions for
offset of losses. Brown has argued that full loss offsets
and one-year depreciation (i.e. expensing) are necessary;
the latter to 'eliminate the interest discount applicable to
the tax rebates from depreciation and return investment
(13 )incentives to their pretax level' [22, p.313]. Elsewhere,
Brown notes that 'the present value of the depreciation 
deduction depends, among other things, on the certainty with
(12 )
Apart from his use of the (implicitly quantifiable) term 
risk, which was not specifically defined for purposes of the 
particular Essay, it is interesting to note that Domar 
stresses the importance of business awareness as a 
determinant of the effect of corporate tax investment 
incentives. Similar stress has been laid on this parameter, 
comprising managerial perception and competence, throughout 
this study.
(13)
However,
If interest is deductible, it would not be legitimate to 
assume that the rate of discount used by the entrepreneur 
is unaffected by the tax,...If interest payments are 
permitted to reduce taxable income, the net interest 
costs of the entrepreneur are proportionately reduced... 
Investment incentives would remain unaffected. One-year 
depreciation for debt-financed investment would not be 
necessary for incentive reasons. If applied to 
debt-financed assets, it would raise investment 
incentives above their pretax level [Brown, 22, p.314].
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which it can be taken in the future against otherwise
taxable income' [26, p.336] . Acceleration of depreciation,
for example by provision of an initial allowance, then
causes a 'gain in present worth...from a more prompt
deduction of depreciation and, if uncertainty regarding its
deductibility in the future is present, from a more certain
deduction' [26, p.338; also 25, p.91; Goode, 88, p.217;
Streeten, 246]. 'In a real sense, this decrease in the
present worth of future tax liabilities could be considered
the same as a decrease in the cost of the depreciable
asset' [Brown, 25, p.91].
Uncertainty about the provision of investment
allowances in the U.K. was a principal reason for their
replacement in 1966 by a new system of investment grants.
Industry has stressed the importance of certain and 
speedy reimbursement as a feature of any incentive.
But the initial effect of investment allowances is not 
felt until about eighteen months (on average) after 
the expenditure has taken place; and the longer-term 
benefit (which derives from the subsequent grant of 
depreciation allowances up to the total cost of the 
asset, undiminished by the investment allowance) accrues 
over a relatively long period of time, and is uncertain 
in its impact since its value ultimately depends on 
future rates of taxation, as well as on the current and 
prospective tax position of investing firms [Department 
of Economic Affairs, 48, p . 6 ] .
In contrast to these drawbacks of investment allowances,
the new investment grants were expected to 'provide a
greater certainty of benefit. Investment involves risks
and grants reduce the risks in a way in which an allowance
dependent on the success of the investment does not'
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(14 )[48, p.7] . In an article published prior to the
introduction of investment grants, Neild stated:
outright subsidies on the purchase price of fixed assets 
would be a more effective way of achieving the purpose 
of the investment allowances, which amount to 
subsidies given in an indirect and delayed manner.
They would have an impact on firms which do their 
calculations pre-tax as well as those which do them 
post-tax. The timing of their receipt would not be 
conditional upon earning sufficient profit against 
which to set the allowances; so it would be more 
c ertain.
At present, some firms justify the fact that they 
ignore investment (and initial) allowances on the 
grounds that these allowances change so often that 
they cannot be sure whether, by the time a planned 
project comes to be paid for, they will still be in 
force at the present r a t e . . . In practice, this seems 
like an excuse for avoiding the labour of post-tax 
calculations: we do not have the impression that many
firms have tried post-tax calculations and abandoned 
them in disillusionment [192, pp.36-7].
It seems that the excuses allegedly made by firms for 
ignoring investment allowances could apply also to the 
investment grants. In principle there is no reason to 
expect greater stability in the rates of the latter than in 
those of the former. Also, while receipt of the grants may 
not be conditional upon earning sufficient profit, 
deductibility of asset costs remains so as before, except 
that the grants reduce the undepreciated balance, whereas 
the investment allowances did not, and that initial 
allowances are no longer available.
(14)
Administration of the new scheme may contain an element 
of uncertainty about eligibility for the grants.
For instance it will normally be a condition of 
payment that the recipient should notify the Board of 
Trade of any disposal (or change from qualifying uses) 
of an asset within a given period; and there will be 
power to secure repayment of the grants in certain 
circumstances [48, p.12] .
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A distinction often made between different tax policy 
measures focuses on their respective incentive effects on 
long- and short-term investment. Thus, investment 
allowances, at least on gross investment, are believed to 
favour short-term investment and replacement, because the 
value of these allowances is a direct function of the 
frequency with which they are used. Firms which turn over 
capital fastest are, of course, not necessarily those which 
grow fastest. [Black, 18, p.47; Brown, 22, p .313; 26,
p.337; Chase, 34, p p . 3 7 - 8 ] . Accelerated depreciation, on
the other hand, tends to favour longer-lived assets. Over 
the life of a single asset an initial allowance, for 
instance, is an interest-free loan. The longer the economic 
life of the asset, the longer the period before the loan must 
be repaid. The bias of accelerated depreciation towards 
longer-lived assets is greater the more is depreciation 
concentrated in the earliest periods of the asset's economic 
life. This accounts for the advantages of asset expensing 
or, at least, of a system including an initial allowance 
over one which does not have this feature. It also means 
that, given the overall period of acceleration, a 
reducing-balance formula is superior to the straight-line 
method. Correspondingly, after the first year, the sum of 
the years-digits method is more favourable than either of 
these. [Brown, 25, p.83; 26, p.338] .
However, accelerated depreciation is mainly of 
interest in relation to streams of investment. Whether 
these are declining, stable or increasing determines when or 
whether the interest-free loan must be repaid, and,
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therefore, the extent of the measure's incentive effect.
Over the period necessary for final values to be 
established (i.e. the depreciation period, assuming steady 
rates of c hange), acceleration results in 'permanently' 
higher, lower or unchanged depreciation allowances, 
depending on whether the firm's investment stream is 
respectively growing, declining or constant. [Brown, 26, 
p.342; Dobrovolsky, 49; D o m a r , 50; Eisner, 67; Goode, 88,
p.216] . The extent of acceleration determines the actual 
gain or loss in each case, given the rate of change in 
inve stment.
The nature of the incentive effect is now clear. A 
growing firm (in terms of its investment rate) is able to 
effect a permanent reduction in its tax burden, or, in 
other words, a permanent increase in its post-tax rate of 
return. The main proviso with regard to the incentive 
effect of accelerated depreciation, as of investment 
allowances, concerns the availability of taxable income 
from which to deduct the incentive allowances. It is widely 
agreed that carry-over provisions are essential adjuncts of 
these policy measures, though not of investment grants.
In general the policy measures considered here seek to 
hinge their incentive effects on the act of investment 
itself, rather than provide general assistance to firms.
This contrasts with tax rate reductions involving equivalent 
revenue losses, and, for that matter, with introduction of 
loss offset provisions. Reductions in tax rates do not 
distinguish profit on previous investment from that to be
earned on current investment. This obviously involves waste
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in relation to direct encouragement of the latter.
(1 5 )[Hochman, 115, p . 2 3 9 ] .
(c ) Critique of the Incentive Measures
It has already been observed that the efficacy of 
corporate tax policy for investment behaviour is an 'article 
of faith' among its proponents which rests on certain views 
about the nature of this behaviour, and particularly about 
its determinants. For instance, the neoclassical theory of 
optimal capital accumulation has been used directly to 
produce results which predict substantial incentive effects 
of various policy changes, through the latter's effect on 
the desired level of capital stock. [Hall and Jorgenson, 
103]. This represents a 'thermostatic' or 'mechanistic' 
approach to the problem.
The first impression, therefore, is that the effect of 
the measures is not pre-ordained or inevitable. It depends 
on whichever theory of investment behaviour one subscribes 
to for purposes of the exercise. This view is reinforced 
by realization that 'the customary justification for the 
belief_in the efficacy of tax stimulus does not rely on 
empirical evidence' [op . c i t . , p.391] .
In fact the empirical evidence that is available 
suggests that the policy measures have substantially failed 
to affect corporate investment incentives. This seems to
(15)
As Anderson observes, 'measures such as accelerated 
amortization... lower average tax rates but leave marginal 
rates intact...' [5, p .121]. The latter rates act as 
sanctions against taxpayers whose behaviour ceases to 
conform to the intentions of the policy measures.
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turn on the failure of most firms to take account of
taxation and tax allowances in their investment decisions.
It implies that 'most firms looked only at returns before
tax when making investment decisions', and that, although
some firms may adjust required pre-tax rates of return after
major changes in tax rates, 'it is most unlikely that it
happens when investment and initial allowances change'
[Neild, 192, p . 3 6 ] . The conclusion that firms consider
only pre-tax returns was reached by the Richardson Committee
[210, para. 282]. Other enquiries have yielded evidence
that investment behaviour is not influenced substantially by
changes in investment and initial allowances. [Butler, 27,
p .17 3; Coen, 39, p .210; Corner and Williams, 42; Hart and
Prusmann, 110]. Phelps Brown quotes from results of a
survey of investment in machine tools carried out by the U.K.
Management Consultants' Association, to the effect that only
5 per cent, of the sample took tax allowances into account.
[203, p . 2 4 6 ] . In the Brookings Study of Britain's Economic
Pro spec t s , Caves and Associates argue that
tax incentives to increase investment or measures to 
raise the rate of household saving seem unlikely to 
get good results; in the last two decades a highly 
favorable tax structure and high levels of corporate 
liquidity have not, in tandem, produced high investment 
rates [32, p . 491]. (16)
Various explanations have been advanced in the 
literature for the apparent failure of accelerated 
depreciation and investment allowances as investment
(16)
In the opinion of Agarwala and Goodson, 'their argument 
does not appear convincing. If the rate of investment was 
low in spite of the incentives, it might have been even lower 
without these incentives' [1, p.386, n.l] .
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incentives. Having already briefly reviewed the evidence, 
it will also be advantageous to discuss these reasons before 
proceeding to relate the tax policy measures to the 
foregoing analysis of real investment decision-making.
A number of authors state, in effect, that firms base 
their investment plans on sales prospects in their various 
markets. If these prospects indicate that capacity will be 
inadequate, further investment is undertaken to which tax 
investment incentives are largely irrelevant.
Correspondingly, if market prospects are gloomy, tax policy
measures will again be ineffective in stimulating
investment. [Domar, 50, p.213; Meyer and K u h , 184, p.104;
(1 7 )Phelps Brown, 203, p . 2 4 1 ] . Caves and Associates believe
that 'a high rate of capital formation will apparently
require favorable demand patterns and conditions for
(1 8 )productivity growth as well' [32, p . 4 9 1 ] .
Other arguments claim that lack of business awareness 
of the benefits to be gained from the investment incentives
(17)
Phelps Brown states that the effectiveness of 
counter-cyclical policy (including investment incentives)
'has been blunted by the continued expansion of public 
expenditure, the changes in which have been made, save 
occasionally and recently, in pursuance not of stabilization 
but of long-run programmes' [loc.cit.].
(18)
Arguments relating investment to the strength of product 
demand make use of capacity-accelerator considerations, which 
were discussed in Chapter 3. These involve induced increases 
in desired capital stock and consequent adjustments in the 
long-term capita1-output ratio, by implication outside the 
scope of tax incentive measures. Hochman, however, defines 
the incentive effect of accelerated depreciation as the 
increase in the equilibrium capita1-output ratio caused by 
acceleration 'increasing the present value of the stream of 
net returns that investment projects are expected to yield,... 
[which] induces a rightward shift of the schedule of the 
marginal efficiency of capital' [115, p . 2 2 1 ] .
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is to blame for their failure to influence investment. For
instance, Brown believes that 'accelerated depreciation will
not make much difference unless it is large enough to be
unavoidably present in investment decisions, that is, unless
it gets over the threshhold of business management's
awareness' [25, p.96]. As already stated, Domar emphasizes
the importance of business awareness that tax policy reduces
the risks of investment. [50, p.212] . Also, the empirical
evidence discussed above indicates that the tendency of
firms to ignore incentive allowances is partly a question of
awareness. Butler believes that
There are practical reasons why cash grants may be 
superior to investment allowances as investment 
incentives. These reasons turn to a large extent on 
the failure of many businessmen to take account, in 
appraising capital projects, of the difference the 
investment allowances made to the cash flows of their 
business as a whole and to appreciate adequately that 
increments of cash sooner are more valuable than 
increments later [27, p.173] . (19)
Closely related to arguments about the role of business 
awareness, but distinct from them, is the notion that 
accelerated depreciation and investment allowances have 
failed for reasons of business uncertainty. It is recalled 
that this was a main official reason for replacement of the 
investment allowances by cash grants in the U.K. Brown has 
argued that investment allowances can never be regarded as 
entirely permanent by firms because a present government 
cannot bind its successors in this way. This fact causes 
inevitable uncertainty for investment purposes. [23, p . 2 0 2 ;
(19)
Butler also states: 'The grants should simplify 
investment appraisal at a time when the corporation tax has 
complicated it' [27, p.178] .
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Chase, 34, p.38; Hochman, 115, p . 2 2 6 ] . However, Neild
suspects that firms overstate the problem to justify their 
avoidance of post-tax calculations. [192, p.36; quoted
supra] . Butler has suggested that 'one possible reason for 
the greater attention paid in public discussion to the 
"tax-saving values" of investment incentives than to their 
effect on estimates of profitability is that the latter 
involve more variable considerations' [27, p.177] . Since
the incentive effect of tax policy measures is conventionally 
defined in terms of their impact on profitability, this 
implies that uncertainty confines their ex ante influence to 
cash-flow calculations.
Some authors believe that incentive allowances may fail 
to stimulate investment because their effects are 
dissipated in other directions. For instance, a continuing 
impetus to investment from receipt of the allowances will not 
occur if the extra funds remain as higher liquidity, or are 
devoted to repayment of debt, etc. [Meyer and Glauber, 182, 
p . 2 5 6 ] . If a balancing allowance is available to recover 
from taxable income the undepreciated balances of existing 
assets at the time of their replacement, the incentive 
provided by accelerated depreciation for replacement is 
undermined. When replacement is considered, that is, the 
undepreciated balance will always be less if accelerated 
depreciation has been received. This increases the 
possibility of a balancing charge being assessed on sale of 
the old asset, and reduces the debit against taxable income 
if the latter is scrapped instead. Firms may not be
impressed by the reminder that tax has been saved in previous
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years through accelerated depreciation of existing assets. 
[Dobrovolsky, 49, pp . 913-4] . Finally, effects of the 
incentive allowances may be dissipated if they are claimed 
on purchases of productive assets for purposes of periodic 
tax assessments without the allowances having ever been 
considered in connection with the act of purchase itself.
The preceding analysis of determinants of corporate 
real investment behaviour strongly suggests that tax policy 
measures, such as investment allowances and accelerated 
depreciation, will largely fail qua investment incentives.
The reasons for this conclusion are those already discussed 
in connection with the corresponding conclusion about 
incentive effects of tax changes, with or without loss 
offset provisions. However, it is worth re-stating and, in 
some instances,amp1ifying them, in order to establish the 
necessary connections with the literature for and against 
the policy measures, and with empirical evidence on their 
effectiveness.
The policy measures make a genuine and valuable offer to 
reduce the cost of productive investment to firms or, 
equivalently, to raise the rate of return on given capital 
outlays. This offer is normally subject to availability of 
taxable income, but firms are usually able to carry-over 
unused allowances to later, or even earlier, periods. In 
economic terms the policy measures induce a rightward shift 
_____
This is largely a question of business awareness and 
uncertainty. However, it would also apply in cases where the 
allowances are considered irrelevant to the criteria in 
relation to which investment decisions are actually made. For 
instance, expected returns may not be influential in decisions 
regarding allocation of resources for investment. [Brown,
25, p.93; Chase, 34, p . 4 7] .
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in the marginal efficiency of capital and therefore, subject 
to the supply of capital schedule, cause increases in the 
desired capital-output ratio which necessitate additional 
inve stment.
In contrast this study asserts that investment is 
determined by managerial motivation and competence in 
conditions of uncertainty, and various market conditions 
which determine the need for investment in relation to 
existing capacity. A competent, ambitious management will 
regard the investment rate as a principal means of pursuing 
its self-interest, subject to market conditions and 
available opportunities. This type of management is 
interested in sustained growth with satisfactory profits. 
Investment decisions are not made primarily in terms of 
profit, however, owing to uncertainty and the availability 
of various proximate criteria, which express managerial 
self-interest in the particular circumstances of the firm. 
Investment incentives provided through the tax system are 
therefore not really necessary to encourage this 
management's desire to invest. It mainly only needs suitable 
market conditions to enable it to exercise its innate 
investment propensity. Reductions in the cost of investment 
through tax allowances appear as a windfall to this 
management.
At the opposite extreme is the management whose 
self-interest under uncertainty is not perceived in terms 
of growth, and whose competence is of a low order. This 
management will also not increase investment in response to 
incentive measures. It is slow to seek out and utilize
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opportunities, and its product-market scope is probably 
narrow and superficial. Asset replacement occurs in
response to physical breakdown rather than to improve 
productive efficiency. Profitability tends to be low, but 
management is insufficiently motivated or aware to take 
available steps, through investment policy and other means, 
to remedy this situation.
Between these extremes are managements with a host of 
combinations of growth motivation and competence. Subject 
to demand conditions and opportunities, as well as firms' 
endowment with resources of various types, investment rates 
will tend to depend on the particular combination in each 
case. It should not be expected that the policy measures 
will have significant influence on desires to invest, owing 
to the position of profit in relation to motivation and to 
the manner in which investment decisions are taken under 
uncer tainty.
Several authors have been cited in connection with the 
importance of market demand to the relation between 
investment rates and the policy measures. Domar, for 
instance, has stated: 'I doubt whether in a period like
1932-33 an initial allowance of even 100 per cent, would 
have induced much investment' [50, p . 2 1 3 ] . Given managerial
motivation, e t c . , the position of this study is that the 
policy measures are upstaged by market conditions. If the 
latter are unfavourable the policy measures are inadequate: 
if conditions are good the measures are unnecessary - at
least as investment incentives.
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Demand in existing markets emphasizes relief of 
production bottlenecks, maintenance of market shares, 
increased sales, e t c . : these are the ingredients of
managerial ambition and security in existing markets, and 
the criteria of investment decisions. In new markets the 
emphasis falls on growth motivation and common threads 
between a new area and existing business. Even given the 
necessary motivation, diversification cannot occur unless 
the firm is suitably equipped. Tax investment incentives 
should not be expected to supply a deficiency of either 
motivation or suitable knowledge for this purpose. It is 
also recalled that managerial unfami1iarity with new areas, 
together with other aspects of uncertainty, normally 
preclude exact consideration of profitability in the 
crucial early stages. Since even the full extent of the 
investment outlay is often not known initially, it would in 
any case be difficult to assess the effect of the tax 
measures. The real investment content of diversification 
entries depends considerably on circumstances and policy 
decisions, and managements do not necessarily view these 
projects only in relation to fixed assets on which tax 
allowances can be claimed. Diversification by acquisition 
may not even involve real investment directly.
Empirical evidence about firms' behaviour in the area 
of replacement, together with evidence about the impact of 
the tax allowances, provide perhaps the most telling 
indication of what may be termed the irrelevancy of the 
policy measures. Investment allowances especially have
favoured keen replacement policies [cf. Caves and Associates,
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32,p.60],which are desirable per se for purposes of productive
efficiency. However, the desired response does not seem to
have been forthcoming in many cases, not all of which are
explicable in terms of available resources being allocated
(2 1 )to expansion. Since replacement is, at least in
principle, further removed than other types of real
investment from considerations of expected demand, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that these deficiencies
(2 2)are largely attributable to managements themselves.
Even if individual managements are not particularly 
interested in maintaining the efficiency of capital stock 
by judicious replacement, fear of competitors' initiatives 
in the area of cost reduction may still provide the 
necessary spur to action. However, if whole industries 
demonstrate inertia in this respect (for example, by fixing 
product prices consonant with low levels of ef ficiency), or 
if particular firms discover market interstices in which 
they are sheltered from the need to reform themselves, this 
external impetus is absent.
In any case it appears that conditions for the policy 
measures to exercise an incentive effect are lacking, 
although the timing of replacement may be affected. Since
(2 1 )
See footnote 1 above.
(2 2 )
One must tread with special caution in evaluating the 
quality of British industrial management. Its 
indictment all too often rests upon a process of 
elimination: after more tangible factors have been
tried and found wanting as satisfactory explanations of 
inferior performance, British management incurs calumny 
by default [Caves and Associates, 32, p.300].
Their study then proceeds to review a damning dossier of 
evidence in support of the conclusion in the text. [ O p .c i t . ,
p p . 300-6] .
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this type of investment contributes to cost reduction 
directly, an efficient management (or one induced to embrace 
cost reduction by external pressures) tends to replace in 
accordance with calculations of relative operating 
advantage, subject to competing claims for available 
resources. In this case the policy measures exercise an 
opportunity effect (in the sense described in Section 5.2) 
to the extent that the above calculations are affected. 
Inefficient managements, however, are not interested in or 
aware of calculations of relative operating advantage. There 
would be neither an incentive effect nor an opportunity 
effect in such cases. More generally, the policy measures 
will have an opportunity effect on investment only to the 
extent that their impact on the costs of productive assets 
are regarded by managements as an important factor in 
decision-making. In practice this condition is likely to be 
narrowly bounded.
(23)
In 3.3(b) - p.174 - it was observed that undepreciated
balances of the cost of existing assets are irrelevant to the 
calculation of relative operating advantages of existing and 
new plant. This conclusion is not altered by imposition of 
a corporate income tax with associated incentive allowances, 
provided that both existing and new assets are subject to the 
same tax treatment. Brown's statement that, 'when the tax is 
imposed, the undepreciated cost of the old asset will affect 
the investment decision because it will affect tax 
liabilities' [22, p.307 ] , presumably refers to the problem of
financing replacements. See also Dobrovolsky [49, p p .910-2] .
(24) One case in which the policy measures could exert an 
opportunity effect involves the degree of project 
capitalization. Other things equal, tax allowances favour 
substitution of capital for labour. This effect is predicted 
by neoclassical capital theory as the result of a rightward 
shift in the marginal efficiency of capital after introduction 
of the policy measures. However, whereas effects of this 
shift are confined to marginal substitution of capital for 
labour in cases where such a course of action is not otherwise 
impractical, the theory is used to predict a general expansion 
in the desired capital stock in these circumstances (i.e. not 
confined to substitution). See footnote 18 supra.
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It is often considered difficult to judge what 
importance, if any, should be attached to uncertainty as a 
cause of business failure to take account of the tax 
allowances in decisions. It is also unclear whether 
uncertainty is important in relation to future tax rates 
(which determine the value of deduct ions), the future rates 
of the allowances themselves, or to the availability of 
taxable income from which to deduct the allowances.
Fundamentally the significance of uncertainty lies in 
inhibiting the comparison of alternative course of action on 
the basis of probability distributions of expected 
profitability. Decisions are thus made on the basis of 
other criteria because of uncertainty, as well as of 
objectives other than profit. The tax allowances are 
intended to restrict uncertainty by speeding up the rate at 
which investment may be deducted from taxable profit. This 
amounts to an opportunity effect, which is weakened if the 
allowances themselves are subject to uncertainty.
In Chapter 2, however, it was argued that, since there 
is an irreducible residue of uncertainty in most business 
decisions, it is more interesting and meaningful to 
concentrate on methods adopted by managements to make 'good' 
decisions in spite of uncertainty. It was concluded that 
managerial attitudes to (normal) uncertainty constitute an 
important indication of entrepreneurial competence. Thrusting 
managements, that is, do not allow their growth motivation 
to be deterred by the normal uncertainty attached to 
investment decisions, whereas conservative managements try 
to limit uncertainty by abstaining from investment.
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To the extent of normal business uncertainty, therefore, 
thrusting managements would not experience an opportunity 
effect from the policy measures; correspondingly they would 
probably not be very concerned by elements of uncertainty 
attaching to the allowances. Conservative managements which 
are yet sufficiently aware to consider new projects, on the 
other hand, may be encouraged by the security aspect of the 
allowances; and this encouragement may therefore be subject 
to reduction if the allowances are uncertain. Sleepy 
managements would fail to react either to the allowances, or 
to uncertainty about them.  ^2 ^
On the other hand, it may be argued that uncertainty 
does not excuse failure to conduct efficient asset 
replacement policies. If firms then continue to replace 
mainly in response to physical breakdown, and to demonstrate 
low rates of investment for expansion, despite generous tax 
allowances, perhaps the effect of the latter in relation to 
uncertainty is less important than some believe.
Alternatively firms may severely discount for decision 
purposes their expectation that taxable income will be 
available for purposes of recovering the costs of assets. (26) 
The effect of uncertainty on the relation between tax 
allowances and real investment is of considerable practical
(25)
If firms are subject to abnormal uncertainty which causes 
'confusion in choice', the opportunity effect on investment 
by conservative managements would tend to disappear. The 
natural propensity to invest of thrusting firms may also be 
temporarily inhibited. See the passage from Simon [228, 
p.57] quoted on p.100.
(26)
Evidence that a majority of firms employ the payoff 
period method of allowing for uncertainty may substantiate 
this latter explanation.
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interest. As previously stated, it was a principal official 
reason for replacement of investment and initial allowances 
by guaranteed cash grants in 1966 in the U.K. Whether, in the 
terms of this study, the new measure will succeed in 
providing an opportunity effect on corporate real investment 
where the previous allowances apparently failed, therefore 
seems to depend on the above effect.
Without making any prediction about the prospects for
success of the cash grants, it still appears that they do
not have much of an edge over the previous allowances for
(27 )purposes of alleviating business uncertainty. It is also
debatable whether an attempt to persuade managements to 
increase investment rates, by offering to relieve them of a 
part of (what is after all only) normal business uncertainty, 
is an effective or efficient method of instigating the 
economic purposes of the State. Policy measures whose 
impact is mainly permissive may fail to exert upon many 
managements the degree of leverage that would suffice to 
induce them to overcome habitual inertia in order to 
re-evaluate their self-interest in terms more acceptable to 
the policy-makers.
* ★ * * *
(27)
As Neild has observed, 'in fact changes [in the rates of 
the allowances] go both ways and, at most, the uncertainty 
would justify the use of the average rate of allowance 
experienced over a period. That is far from zero' [192, 
p . 3 6 ] . As already mentioned the rates of the cash grants 
may vary over time to the same extent as those of the 
allowances. Firms must also rely on availability of taxable 
income to recover the balance of asset costs as capital 
allowanc e s .
APPENDIX
A DIGEST OF THE DOMAR-MUSGRAVE ANALYSIS 
Main Conclusions
'An investment involves the possibility of a loss. It 
will not be undertaken unless the expected return appears 
sufficiently promising. In every investment decision the 
investor must weigh the advantage of a greater return, or 
yield , against the disadvantage of a possible loss, or r i s k . 
These two variables serve as tools for the analysis of the 
p r o b l e m .
'The effects of taxation upon risk-taking are 
analyzed in two steps: first, we consider how the imposition
of a tax, under varying conditions, affects the yield and 
the risk of an investment (or more correctly, of a whole 
combination of various assets) ; second, we inquire how the 
investor will react to these changes. That the tax reduces 
the yield, is entirely evident and has been much emphasized; 
but the equally important fact that the tax may also reduce 
the degree of risk has received little attention...
'By imposing an income tax on the investor,the Treasury 
appoints itself as his partner, who will always share in 
his gains, but whose share in his losses will depend upon 
the investor's ability to offset losses against other 
income. Three cases may be distinguished:
1. If losses cannot be offset, the investor carries 
the entire burden of the loss. The tax reduces the yield 
(and even by a higher percentage than the tax r a t e ) , but
266
App . 267
leaves the degree of risk unchanged, so that the compensation  
per unit of risk-taking is r e d u c e d . ..
2. If a complete offset of losses is possible, the 
result is very d i f f e r e n t . ..The yield and the risk of the 
investm ent have been reduced by the rate of the tax, so 
that the return per unit of r i s k - taking remains unchanged.
3. If only a partial offset of losses is possible,
the yield is reduced by a greater percentage than the degree 
of risk, and the results fall between those of cases (1) and 
(2 ) .
'How will the investor react to these changes in yield 
and risk, which the tax has produced? Prior to the tax, he 
was in an e q u i l ibrium position, which gave him the most 
adv ant ag eous c ombination of yield and risk available. After 
one or both of these variables are changed, he may wish to 
change his position, that is, take more or less risk. We 
again consider the same three cases:
1. Since, without loss offset, the yield is cut, while 
risk is unchanged, the comp e n s a t i o n  for risk -taking is 
reduced. R isk-taking has become less attractive, so that 
the investor will want to take less risk. But the 
re duc tio n in yield also means a lower income from his 
investments. To restore his income, the investor will try 
to take more risk, since risky investments can be expected 
to have a higher yield. These two forces are operating in 
opposite directions. Theor e t i c a l l y  the result is uncertain; 
pra ctical evidence would indicate that the investor is
likely to shift in the direction of less risk.
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2. If losses can be offset, and the Treasury assumes 
part of the risk, as well as the yield, a dist i n c t i o n  must be 
drawn between private risk (and y i e l d ) , which is carried by 
the investor and the total risk (and y i e l d ) , which includes 
also the share borne by the Treasury. It is the private 
risk (and yield) of an investment that is reduced by the 
tax; the total risk (and yield) remains, of course, 
unchanged. Since the private risk and yield are reduced by 
the same percentage, r isk-taking has not become less 
attractive. The inducement to take less risk, which was 
pr ese nt in the first case, has disappeared. The investor's 
income, however, has been reduced, and to restore it, he will 
take more risk, al though the private risk taken after 
adj us tm ent to the tax need not equal the pre-tax level. If 
the investor had retained the original asset combination,
its total risk would have remained the same. But since the 
investor was shown to adjust his asset combination so as to 
increase his private risk above the unad justed level to 
which it was lowered by the tax, total risk must have 
increased above the pr e-tax level.
3. Under conditions of partial loss deduction, the 
yield is reduced by a greater percentage than risk. Both 
forces will be o p e r ating as in case (1), and the outcome 
will be uncertain. But there appears little doubt that the 
higher is the rate of loss offset, the higher will be the 
degree of risk taken after the tax.
'A shift towards a more risky investment (or rather 
asset combination) may be acco mplished by reducing the
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pr o p o r t i o n  of the investor's total assets held in cash, that 
is, by larger total investment, or through a change from 
less to more risky investments' [52, p p . 388-91].
A ss um pt io ns
'For purposes of simplicity, our analysis is mainly 
concerned with the case of financial i n v e s t m e n t ,...In 
addition, the following assu mptions are made:
(a) a given amount of investment funds is available to the 
investor; (b) investments are divisible into small units, 
that is, "lumpiness" is excluded; (c) the investment market  
is pe r f e c t l y  atomistic, so that the investor can neglect the 
effect of his decisions on yields; (d) the investor's 
expectations, gross of the tax, are unaf fected by the 
imposit ion of the tax and by resulting government 
expenditures' [52, p.393] .
'For purposes of this a n a 1ysis . . .it is assumed that the 
investor will consider changes in y [yield] and r [risk] 
only' [52, p.397].
'Besides investments, the investor's asset 
c om bi na tion will also include a prop o r t i o n  of cash. Cash 
differs from investments by having a zero risk and zero 
yield. Cash h oldingsare riskless, since they can not give 
rise to losses. This is the case because o p p o r tunity costs, 
that is, income not received because investment
o p po rt unities were missed, do not enter our analysis. Losses 
or gains in the real value of cash, due to price changes, 
are excluded likewise, because the entire analysis is in
terms of cash' [52, p.400] .
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'The indifference map presented in Figure II and in the 
other figures is constructed on the basis of the following 
conditions: it is assumed, first, that for any individual
the marginal utility of income declines with increasing 
income, and second, that the marginal disutility of 
risk-taking rises with increasing risk. We also assume the 
marginal utility of income to be independent of risk and 
vice versa. Our analysis being limited to the immediate 
effects of a tax on investment, without regard for secondary 
effects such as changes in wealth, this assumption appears 
reasonable' [52, p.402] .
'If the marginal utility of income is assumed to be 
constant, the slopes of the indifference curves will be 
constant with increasing values of y for any given value of 
r. In other words, the curves will be horizontally 
parallel. If income utility is thus assumed constant, the 
second assumption (increasing disutility of risk-taking) 
must be applied, since the tax will produce no effects on 
risk-taking whatsoever, if both income utility and risk 
disutility are held constant' [52, p.403, n . 9 ] .
The Model
'To handle our problem, quantitative values for the 
yield and the degree of risk of an investment are needed; and 
in the absence of a better approach, they are obtained by 
means of a probability distribution which the investor will 
construct for each available investment opportunity. Each 
possible yield, positive or negative, will include the 
recurrent income from the investment (such as interest or
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d i v i d e n d s ) , as well as the change in capital value which the
investor expects to r e a 1 i z e ...Each expected yield will be
net of all m o n etary costs of investment. The dollar amounts
are tra nsformed into percentage yields on the amount
invested by a process similar to that used by Keynes in
de fin ing  the marginal effi ciency of capital...
'From the p r o b a b i l i t y  distr i b u t i o n  thus constructed,
the investor will compute the mathe m a t i c a l  expe ctation of the
p e r c en ta ge yields, to be indicated by y. It will prove
helpful in the following d i s c ussion to separate y into its
negati ve component r and its positive component g. Thus, if
q . , ...q, , q, , . . .q are the expected rates of return, such1 2 k k + 1 n
that q.<q. , and q, = 0, and if the p r o b a b i l i t y  of thel l + l k
oc cu rr en ce of q. is p . , so thatl l
n
I
i = l
(1)
(2 )
(3 )
1, we arrive at the following definitions:
k
i = k + l
n
y =  ^ q i P i = g - r
i = 1
'The magnitude of the actuarial value is not the only 
factor d etermining the investor's choice. Other 
cha r a c t e r i s t i c s  must also be considered, though for purposes 
of this analysis their number must be limited.
'Investment decisions  are made in spite of u ncertainty 
with respect to the relevant data and their implications.
No investor is sure that his estimated prob a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  is entirely correct, but the degree of
App . 272
u nc er ta in ty will vary with different investors and different 
investments. It will be a factor in the investment decision. 
Yet it is extremely difficult to express the degree of 
u n c e rt ai nty involved in workable terms. For our purpose it 
is sufficient to say that the p r e v alence of u n c e r tainty may 
induce the investor to require a somewhat higher return 
than would be required otherwise...
'Of all possible questions which the investor may ask, 
the most important one, it appears to us, is concerned with 
the p r o b a b i l i t y  of the actual yield being less than zero, 
that is, with the prob a b i l i t y  of a loss. This is the essence 
of r i s k . Since the investor is not only interested in the 
p r o b a b i l i t y  of a negative return, but also in the chances of 
suf fering losses of various magnitudes, the coefficient of 
risk should be defined more p r e c isely as...r, i.e. the 
sum mation of all possible losses m u l t i p l i e d  by their 
re sp ect ive pr o b a b i l i t i e s  as defined in (1)' [52, p p . 393-6].
'It should be noted that a d i s t i nction is made here 
between an investment c o m b i n a t i o n , which refers to that part 
of the investor's wealth which is not held in cash form, and 
an asset c o m b i n a t i o n , which includes both investments and 
cash. It will be convenient to assume, at first, that the 
investor intends to invest all his funds, and then to 
introduce varying holdings of cash. To the extent that the 
p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r ibutions of various possible investments 
are in dependent of one another, their c o m b ination will reduce 
the degree of risk in accordance with the usual prob a b i l i t y  
theory. But actually the prob a b i l i t y  d i s t r ibutions of most 
invest ments are somewhat interdependent, pr i m a r i l y  due to
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their common dependence on general business conditions. A 
careful selection of investments may thus be more important 
than the choice of a large number of different investments.
'Let the ordinate and abscissa of the points A and B 
in Figure I indicate the degree of risk and the yield of two 
di ffe ren t asset combinations consisting entirely of the 
inv es tme nts A and B respectively. Thus no cash is held at 
all. If the two investments are combined, the magnitudes  
of the r and y of each c o m b i nation will depend upon the r 
and y of the components, the ratio at which they are 
combined, and their degree of independence. If they are 
c om pl et ely interdependent, the magnitudes of y and r of the 
com bi na ti ons will equal the w e i ghted averages of the 
comp one nts and will hence be located on a straight line AB. 
If, as is more likely to be the case, they are more or less 
independent, the r of each comb ination will be more or less 
below the we ighted average of the r of the components. This 
reflects the principle that d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  reduces the 
disp er si on of a p r o b a b i l i t y  distribution. Therefore the r's 
and y's will fall on a curve such as ACB.
'Beginning with an asset c ombination cons isting of 
inves tments only, such as represented by a point C, the 
investor can move his c o m b ination towards the origin by 
increas ing the pro p o r t i o n  of his assets held in cash. The 
dotted curve CO d e s c ribed by this movement will be called 
the ca s h - i n v e s t m e n t  c u r v e . As the prop o r t i o n  of cash 
increases, the risk and the yield of the whole asset 
c om bi na ti on decline, since cash has zero risk and yield.
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FIGURE I
THE OPTIMUM ASSET CURVE
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The point C will move towards 0, not along a straight line, 
but rather along a curve of the type CO, since r falls faster 
than y. The reason is that as the proportion of cash in the 
asset combination increases, it becomes less likely that a 
forced sale under unfavorable conditions will be necessary. 
Therefore the risk of the investment combination will 
decline, while its yield may even rise.
'In order to find the best available asset combination, 
the investor will draw all possible cash-investment curves 
between each point indicating an investment combination and 
the origin, as shown by the dotted curves in Figure I. It is 
evident that for each level of risk there will be a large 
(infinite) number of asset combinations with varying 
proportions of the investments A, B and cash. Of these, 
however, only the one with the highest yield is relevant.
The locus of these points of maximum yield, AMO, is the curve 
which describes the investor's evaluation of the market 
situation and which is the principal tool for our analysis.
We shall call it the optimum-asset curve.
'In order to determine the investor's choice of the best 
position on the optimum-asset curve, a preference map between 
y and r can be constructed. Again y is measured along the 
abscissa and r along the ordinate. The essence of the map is 
a comparison between the investor's advantage of obtaining 
income and the disadvantage of jeopardizing his wealth. In 
our analysis both income and losses, measured in terms of _y 
and r, are expressed as percentage rates on a given dollar 
amount of wealth. Therefore, any changes in wealth will
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result in a change in the indifference map. But since the 
amount of wealth is assumed to be constant, changes in 
pe rc e n t a g e  returns are equi valent to c o rresponding changes 
in i n c o m e .
'Since the slope of each indifference curve, or the 
margina l rate of r i s k - t a k i n g , equals the ratio of the 
margin al utility of income to the marginal disutility of 
risk, the slopes of the indifference curves must be positive: 
an increase in y along any indifference curve must be 
a cc om pa nied by an increase in r and vice versa. The 
ap pl ic at ion of the two [preference] assumptions, stated 
above, to the pref erence map gives the indifference curves 
the following three properties:
1. The slope of any one indifference curve must be 
de cr ea si ng upward and to the right. This is the result of 
either one or both assumptions.
2. The slopes of the indifference curves must decline 
with increasing values of y for any given value of r - the 
result of the first assumption.
3. The slopes of the indifference curves must decline 
with increasing values of r for any given value of y - the 
result of the second assumption.
'The e q u i librium po sition of the investor can now be 
easily found by e s t a b lishing the point of tangency of the 
o p t i m um -asset curve, ABO, with one of the indifference
curves, as shown by point B on Figure II' [52, p p . 399-403].
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FIGURE II
THE EQUILIBRIUM POSITION
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Taxa tio n without Loss Offset
'Let the rate of the tax be indicated by t, (0<t<l) ,
and let y , r , and g indicate the m a g n itudes of these t t t
var ia bl es after the tax. From (1) and (2) it is evident that
(4) g t = g d-t)
(5) r t = r '
since by assumption, no losses can be deducted. Therefore,
(6) y = g (l-t)-r = y (l-t)-rt 
'From (6) we find that
(7) y t < y (1-t) .
Thus the rate of yield is reduced by a greater percentage  
than the rate of the tax. This, of course, should be 
expected, because all gains are reduced by the rate of the 
tax, while all losses are left unchanged. When t^ — , weg
obtain y 1 0. In other words, if the tax is sufficiently  
high, the rate of yield becomes zero or negative.
'Let a indicate the fraction by which y is reduced by 
the tax so that
(8 ) y-y.
Subst it uting the values of y and y^ _ from (3) and (6) , we 
obtain
(9 ) a - {1+ — }t .y
r'Thus, a is not a function of risk, but of — . Thisy
expr es si on may be called the degree of tax sensitiveness, and 
will be indicated by s.
'Figure III shows that s can be inte rpreted 
ge o m e t r i c a l l y  as being the slope of the line connecting any
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FIGURE III
TAX SENSITIVENESS
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point representing a given asset combination with the origin. 
It also demonstrates that the degree of risk and the degree 
of tax sensitiveness are different concepts, and that there 
is no apparent reason in general why a higher degree of risk 
should be accompanied by a higher degree of tax 
sensitiveness...It must be noted, however, that if a 
comparison is made among points located on the same 
optimum-asset curve, ABCO, a point with a higher degree of 
risk (B) will also be more tax sensitive than a point with a 
lower degree of risk (C) .
'As the yield is cut by the tax, the investor may wish to
change the asset combination chosen by him prior to the
imposition of the tax. The adjustment will depend upon both
the reduction in yields and the investor's preferences. It
will be the result of the income and substitution effects.
On the one hand, the tax will reduce the compensation per
unit of risk — , because y is reduced while r is left r
unchanged. The investor will therefore tend to take less 
risk. On the other hand, a reduction in y means that his 
total income is reduced, which will induce him to take more 
risk. The substitution and income effects will thus work in 
opposite directions, and the outcome will depend upon the 
circumstances of each case ... General opinion and empirical 
evidence would indicate, however, that a shift towards less 
risk appears more likely.
'A geometric analysis of the problem may permit some more 
definite conclusions. Let ABO (Figure IV) indicate the 
position of the optimum asset curve prior to the imposition
of the tax, and let B be the equilibrium point. When a tax
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FIGURE IV
NO LOSS OFFSET
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is imposed, each point of the asset curve suffers a reduction
in y, in accordance with its degree of tax sensitiveness.
It will move to the left along a horizontal line, since the
degree of risk remains unchanged by the tax. Thus, any
point F moves to F , F , etc., and so does the whole asset2 5 5 0
curve, ABO, which now becomes A„_B„_0, A^^B^^O, and so on,2 5 2 5  5 0 5 0
the subscripts indicating the rate of the tax. Because the 
tax sensitiveness of any point on the asset curve rises 
with risk, the upper part of the curve bends leftward as the 
tax rate increases, so that, as shown in Figure IV, its 
upper part becomes negative, if the tax is sufficiently 
heavy.
'The investor who before the tax was located at the
equilibrium point B, will, after a 25 per cent tax, find
himself at B__. This point is not an equilibrium position.2 5
He will therefore move up along the asset curve ^25B25^ to
the new equilbrium position located at the point of
tangency of ^25^25^ with an indifference curve, where his
risk will exceed that taken before the tax. In the case of
a 50 per cent tax, the corresponding adjustment would have
been a downward move from Brn to Crn. It should be noted50 50
that the price of risk-taking ^ falls (increases) as the 
investor moves up (down) the optimum asset curve, which 
produces a secondary substitution effect and acts as a check 
to his movement.
'Whenever an investor shifts to a more risky asset 
combination, he may do so by taking more risky investments 
or holding less cash or, most likely, by applying both
methods at the same time.
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'As the optimum asset curve moves to the left, the new
eq ui li br ium positions describe the curve BC C C 0 , which25 50 75
will be called the tax-asset curve (Figure I V ) . It first 
rises and then grad ually falls towards the origin. Its 
shape, p r o c eeding this time from left to right, can be 
exp lained in the following manner. If the return on 
ri sk -t aking is close to zero - that is, if market prospects 
are ex tremely poor - the investor will take little risk, if 
any. As the market improves, he will take more risk. 
Finally, as his income increases, due to improved market 
conditions, he may once more become less willing to take 
risk. The result is d eterm ined by the interaction between 
the sub stit ution and income effects' [52, p p . 403-7].
'The faster the slopes of the indifference curves fall 
as the rate of yield increases along any given horizontal 
line, that is, the more the investor's marginal rate of 
ris k- ta king is (inversely) affected by the size of his 
income, the sooner will the tax-asset curve begin to fall. 
Since an increasing tax rate makes the investor move from 
right to left, an investor who "tires" quickly of taking 
risk as his income increases, is more apt to shift to more 
risky investments as a result of the tax than is another 
investor whose w i l l i ngness to take risk is less affected by 
the size of his income. In the extreme case, the investor 
who insists on a given income, irrespective of the risk 
involved, will be taking higher and higher risk as the rate 
of the tax increases' [52, p.407, n . 4 ] .
'It follows that if an investor (with a given amount 
of wealth) is opti mistic about the market outloook, so that
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the optimum asset curve is further down and to the right, 
the effect of a tax on risk-taking is more favorable or less 
detrimental than in the case of a darker market outlook. If 
the tax is very heavy, the investor may prefer to hold his 
entire assets in cash.
'The subjective nature of the problem should be 
emphasized. The indifference curves, by their very 
definition, are only expressions of the investor's 
preferences, and the optimum asset curve represents his 
personal evaluation of the market situation. Since the same 
market situation may appear more favorable to one investor 
than to another, it is quite possible that a given tax may 
induce the more optimistic investor to take more risk, while 
driving his more pessimistic colleague out of the market.
But the general conclusion is likely to hold that a 
relatively low tax imposed under depressed economic 
conditions, when expectations are bad, may have more harmful 
effects on investments than a much higher tax imposed under 
more favorable conditions' [52, pp.407-8].
'As promised above, the argument is reconsidered on 
the assumption that the marginal utility of income remains 
constant with an increasing y, so that the indifference 
curves are horizontally parallel. In that case, there is no 
income effect. The tax asset curve moves downward 
throughout, and the investor takes less risk' [52, p.408, 
n . 5 ] .
Taxation with Full Loss Offset
'We shall now assume a complete offset of losses. This 
implies that the investor is assured of a sufficient amount
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of income derived from other sources (than the asset 
c o m b i n a t i o n ) , and that adequate prov isions for loss offset 
are made in the law. If he suffers a loss from his asset 
combination, he can then reduce his other taxable income by 
the ma gni tude of the loss. Thus, his total tax liability is 
dec re as ed by an amount equal to the loss m u l t iplied by the 
tax rate, so that this part of the loss is recovered. In 
other words, full loss offset means that whenever the 
investor suffers a loss, the Treasury reimburses him for a 
fraction of the loss equal to the tax rate. The Treasury 
thus becomes a partner who shares equally in both losses and 
g a i n s .
'Under these conditions, not only are the expected 
gains in the p r o b a b i l i t y  distr i b u t i o n  cut by a percentage 
equal to the tax rate, but all losses are reduced likewise. 
We there fore have from (1), (2) and (3)
(10) r t = r (1-t)
(I D  gt = g (l-t)
(12) yt = 9t -rt = y(i-t)
Thus, both the degree of risk and the yield are reduced by a 
p e r c en ta ge exactly equal to the rate of the tax. The 
qu est ion  of tax sensitiveness does not arise here at all, 
because all asset combinations (or investments) suffer the 
same p er centage reduction. These results are in sharp 
contrast with those of the preceding case, where no loss 
offset was possible, so that we may expect the investor's 
reacti on to be m a r kedly different.
'Before proc e e d i n g  further, we must make a distinction
betw een  total yield and private yield and between total risk
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and private r i s k . The imposition of the tax reduces the 
yield and the degree of risk which are left to the 
investor, or his private yield and private risk, in the 
manne r already described; but the total yield and the total 
risk of the given asset c o m b ination are entirely 
u na ff ec ted by the tax. The fractions of yield and risk which 
the tax takes away from the investor are simply transferred  
to the Treasury. The symbols y and r^ refer to private 
yield and degree of risk, respectively. Total yield and 
degree of risk, being unchanged by the tax, are still 
deno ted  by y and r. Since our main p r oblem is the effect of 
the tax on total r i s k - t a k i n g , not much use will be made of 
the di fference between y and y ^ ; but the d istinction between 
r and r will be extr emely important. This d istinction was 
not needed in the p r e c eding case, where it was assumed that 
no loss offset was possible. Since in that case the 
Tre as ur y did not share in risk, private risk and total risk 
were n e c e s sarily equal. From the point of view of the 
economy as a whole, it is, of course, total risk that is 
important, not private risk.
'Faced with a reduction in private yield and private 
risk, the investor will try to readjust his asset 
combination. His reaction can again be studied in terms of 
the income and substitution effect. This time, however, the 
tax pro duces no initial substitution effect, because the 
price of r i sk-taking{^} is unchanged, the yield and the 
degree of risk being reduced in the same proportion. The 
income effect will make the investor shift to an asset
co mb in ation with higher risk. This increase in private risk
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taken (though not necessarily to or above the private risk 
taken before the tax) also implies an increase in total 
risk, since from (10)
1
r ~~ r t ’ ------(1-t)
Thus we reach the important and somewhat unexpected 
conclusion that the imposition of the tax will increase the 
total risk taken.
'A geometric demonstration will help to clarify this 
result. Let ABO in Figure V be the position of the optimum 
asset curve before the tax, and let B be the optimum point. 
Since the imposition of the tax reduces y and r equally by 
the percentage of the tax rate, any point F on ABO moves 
to wards the origin along a straight line FO, covering a 
fraction of the distance from F to O equal to the tax rate, 
so that if the new position of F is F we have FF^/FO = t. 
Similarly, the entire curve ABO moves to a new position, 
A^B^O, and the investor, who prior to the tax was at the 
equilibrium point B, now finds himself at B^ _ .
'Finding himself at B ^ , the investor discovers that, 
while holding the identical asset combination, his net 
return (after tax) has fallen by a fraction equal to the 
rate of the tax, and so has his private risk. He will then 
find that he can improve his position by moving from B to 
C^ _, the point of tangency of the optimum asset curve, in its 
new position, with an indifference curve. Since, as shown 
before, the imposition of the tax will produce an income 
effect only, the point C must be above B . . .
App .
FIGURE V
FULL LOSS OFFSET AND CONSTANT TAX
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'From the fact that private risk taken after 
ad ju stm ent to the tax exceeds pr i v a t e  risk taken prior to 
this adju stment (although not n e c e s s a r i l y  private risk taken 
prior to the t a x ) , it follows that total risk taken after 
the tax will exceed total risk taken before the t a x . To 
find the total risk point, E^, c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to the private 
risk point C , we can either apply the formulae 
r = r^ l/(l-t) {and y = y^ _ 1/ (1 — t )} or draw the line C O and 
extend it to its i n t e r section with ABO, which gives the 
pos it io n of E^ _ . The total risk (and yield) of any optimum 
asset c ombination being unaf f e c t e d  by the tax, it is still 
rep re sented by its original p o s i t i o n  on the optimum asset 
curve. Since is above B , E must be above B' [52,
p p .409-13].
'Continuing the story of footnote 5, p.408, we must
review the argument on the a s s u m p t i o n  of a constant marginal 
uti lity of income. As explained in note 9, p.403, an
increas ing marginal d i s u t i l i t y  of risk - t a k i n g  must then be 
assumed. The con c l u s i o n  reached in the text that the 
imposit ion of the tax will increase the level of total risk 
taken still holds, because the price of r isk-taking is 
unchanged, while the marginal d i s u t i l i t y  of risk is reduced 
by the reduction in pr ivate risk' [52, p.413, n.l].
'The r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t ween the level of total risk and
the rate of tax remains to be considered. As the tax rate
increases, the op t i m u m  asset curve ABO moves towards the
origin, taking the p o s i tions A __B _ _ 0 , A B 0 , etc . , as shown on25 25 51) 51)
Figure VI, the subscripts indicating the corre s p o n d i n g  tax 
rates. The new e q u i l i b r i u m  pos i t i o n s  located at its tangency
A p p 2 9 0
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points with the indifference curves describe the already
familiar tax asset curve, This time, however,
this curve indicates only the private degree of risk (and
yield) taken by the investor under given tax rates, and will
be referr ed to as the private tax-asset curve.
'In Figure VI the private tax- asset curve first rises
with an increasing tax rate from B to somewhat beyond C._,2 5
and then falls towards the origin, this movement again
dep en di ng upon the investor's e valuation of market conditions
prior to the tax, and the shapes of the indifference curves.
Since the equal p e r c entage reduction of y and r leaves the
ratio ^  unchanged, it may appear surprising that the private
tax-a sse t curve should fall at all; that is, that under
certain conditions the investor should fail to recover the
degree of private risk taken before the tax. When a given,
say 50 per cent, tax is imposed, the investor will find his
original e q u i librium point B moved to B , and again
readjust his po s i t i o n  in the dire ction of increased private
risk by moving up along the new op timum asset curve
A 5 0 B 5 0 ^ ‘ the latter were a straight line passing through
the origin, he would be able to return to the original point
B, thus taking just as much risk as he did prior to the tax;
but as the slope of A B O  increases with increasing risk,5 0 5 0
the investor finds that the ratio diminishes as he goes up
along A B O ;  this secondary subs titution effect will 5 0 5 0
finally stop his upward movement. In the general case, it 
cannot be said wh ether any given tax will cause the investor 
to stop short of or exceed the private risk taken prior to
the imposition of the tax. But as in the p r e ceding case, a
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c o m p a ra tively favorable market and lower tax rate will be 
con ducive to a higher level of private risk.
'From the point of view of the economy, the question
whether the p r e -tax level of private risk is recovered is
rel at iv el y unimportant. What matters is the degree of total
risk taken jointly by the investor and the Government. By
ext ending the lines O C ^ ,  O C 5o' ° C 75' e t c * to their
int er se ction with ABO, we find the c o r r e sponding points
E , E , E , etc., indicating the degrees of total risk 25 50 75
whi ch will corr espond to the investor's adjustment to 
various tax rates. We have already proved that all these 
points must fall above the pre-tax equi librium B; it can be 
shown by a similar proof that the degree of total risk taken 
will be the higher the higher the tax rate. This, of course, 
is not an argument for a tax rate a pproaching 100 per cent. 
The simplifying assu mptions upon wh ich the c onclusion rests 
must be kept in mind. In addition, the results for the 
economy would obviously be chaotic, if the Government were 
to invite everybody to invest his funds in whatever project 
he chooses with a "no loss" (and "no gain") guarantee' [52, 
p p .413-5].
[The general case of taxation with variable loss 
offset, disc ussed by Domar and Musgrave in Section V (52, 
p p . 415-21), has been omitted from this D i g e s t ] .
A p p l i c a t i o n  to Corporate Real Investment
'The extent to which investors may utilize...
[l o s s - o f f s e t ] p rovisions depends upon the a vailability of 
other income. Here the p o s ition of various taxpayers differs
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greatly . A large c orporation or a large-scale financial 
investor may undertake a risky investment as a side line, 
and know that possible losses are covered by other income 
which is reas onably certain to be derived from the main 
line of business. It is not necessary, of course, that the 
losses should be realized in the form of capital losses; 
they may also take the form of a lower taxable income 
re sul tin g from d e p r e c i a t i o n  costs being charged against 
other income. Further, a large corporation is assured of 
the po ss i b i l i t y  of loss offset as long as the investment in 
quest ion  does not exceed the m i n imum net income (low as it 
may be relative to total invested capital) which the 
m a n a ge ment is r easonably certain to derive during the period 
of carry-over. Thus, if a public utility or a life 
insurance company were to make a small investment (small 
relative to other income from o p e r ations or interest on 
gil t- ed ged bonds) in a very risky venture, it could be quite 
certain of a loss offset, and would thus have a great 
adva nta ge over a small competitor who might consider the 
same venture. The d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  is even more flagrant in 
the case of loss carry-back, which gives an "old" 
co rp or ation (that is, a c orporation with past net income) 
the ce rtainty of possible loss offset, thus placing it in a 
very a dv antageous p o s ition as compared with a new company. 
Ine quities of this type will tend to increase economic 
concentration, and may lower the volume of new investment.
'It is evident that the tax law should be adjusted to 
create the most favorable possible condition for loss offset 
for all types of investors. This raises numerous technical
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pr obl ems  which are not considered in this paper. A careful 
analysis should be made of the length of the carry-over  
perio d required for this purpose, and, if nece ssary and 
feasible, unlimited ca r r y - f o r w a r d  of losses should be 
permitted, supplemented by a limited carry-back. The 
pos si b i l i t i e s  of averaging income over a period of years 
should also be explored, and the present differential 
trea tme nt of capital gains and losses, as well as the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of p r o v iding more flexible d epreciation 
schedules, should be examined. These co nsiderations by no 
means apply to the c orpora tion tax only, but are equally if 
not more important with respect to the personal income tax' 
[52, p p .391-2] .
'The prob a b i l i t y  approach as used here is more nearly 
app lic able to the case of the financial investor than to 
"real" investment decisions. The manager of a corporation  
about to decide which of his plants he should expand, and 
what equipment he should purchase, is conf ronted with fewer 
and more unique investment a lternatives than is the 
financial investor, and is thus unable to achieve an equal 
degree of diversification.  Certain c o n s i d erations which 
might be of little importance for the financial investor, 
such as those related to main t a i n i n g  competitive 
advantages, might be very significant for him. On the whole, 
however, it is likely that the rationale of real investment 
de cis ions would move along similar lines, and that the 
general conclusions here arrived at would also apply to the 
case of real investment' [52, p. 422] .
* * * * *
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